Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged by Lande, Robert H.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 34 | Issue 1 Article 2
9-1982
Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged
Robert H. Lande
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
Hastings L.J. 65 (1982).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol34/iss1/2
Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged
By ROBERT H. LANDE
Table of Contents
Page
I. Economic Effects of Monopoly Power: A Brief Overview 71
A. Allocative Inefficiency ................................ 72
B. Transfer of "Consumers' Surplus" from Consumers to
M onopolists .......................................... 74
C. Productive Efficiency and Inefficiency ................ 77
II. Congressional Goals ....................................... 80
III. The Sherman Act ......................................... 82
A. Improving Economic Efficiency ...................... 83
1. Allocative Efficiency .............................. 86
2. Productive Efficiency .............................. 89
B. Protecting Consumers from Unfair Transfers
of W ealth ............................................ 93
C. Other Goals .......................................... 96
1. Curbing the Social and Political Power of Trusts
and Monopolies ................................... 96
2. Protecting Small Businesses ....................... 101
D . Summ ary ............................................ 105
IV. The Federal Trade Commission Act ...................... 106
A. Improving Economic Efficiency ...................... 108
B. Protecting Consumers from Unfair Transfers of
W ealth ............................................... 112
C. Other Goals of the FTC Act ......................... 115
1. Preventing Unethical Business Practices ........... 115
2. Curbing the Social and Political Power of Trusts
and Monopolies ................................... 118
3. Protecting Small Businesses ....................... 120
66 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
D. Antitrust and Consumer Protection Synthesis ........ 121
V. The Clayton and Celler-Kefauver Acts .................... 126
A. The Clayton Act ..................................... 127
B. The Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act ................. 130
1. Improving Economic Efficiency ................... 131
2. Protecting Consumers from Unfair Transfers
of W ealth ......................................... 135
3. Additional Goals ................................. 137
C. Sum m ary ............................................. 140
VI. Comparison of Efficiency and Wealth Transfer Goals:
Analysis of a Horizontal Merger .......................... 142
VII. Conclusion ............................................... 150
Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged
By ROBERT H. LANDE*
Considerable dispute over the goals of the antitrust laws has sur-
faced in scholarly commentary on the subject.1 While it is unani-
mously agreed that Congress enacted these laws to encourage
competition, disagreement continues over Congress' ultimate goals.
2
* Attorney, Planning Office, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission.
B.A., 1974, Northwestern University; J.D., 1978, Harvard University; M.P.P., 1978, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
The opinions expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission, of any individual Commissioner,
or of the Bureau of Competition.
An earlier version of this Article appeared as an internal Federal Trade Commission
document in January, 1979. This Article has profited from the comments of a number of
lawyers and economists. Among those contributing were Richard Craswell, Kenneth Da-
vidson, Kathryn Fenton, Eleanor Fox, Judith Gelman, James Hurwitz, Thomas Jorde,
Heather Kirkwood, William Kovacic, Ronald Lafferty, Howard Marvel, Nancy Warder,
and Richard Zerbe. I am especially grateful to Neil Averitt for his invaluable assistance
with the introduction and the legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission, and,
above all, to John Kirkwood for his assistance on the entire project.
I. For excellent summaries of the arguments regarding the wisdom of a large number
of possible antitrust goals, see Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Polit-
ical and Social Goals ofAntitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1977); The Goals of.Anti-
trust: A Dialogue On Policy, 65 COLUM. L. RaV. 363 (1965). For the history of this debate,
see Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 377-82 (1965).
2. Nor has the Supreme Court resolved this problem. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330 (1979). The Court has stated on different occasions that the antitrust laws have
a variety of goals. The Court has never made clear which goals were meant to prevail under
what circumstances, or how conflicts among competing goals should be resolved.
Judicial uncertainty over the goals of the antitrust laws can be illustrated by Chief Jus-
tice Burger's opinion inReiter. Some of the Court's language implies that the antitrust laws
contain a strong preference for consumers: "It is in the sound commercial interests of the
retail purchasers of goods and services to obtain the lowest price possible within the frame-
work of our competitive private enterprise system .... Here, where petitioner alleges a
wrongful deprivation of her money because the price of the hearing aid she bought was
artificially inflated by reason of respondents' anticompetitive conduct, she has alleged an
injury in her 'property' .... [The treble-damages remedy was passed] as a means of pro-
tecting consumers from overcharges resulting from price fixing." Id at 339-43.
In the middle of this proconsumer pronouncement, however, the Chief Justice stated
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The importance of this debate was eloquently expressed by Judge Rob-
ert Bork:
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a
firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law-what are
its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give. Is the
antitrust judge to be guided by one value or by several? If by several,
how is he to decide cases where a conflict in value arises? Only when
the issue of goals has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent
body of substantive rules. 3
The prevailing view is that Congress intended the antitrust laws
only to increase economic efficiency.4 Others, however, contend that
Congress was largely motivated by a number of social, moral, and
political concerns. 5 This Article presents a third view, one suggested by
the antitrust laws' legislative histories.6 This Article will argue that
Congress passed the antitrust laws to further economic objectives, but
primarily objectives of a distributive rather than of an efficiency na-
ture.7 In other words, Congress was concerned principally with
preventing "unfair" transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with
market power. This Article will also demonstrate that Congress in-
that the legislative debates "suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer
welfare prescription"' (citing R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)). 442 U.S. at
343. Of course, Judge Bork concluded that the "consumer welfare prescription" embodied
in the antitrust laws includes economic efficiency and excluded any concern with wealth
distribution or any preference for consumers. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX ch. 2
(1978). (Judge Bork wrote the sources cited in this Article while he was still a professor.)
3. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 50.
4. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPALS AND THEIR APPLICATION 149 n.2 (1980); R. BORK, supra note 2; R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, (1976) (Judge Posner wrote most of the
sources cited in this Article while he was still a professor.)
5. Historian Richard Hofstadter wrote that "[t]he goals of antitrust were of three
kinds. The first were economic; the classical model of competition confirmed the belief that
the maximum of economic efficiency would be produced by competition, and at least some
members of Congress must have been under the spell of this intellectually elegant model,
insofar as they were able to formulate their economic intentions in abstract terms. The
second class of goals was political; the antitrust principle was intended to block private accu-
mulations of power and protect democratic government. The third was social and moral;
the competitive process was believed to be a kind of disciplinary machinery for the develop-
ment of character, and the competitiveness of the people-the fundamental stimulus to na-
tional morale-was believed to need protection." R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE
IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 199-200 (1965) [hereinafter cited as R. HOF-
STADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE].
6. This Article will not, however, discuss what the goals of antitrust policy should be.
It will merely attempt to ascertain the goals the Congresses that passed the antitrust laws
were attempting to further.
7. For an explanation of the distributive and efficiency effects of market power, see
mfra text accompanying notes 23-58.
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tended to subordinate all other concerns to the basic purpose of
preventing firms with market power from directly harming consumers.
The efficiency view has been espoused by a number of leading
commentators, who argue that the relevant legislative history and cases
reveal only one goal, the maximizing of economic efficiency.8 The use
of social, political, or other nonefficiency criteria in antitrust analysis,
they conclude, is not only unwise policy, but completely without legal
foundation .9 Sound analysis under this view consists solely of deter-
mining and implementing those actions within the scope of the anti-
trust statutes that maximize economic efficiency.10
A second group of analysts believe that in addition to enhanced
economic efficiency, various social, moral, and political goals were im-
portant to the antitrust laws' framers. These goals include promotion
of small business and creation of entrepreneurial opportunity," en-
couragement of local control over business,12 prevention of industrial
concentration,' 3 and the reduction of the political influence of large
firms and promotion of individual liberty.14 Not surprisingly, these
commentators often disagree over the specific values to be considered,' 5
and the nature of the role these goals should play.' 6
The view expressed in this Article is that the antitrust laws were
8. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4; R. Bon.K, supra note 2; R. POSNER,
supra note 4. Efficiency is defined and distinguished from other possible goals of antitrust
policy infra at text accompanying notes 33-61.
9. One leading exponent of this view is Judge Bork. In chapter 2 of The Antitrust
Paradox, he analyzes relevant legislative history with this question in mind. He concludes
that there is no support in the legislative history of the antitrust laws for the use of other
factors, and that the cases which indicate otherwise are incorrect. In addition, he identifies
reasons apart from his analysis of the legislative history for eschewing objectives other than
efficiency. R. BoRn, supra note 2; see also remarks of William Baxter, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice: "The sole goal of anti-
trust is economic efficiency." Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1982, at 28.
10. See, ag., R. PosERn, supra note 4, at 8-22 (Judge Posner agrees with Judge Bork
that antitrust laws should be used only to enhance economic efficiency, but differs with him
over which actions will best achieve this. Compare, for example, Posner's approach to pre-
dation analysis, id at 184-96, with Bork's approach, contained in R. BoRK, Supra note 2, at
144-60.).
11. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else
Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191 (1977).
12. Id.
13. Arnold, The Economic Pur.pose ofAntitrust Laws, 26 Miss. L.J. 207, 207-08 (1955).
14. Blake & Jones, supra note I, at 382-84.
15. Compare, eg., Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051
(1979), with Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, id at 1076.
16. For example, Pitofsky, supra note 15, and Schwartz, supra note 15, disagree about
whether noneconomic values should play a role only when the efficiency considerations are
neutral or whether they can be balanced against efficiency considerations.
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passed primarily to further what may be called a distributive goal, the
goal of preventing unfair acquisitions of consumers' wealth by firms
with market power. It should be stressed, however, that Congress did
not pass the antitrust laws to secure the "fair" overall distribution of
wealth in our economy or even to help the poor. 17 Congress merely
wanted to prevent one transfer of wealth that it considered inequitable,
and to promote the distribution of wealth that competitive markets
would bring. In other words, Congress implicitly declared that "con-
sumers' surplus" 18 was the rightful entitlement of consumers; consum-
ers were given the right to purchase competitively priced goods. Firms
with market power were condemned because they acquired this prop-
erty right without compensation to consumers. This Article contends
that the antitrust laws embody a strong preference for consumers over
firms with market power. 19
The Article begins by defining possible economic goals of the anti-
trust laws. Turning to the specific antitrust statutes, the Article first
analyzes the legislative history of the Sherman Act to demonstrate
Congress' motivations. 20 The Article next examines the legislative his-
tory of the Federal Trade Commission Act, concluding that its prohibi-
17. On balance, however, the redistribution effects of the antitrust laws probably favor
the poor. See infra note 37. See also Elzinga, supra note 11, at 1194-96.
18. Consumers' surplus is the difference between the maximum amount that a con-
sumer would pay and the price that he or she actually pays. Suppose that widgets are priced
at $2.00, the competitive price. Marginal consumers of widgets would be willing to pay only
this amount. Some consumers, however, would particularly desire widgets and willingly pay
more-as much as $3.00. These consumers receive $1.00 in consumers' surplus when they
purchase competitively priced widgets. If a monopolist gained control of the widget market
and raised the price of widgets to $3.00, marginal consumers would no longer purchase
widgets, and nonmarginal consumers would lose their surplus. The widget monopoly would
acquire $1.00 of monopoly profits at the expense of widget consumers. For a more detailed
definition, see E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 15 (4th ed.
1982); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 78-81 (1966).
19. Thus, although Congress was strongly interested in increasing the size of the eco-
nomic "pie" when it passed the antitrust laws, it was even more interested in ensuring its
"fair" ownership. It should also be observed that all purchasers were to be protected,
whether they were resellers, farmers or ultimate consumers. See infra note 123 & text ac-
companying note 137.
20. This Article will attempt to demonstrate that the Sherman Act was passed despite
the possibility that its enforcement might impair, to a small degree, the efficiency of trusts,
the form of industrial organization that in 1890 was thought to be most efficient. It argues
that the legislative history shows that the Sherman Act was passed for a number of purposes:
preventing monopolistic transfers of wealth from consumers to trusts, encouraging corporate
productive efficiency in order that consumers would receive these benefits as well, reducing
the social and political power of large aggregations of capital, and providing opportunities
for small entrepreneurs. Congress' more minor goals were not, however, meant to interfere
significantly with the right of purchasers to buy competitively priced goods.
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tion against "unfair methods of competition" could be restated, with
only some restriction in its intent or meaning, as a prohibition against
"unfair" transfers of wealth.21 A similar interpretation is then devel-
oped for the Clayton Act and its major extension, the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act.2 Each of these discussions focuses upon Congress'
distributive or wealth transfer goals, but also discusses Congress' effi-
ciency goals and other goals so as to place the distributive objectives in
proper perspective. Following the legislative history discussions, the
Article uses the example of a horizontal merger to illustrate some of the
differences that would result if distributive goals, in addition to or in-
stead of efficiency goals, were considered in antitrust analysis. Incorpo-
ration of Congress' distributive goals into antitrust analysis would
cause the antitrust laws to reach many more mergers and other monop-
olistic practices than does the present quest for efficiency in antitrust
decisions.
Economic Effects of Monopoly Power A Brief Overview
The observation that monopolies23 cause increased prices and re-
duced output is hardly new. This conclusion finds expression in early
English common law 24 and in classical economic theory. Adam Smith
noted that "The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-
stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their com-
modities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments,
whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural
21. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was charged, in § 5 of the Act, with
preventing "[ulnfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1914). The legislative
history of the Act shows that certain methods of competition were considered "unfair," but
not primarily because they might interfere with economic efficiency. Congress, in a single
phrase, condemned both monopolies and fraud as "unfair" methods of competition primar-
ily because each "unfairly" transferred wealth from consumers to firms with market power.
22. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976), is not discussed.
23. In this Article, the term "monopolies" will normally be used to include both in-
dividual firms with market power and cartels and trusts acquiring or exercising market
power. This Article makes no distinction between single-firm and multifirm market power
unless expressly noted.
24. See W. LETwIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLiCY IN AMERICA ch. 2 (1965). Even the
Bible recognized the impact of monopolies. See Isaiah 5:8 ("Woe to those that add house to
house/ And join field to field/ till there is room for none but you/ To dwell in the land");
Proverbs 11:26 ("He that withholdeth corn, the people shall curse him: but blessing shall be
upon the head of him that selleth it."). For an elaborate discussion of the biblical attitude
toward market power, see A. LEvINE, FREE ENTERPRISE AND JEWISH LAW (1980), especially
chapter 2, "Monopoly and Restraint of Trade."
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price." 25 By the time the Sherman Act was passed, economists were
able to prove that a monopolist pursuing its own best interests would
normally follow this course of conduct.26
Modem economists have, of course, made many important ad-
vances in the theory of monopoly.27 The most important development
may be the modern analysis of the implications of monopoly self-inter-
est, long recognized as including higher prices and restricted output.
These effects can be divided into three categories. The first, allocative
inefficiency, describes the misallocation of resources, which diminishes
the total wealth of society. A second effect is a transfer of wealth from
consumers to monopolists. The third involves the effect of monopolies,
and antimonopoly statutes, on firms' productive efficiency. These three
categories, the economic effects that might have caused Congress to leg-
islate to prevent firms from obtaining or increasing market power, are
examined here.
Allocative Inefficiency
Monopoly pricing reduces the total amount of wealth in society.
Because a monopolist produces less than would be produced under
competitive conditions,28 some resources that would otherwise have
been used to make the monopoly product will instead be used for other
purposes, ones that consumers value demonstrably less.29 This misallo-
cation of resources results in diminished satisfaction of society's wants,
and thus, in terms of what society values, a reduction of society's total
25. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 61 (Modern Library Ed. 1978) (1st ed. 1776).
26. For example, in his influential 1890 book, Princiles ofEconomics, Alfred P. Mar-
shall demonstrated that a monopolist will reduce supply to maximize profit: "The monopo-
list would lose all his monopoly revenue if he produced for sale an amount so great that its
supply price, as here defined, was equal to its demand price: the amount which gives maxi-
mum Monopoly Revenue is always considerably less than that. It may therefore appear as
though the amount produced under a monopoly is always less and its price to the consumer
always higher than if there were no monopoly." 1 A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF EcONOM-
ics 484 (lst ed. 1890). Interestingly, Marshall also observed that the monopoly price never-
theless can be lower than the competitive price, particularly in the long run, because the
monopolist can increase innovation without risking having to share the benefits of any ad-
vances made, be more efficient, waste less in advertising, or have greater access to capital.
Id
27. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18, chs. 10 & 11 (2d ed. 1975); F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ch. 2 (2d ed. 1980).
28. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18, at 277-92; F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at ch. 2; Stig-
ler, supra note 18, at 78-81.
29. Firms operating in a competitive market are forced to use their resources in a man-
ner that consumers desire most. Any deviation from competitive price and output decisions
will result in consumer demand being somewhat less satisfied.
[Vol. 34
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wealth. This effect is termed "allocative inefficiency."' 30 Elimination of
monopoly pricing would, ceterisparibis, increase society's total wealth
and, therefore, increase consumer satisfaction.31
Economists have almost universally condemned the allocative
inefficiency resulting from monopoly pricing.32 Before one can under-
stand why it is consistently viewed as "bad," however, the welfare crite-
rion that will be used as the appropriate standard must be defined.
Modem economists almost universally use "Pareto optimality" as
the appropriate welfare criterion.3 3 Under this standard, a change that
harms no one and improves the lot of at least one person in his or her
30. For a diagrammatic illustration of allocative efficiency, see infra text accompanying
notes 290-91. For a formal proof that monopoly pricing leads to allocative inefficiency, see
E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18, at 277-92; F. ScHERER, supra note 27, at ch. 2; Stigler, supra
note 18, at 78-81.
31. E. MANsFIELD, supra note 18, at 277-92; F. SCHERER supra note 27, at ch. 2; Stig-
ler, supra note 18, at 78-81.
32. In particular it is condemned by scholars of both the "Harvard" and "Chicago"
schools of analysis. See Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1214 (1974); see also 4
P. AREEDA & D. TuRmit, supra note 4; R. BoRr, supra note 2; R. POsNER, supra note 4.
This unanimity of views explains the prominence of allocative efficiency in the antitrust
literature. While it is theoretically very significant, there is evidence that it may be quantita-
tively less important. The first estimate of the loss to the American economy caused by
monopolistic misallocations was presented by Arnold Harberger in 1954. If the results of
Harberger's estimates were expressed in terms of 1982 dollars, they would be equal to ap-
proximately $12.00 per person per year. Harberger, Monopoly andResource Allocation, AM.
EcoN. Rnv. 77 (1954). This estimate is based upon a variety of assumptions. It is hardly
surprising that other economists arrive at different estimates, some of which are lower than
Harberger's, while others are larger (some even by a factor of 50). Scherer's review of the
evidence puts the figure "between 0.5 and 2 percent of the gross national product [between
approximately $50 and $200 per person per year] with estimates nearer the lower bound
inspiring more confidence than those on the higher side." F. SCHEREE, supra note 27, at 464
(footnote omitted). The more important question is what the magnitude of this loss would
be if there were no antitrust laws to act as both deterrent and corrective systems. It may be
impossible, however, to formulate a meaningful estimate of this figure.
33. See, e.g., E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18, at 57-8, 440, 459; E. PHELPS, ECONOMIC
JUSTICE 12 (1973); F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 595-96.
Other welfare criteria exist, see E. PHELPS, supra, at 12, and a few economists and phi-
losophers reject the Pareto principle, considering it inadequate or irrelevant. For example,
some believe that it is impossible to hold liberal (or libertarian) values, and at the same time
accept the Pareto principle. See Peacock & Rowley, Pareto Optimality and the Political
Economy of Liberalism, 80 J. PoL ECON. 476 (1972); Sen, The Impossibility OfA Paretian
Liberal, 78 . POL. ECON. 152 (1970). Like all welfare criteria, Pareto optimality ultimately
is subjective; no one is compelled logically to accept it or its economic implications. As all
modem economic analysis is based on one or another subjective welfare criterion, philo-
sophically the results of any such analysis inherently are subjective. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that Pareto optimality represents the theoretical underpinnings of almost all mod-
em economic analyses of the effects of antitrust actions.
September 1982]
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own opinion is considered an improvement. 34 The most commonly
used version of Pareto optimality, however, recognizes that virtually
any change is likely to harm at least one person. Thus, a Pareto im-
provement is usually defined to include a change that would benefit at
least one person and would, through the use of transfer payments, si-
multaneously eliminate any harm to others. 35 Because all modem eco-
nomic analysis is based upon this, or upon some other subjective
welfare criterion, it must be observed that every result of "objective"
modem economic analysis is, in some philosophical sense, subjective.36
Economic theory has established that monopolies cause allocative effi-
ciency and therefore violate Pareto optimality. Monopoly pricing, as
measured under Pareto optimality, thus harms social welfare, unless
some other characteristic of monopolies creates offsetting advantages.
In summary, monopoly pricing leads to allocative inefficiency that
virtually every antitrust scholar criticizes as harmful to society. We
now turn to a discussion of the other effects of monopolies and an-
timonopoly statutes.
Transfer of "Consumers' Surplus" from Consumers to Monopolists
The most visible and obvious result of monopoly pricing is a trans-
fer of wealth from purchasers to the monopolist; consumers become
poorer while the monopolist becomes richer.37 The relative size of the
34. V. PARETO, MANUAL D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (1909). There are several variations
and restatements of this principle. See, e.g., E. PHELPS, supra note 33, at 12.
35. E. PHELPS, supra note 33, at 12. In fact, many economists assume that a transfer
payment can be made so that all or most losers will be compensated. For this reason they
ignore distributive results. Other economists recognize that certain public policy actions
inevitably help some people and hurt others, and decline to make the necessary interper-
sonal comparisons of utility. For a superb general discussion of the disinclination of "posi-
tive" economists to consider distributive effects, see Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or
Politics, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 905 (1980).
36. See supra note 33.
37. Scherer concludes that "the redistribution associated with monopoly for the entire
economy is... probably between 2 and 3 percent of GNP." F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at
471. Comanor and Smiley, in Monopoly and the Distribution of Wealth, 89 Q.J. ECON. 177
(1975), report that, if there had been no monopoly profits, the share of total personal wealth
controlled by the wealthiest 2.4% of American families in 1962 would have been reduced
from 40% to somewhere between 16.6 and 32%. Id at 191-93. See the discussion in F.
SCHERER, supra note 27, at 472-73.
It should be noted that wealth redistribution caused by monopolies does not always
transfer wealth from poor consumers to rich stockholders. Monopolized products almost
always will be purchased by at least some consumers who are richer than at least some
stockholders. On balance, however, the redistributive effects of the antitrust laws would
seem to favor the poor. But, as the legislative histories indicate, the legislators passing these
laws were concerned with preventing transfers from consumers to monopolists and did not
premise these statutes on redistribution from rich to poor. See infra notes 110-23, 181-90,
[Vol. 34
transferred wealth and the allocative inefficiency will vary considerably
from case to case depending upon a number of factors.38 Under mar-
ket conditions most likely to be encountered, however, the transferred
wealth usually will be between two and forty times as great as the ac-
companying allocative inefficiency.39 Thus, the redistributive effects of
market power generally exceed the allocative inefficiency effects by a
substantial amount.
The two principal effects of monopolistic pricing, the transfer of
wealth from consumers to monopolists and the decrease in allocative
efficiency, are different in one fundamental manner: the latter repre-
sents a decrease in society's absolute wealth, while the former merely
redistributes that wealth. As Professor Williamson has observed,
"[t]his [redistributive] transformation of benefits from one form (con-
sumers' surplus) to another (profit) is treated as a wash under the con-
ventional welfare economics model."'4
Nevertheless, this transfer of wealth raises a very controversial
question: is the transfer a "good," "bad," or neutral result of monopoly
pricing? The value-laden answer in large part is determined by
whether anyone is thought to be entitled to the economic benefit of the
"consumers' surplus." Under monopoly pricing, some consumers' sur-
plus is acquired by the monopolist. Depending on one's perspective,
one can be entirely indifferent to the result, or one can conclude either
that the monopoly is "unfairly taking" property from consumers, or
267-74 & accompanying text. This redistributive process will also, of course, affect the total
distribution of wealth in our society. For example, a yacht cartel with numerous stockhold-
ers might help to even the distribution of wealth, while a cartel that sells to poor people
would probably act to skew the distribution. Questions concerning the fairness of the redis-
tributive process are, however, different from questions concerning the initial or final distri-
bution of wealth that the process produces.
38. These factors include the shape of the demand curve and the amounts by which the
monopolist restricts output and raises prices.
39. Under certain standard assumptions the wealth redistribution can be shown to be
exactly twice as large as the allocative inefficiency. These assumptions include a straight line
demand curve and constant marginal costs. See Schmalensee, Another Look at Market
Power in Antitrust, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1787, 1805 (1982). Under circumstances more likely to
be encountered, the wealth transfer probably will be much larger relative to the allocative
inefficiency. See Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 91 YALE
LJ. - (1982).
40. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 699,
711 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, Economies Revisited]. Areeda and Turner simi-
larly wrote that their analysis of Williamson's merger example "assumes that the income
transfer from consumers to producers is neutral." 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4,
at 149 n.2. Landes and Posner wrote that "[w]e ignore possible distributional objections to
monopoly, as both controversial and difficult to quantify." Landes & Posner, Market Power
in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937, 954 (1981).
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that the monopoly is only reaping its just reward.41
The redistributive effects of monopoly power are clearly good or
bad only with respect to the assumptions and welfare criteria that are
used to evaluate them. Condemnation of the direct consumer impact
of monopoly power is therefore normally and properly termed "subjec-
tive" or a "value judgment," because it is based upon a preference for
consumers over monopolists.
This Article argues that Congress decided that consumers were en-
titled to the benefits of a competitive economic system. Consumers
were deemed entitled to the "consumers' surplus" because Congress re-
garded the competitive scenario as the normal one.42 Monopoly pric-
ing represented a change from the norm which Congress condemned as
an "unfair" taking of consumers' property.43
This congressional decision does not, moreover, violate the impor-
tant principle of Pareto optimality. Before one can evaluate an im-
provement under the Pareto principle, the initial distribution of
entitlements or property rights must be defined. 44 Assuming that Con-
gress decided consumers were entitled to consumers' surplus, condem-
nation of monopolistic extractions of wealth does not violate Pareto
optimality because the monopoly is unfairly taking property from con-
sumers and, as a practical matter, no compensating transfer payments
by monopolists to consumers are made.45 Condemnation of monopoly
pricing can thus be justified as the only practical method of preventing
monopolies from "unfairly" taking property that, in the view of Con-
41. We could conclude, for example, that in order to provide firms the incentive to
compete vigorously, we should permit them to earn monopoly profits.
42. It appears that Congress considered the distribution of wealth that would result if
there were no monopolies as the more nearly "just" distribution. See infra notes 114-22,
181-90, 267-75 & accompanying text.
43. Not all of the consumers' surplus is taken by monopolies. Some is left with the
consumers; some is destroyed (allocative inefficiency).
44. See supra note 33 & accompanying text.
45. Nor does allowing monopolization constitute a taking of property that could be
substantially, even if not completely, rectified by transfer payments. If it could be shown
that allowing monopolization helped 90% of society, and if 90% of the consumers harmed by
monopolization could be compensated through transfer payments, society would almost cer-
tainly not condemn monopolization even though, strictly speaking, the change from compet-
itive to monopoly pricing was not a Pareto change. The existence of allocative inefficiency,
however, makes it extremely difficult to show that allowing monopolies generates more ben-
efits than losses. Further, as a practical matter, the only way to make these transfer pay-
ments is through government regulation of the monopoly or through a complicated taxation
and rebate plan, actions that are likely to cause so much waste and inefficiency that any
gains from permitting monopolies would be dissipated. As it cannot be shown that most
consumers would be compensated for their lost consumer surplus, the policy presumption
should be in favor of allowing them to keep their property.
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gress, belongs to consumers.46
Even if a condemnation of monopolistic transfers from purchasers
to producers does violate Pareto optimality, this violation would not
undermine the thesis of this Article. Pareto optimality, on which the
condemnation of allocative efficiency is based, is itself a subjective
standard which almost every modem economist is willing to accept.47
No member of Congress, however, when subjectively designing or vot-
ing for any antitrust law, was, or is, under any compunction to be held
to the Pareto principle. Similarly, it may or may not be wise social
policy to design antitrust laws to prevent certain transfers of wealth; the
decision, however, belongs to Congress.4 8
In summary, considerable controversy exists over the proper treat-
ment of monopolistic transfers of wealth. This Article contends that
Congress believed consumers were entitled to products priced at com-
petitive levels and to the opportunity to buy the quantity of products a
competitive market would offer. The Article argues that when Con-
gress passed the antitrust laws it condemned the use of market power to
interfere with these property rights or entitlements out of an explicit
antimonopolistic, proconsumer bias.4 9
Productive Efficiency and Inefficiency
Monopoly power most directly affects the allocative efficiency and
wealth distribution throughout our economy. However, monopolies
have a host of other effects, positive and negative, on the productive
46. Further, the antitrust laws might not violate Pareto optimality if society believed
that one way to prevent revolutions or the spread of communism or fascism was to prevent
monopolistic transfers of wealth. See infra notes 125-42, 275-84 & accompanying text.
47. See, ag., E. MANSFIELD, supra note 18 at 457-60; E. PHELPS, supra note 33, at 12; F.
ScHERER, supra note 27, at 595-96.
48. It is possible that many congressional actions violate the Pareto principle. For ex-
ample, suppose that Congress believed that, in certain circumstances, a poor person valued a
marginal dollar more than a rich person. Congress might judge that society as a whole
could be made better off by taxing the rich to provide welfare payments. Congress' desire
for equality or other notions of justice might at times prevail and override its desire for
efficiency. Pareto optimality also might be rejected if Congress believed that the existing
distribution of wealth was not a "fair" one. For example, suppose that a certain business
practice, without taking any wealth away from anyone in absolute terms, produced a large
increase in the yearly GNP, but gave the increase to the richest .01% of the population, or,
alternatively, only to white Americans. Further, suppose that transfer payments, as a practi-
cal matter, could not be made. This business practice would satisfy Pareto optimality and
yet, in the eyes of many, could be socially undesirable.
49. Congress believed that consumers, in other words, were entitled as a matter of right
to the range of options that free competition would produce.
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efficiency of an economy.50 Whereas allocative efficiency concerns
overall placement of resources in the economy, productive, or techni-
cal, efficiency refers to individual firms' use of their resources in the
most effective manner. Productive efficiencies, whether in innovation,
purchasing, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, or transportation,
are crucial to any economy.51
Firms' desires to become monopolies can lead to important pro-
ductive efficiency gains. The desire to earn monopoly profits often
motivates businesses to compete energetically, to lower costs and prices,
and to improve the quality of their product. Additionally, two or more
firms often desire merger or combination to take advantage of large
scale or multiplant economies, thereby improving their own efficiency
and competitive posture. Any statute that, for other reasons, forbids or
discourages mergers, the formation of monopolies, and even cartels,
sacrifices these important advantages to some degree.
However, monopolies can simultaneously negatively affect pro-
ductive efficiency. Sir John Hicks observed in 1935 that monopolists
"are likely to exploit their advantage much more by not bothering to
get very near the position of maximum profit, than by straining them-
selves to get very close to it. The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet
life." 52 More recently, other economists have written that inefficiencies
result when a monopolist is shielded from hard competition,53 and that
waste is caused by non-price competition to obtain monopoly profits.54
50. Productive efficiency is probably that type of efficiency which most commonly
comes to mind when one thinks of business efficiency.
51. For more complete definitions of productive and allocative efficiencies, see E.
MANSFIELD, supra note 18, at 1, 4-6; F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 13-21.
52. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Mfonopolyv, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935).
53. See, e.g., Liebenstein, Allocadive Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 AM. ECON. REV.
392 (1966). Professor Liebenstein argues that the motivations and incentives of workers and
managers are different when their firm does not have to face competition: "In situations
where competitive pressure is light, many people will trade the disutility of greater effort, of
search, and the control of other peoples' activities for the utility of feeling less pressure and
of better interpersonal relations. But in situations where competitive pressures are high, and
hence the costs of such trades are also high, they will exchange less of the disutility of effort
for the utility of freedom from pressure, etc." Id at 413.
Similarly, monopolies can create "organizational slack" by tolerating inefficiency and
waste. Without the discipline of competition, monopolies may have less incentive to cut
waste and to search for ways to reduce costs. They may have the discretion to make only a
comfortable profit and to tolerate a substantial amount of "fat" in their organizations and
thus further waste society's resources. Some economists believe that it is "eminently plausi-
ble" that inefficiencies resulting from weak competitive pressures "are at least as large as the
welfare losses from [allocative inefficiency]." See F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 466.
54. Judge Posner hypothesized, "[A]n opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer pay-
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Similarly, some evidence suggests that the existence of monopolies
might curtail overall research and innovation 55 or lead to other unde-
sirable economic consequences.5 6
As this brief discussion demonstrates, monopolies both positively
and negatively affect the productive efficiency of our economy. It thus
becomes very difficult to know when the existence of monopolies, or,
conversely, the existence of antitrust statutes, ultimately benefits soci-
ety.57 Further, because monopolies also create allocative inefficiency
and affect society's distribution of wealth, an overall welfare-analysis of
the desirability in various instances of permitting firms to obtain or re-
tain monopoly power becomes extremely complex and involves subjec-
tive judgments that transcend conventional economic analysis.58
ment in the form of monopoly profits will attract real resources into efforts by sellers to
monopolize, and by consumers to prevent being charged monopoly prices. The costs of the
resources so used are costs of monopoly just as much as the costs resulting from the substitu-
tion of products that cost society more to produce than the monopolized product." R. Pos-
NER, supra note 4, at 11. Judge Posner theorized that part or all of a firm's monopoly profits
could be dissipated by its wasteful nonprice competition to achieve or protect its monopoly.
In addition, he pointed out that this effect might also cause consumers or actual or potential
competitors of the monopolist to waste resources as well. Id at 11-12; see also Posner, The
Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. PoL EcoN. 807 (1975). Professors Caves
and Porter similarly believe that monopolies may channel their competitive activities into
activities such as advertising to create entry barriers that help to preserve their monopoly
position. Caves & Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers Conjectural Decisions
and Contrived Deference to New Competition, 91 Q.J. EcON. 241, 245-54 (1977). Of course,
many economists do not believe that this occurs to a significant degree and believe that
monopolies consequently continue to enjoy their full monopoly profits. See supra note 37.
But if this effect does occur, some or all of the resources that otherwise are thought to be
transferred from consumers to the monopolist instead would be wasted by the monopolist
and would increase the absolute cost to society of monopoly power. See generally Rice &
Ulen, Rent-Seeking and Welfare Loss, 3 REsE ACH L. ECON. 53 (1981).
55. See, ag., Kamien & Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey, 13 J.
ECON. Lrr. 1 (1975).
56. Some believe that monopolies overpay their executives or rank-and-file employees.
See the discussion of those and other allegations in F. SCHERER, supra note 27, at 471-73. It
is even possible that monopolistic redistributions of wealth might adversely affect employee-
consumers' sense of justice and their feeling that they are obtaining their fair share of soci-
ety's wealth. If so, the accompanying frustration could deaden work incentives and lead to a
loss in productivity.
57. Even if monopolies benefit society by resulting in a net increase in society's wealth,
and side payments (through the tax laws, for example) in theory could be made which would
leave consumers better off despite the redistributive effects of monopolies, one could still
justify having antitrust laws on the ground that side payments are, as a practical matter, too
difficult to make.
58. The difficulties of analyzing the efficiency and distributive effects of monopoly
power are illustrated by presenting an analysis of a horizontal merger that might yield pro-
ductive efficiencies yet lead to a firm with monopoly power. See infra notes 287-309 &
accompanying text.
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However modem economists may resolve the issue, it is clear Con-
gress has determined that, in certain circumstances, firms should be
prevented from obtaining monopoly power. Keeping in mind the cata-
logue of possible economic effects of monopoly power and the possible
economic reasons that Congress might have condemned these firms
when it passed the antitrust laws, the following sections of this Article
will examine the legislative histories of the major antitrust statutes to
discern the true underpinnings of congressional intent.
Congressional Goals
It is axiomatic that when the words of a statute are clear and un-
ambiguous, courts need go no further in their interpretation of that
law.59 Ambiguous, doubtful, or undefined words or phrases require in-
terpretation, however, by reference to the statute's legislative history.60
Examination of a legislative history generally seeks determination of
legislative intent regarding particular applications of the statute. The
analysis often goes one step further in an attempt to determine what
legislative intent "would have been" had Congress considered situa-
tions never actually contemplated. 61
59. "[W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of
the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations drawn
...from any extraneous source." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917).
60. Indeed, even the term "legislative history" needs clarification. The term can mean
a narrow analysis of the history and progress of a bill in a legislative assembly. Alterna-
tively, "legislative history" can mean an analysis of the condition of the times when the bill
was passed, and an analysis of the factors which led to its passage. This Article uses the
latter definition. For a more complete discussion of courts' reliance on legislative histories
in interpreting acts, see Limbaugh, Historic Origins ofAnti-Trust Legislation, 18 Mo. L. REV.
215, 215-17 (1953); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitu-
tion, 49 U. CHi. L. REv. 263 (1982).
61. For example, in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), a case involving antifraud
provisions of the Security Acts, Judge Friendly noted: "We freely acknowledge that if we
were asked to point to language in the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that com-
pelled these conclusions, we would be unable to respond. . . .Our conclusions rest on case
law and commentary. . . and on our best judgement as to what Congress would have wished if
these problems had occurred to it." Id at 933 (emphasis added). As Judge Bork noted, "[a]
legislature may never address the issue of ultimate policy goals and yet write a law whose
various categories and distinctions can be explained only by a particular policy. That policy
may then quite legitimately be said to have been intended by the legislature, even though
not a single member articulated it even to himself. A system of classifications has implica-
tions, and the legislature must be taken to intend not only what it says but also what is
implied by what it does." R. BoRc, supra note 2, at 57.
The Supreme Court, in Minnesota Mining v. N.J. Wood Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1964),
quoted an earlier statement by Justice Holmes: "[lit is not an adequate discharge of duty for
courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we
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The antitrust laws are among the least precise statutes enacted by
Congress. The central terms, including "competition," "unfair meth-
ods of competition," "conspiracy in restraint of trade," and "monopo-
lize," are inherently vague and not self-defining. 62 One commentator
has observed that antitrust legislation has, perhaps more than any other
field, stimulated the courts to consider, as an interpretative aid, the his-
tory of the era that gave rise to the legislation.6 3
It is not possible to ascertain with certainty the original goals of
the antitrust laws. Not only are there conflicting statements of legisla-
tive purpose, but it is often difficult to decide whether certain state-
ments represent isolated, unimportant views 6 4 or infrequently
mentioned but nevertheless significant motivating factors.65 Therefore,
this Article cannot hope to resolve every conflict, but it does attempt to
generally reconcile the evidence to determine the common spirit, goals,
policies, and purposes underlying the antitrust laws, and to develop an
appropriate decisionmaking theory with which to analyze antitrust
cases.66 This judgment will by necessity be relative instead of absolute.
shall go on as before." Id at 321 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir.
1908)).
62. No attempt will be made here to list those cases in which the courts have examined
the legislative history of the antitrust laws in order to ascertain what Congress "would have
wished" if the problems had occurred to it; such a list would be unbearably long. Good
compilations of cases which examine the legislative histories of the antitrust laws, as well as
comprehensive legislative histories of the antitrust laws can be found in E. KITNER, THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES (1978);
H. THORELLi, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955); 1 A. TOULMiN, TREATISE ON THE
ANTI-TRUST LAws OF THE UNITED STATES AND INCLUDING ALL RELATED TRADE REGU-
LATORY LAWS 1-23 (1949).
63. Limbaugh, supra note 60, at 217.
64. An example of just such a remark in the FTC Act legislative history would, hope-
fully, be where Senator Kenyon quoted Senator Martine for the proposition that "everybody
should be permitted to kill one lawyer and not be punished for it." 51 CONG. REc. 13,196
(1914).
65. Although it may be assumed that the legislators meant what they said during the
floor debates, their statements might at times mask their true intentions. Further, some
statements can be best classified as political rhetoric. For example, legislators might have
stated that they condemn monopolization out of a concern for consumers when they actually
were more concerned with providing small businesses fair opportunity to compete. Some
Congress members might have supported weak antitrust legislation in order to protect large
predators from stronger remedies. For a cynical view of relevant economic history see G.
KOLKO, THE TRiuMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1973).
66. As Judge Bork noted in his examination of the legislative history of the Sherman
Act, the task of ascertaining legislative intent should not be "an attempt to describe the
actual state of mind of each of the congressmen who voted for the Sherman Act but...
merely an attempt to construct the thing we call 'legislative intent' using conventional meth-
ods of collecting and reconciling the evidence provided by the Congressional Record."
Bork, Legislative Intent and The Policy of he Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7, 7 n.2 (1966).
September 1982] GOALS OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
We can only make our most informed decision as to Congress' true
intentions. And, although current antitrust decisionmakers have some
degree of discretion in interpreting the antitrust laws, this discretion
must be bounded by Congress' desires. This examination of congres-
sional intent proceeds chronologically, because the earlier antitrust
laws, and the Sherman Act in particular, laid out Congress' most fun-
damental antitrust policies.
The Sherman Act
From the language of the Sherman Act,67 its legislative history,68
and the history of late nineteenth century America,69 it is clear Con-
gress was concerned about those activities of trusts and monopolies that
unduly restrained trade or caused a monopolization of interstate com-
merce. It is equally clear that with the Sherman Act "'Congress was
dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly,
which it sought to prevent.' "70 These truisms do not, however, reveal
why Congress passed the Sherman Act, or what goals it attempted to
implement. If the goals of the antitrust laws are to be understood, the
Since most legislation is passed by a coalition whose members have very different interests, a
complete reconciliation of every legislator's views is often impossible.
For the purposes of this Article, the historical methodology will be as follows: The
statements that support a particular goal or policy will be identified, and given weight ac-
cording to the relative importance of the speaker, and the strength of his sentiments. They
will be balanced against opposing or contradictory legislative statements. If this calculation
reveals a preponderance of evidence which favors a particular policy, then it will be as-
sumed that the policy can be ascribed to Congress as a whole. If, however, there are only a
few comments by less important legislators on a particular issue, the remarks will be cited
but then ignored and it will be assumed that Congress did not articulate a policy toward that
issue.
67. The Sherman Act condemns "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... "
Sherman Act, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)). It provides
punishment for "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States. Sherman Act, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
68. For comprehensive sources on the legislative history of the Sherman Act, see E.
KITNER, supra note 62; H. THORELLI, supra note 62; A. TOULMIN, supra note 62; Bork, supra
note 66.
69. See infra notes 125-42 & accompanying text.
70. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951) (quoting
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943)). As the
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures succinctly stated:
"[Tihe chief aim of government litigation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act is the dissipa-
tion of persistent monopoly power." NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEw OF ANTI-
TRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, 1 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL 158 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NCRALP REPORT].
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crucial issue is the explanation behind Congress' effort to protect
competition.71
This Article first attempts to demonstrate that the legislative his-
tory of the Sherman Act reveals a total lack of concern for allocative
inefficiency. Trusts and monopolies were condemned principally be-
cause they "unfairly" extracted wealth from consumers. Productive ef-
ficiency also was an aim of the Act. Congress wanted the economy to
function efficiently primarily to provide consumers the benefits of free
competition. This section demonstrates, however, that in balancing the
competing considerations, Congress condemned firms with monopoly
power despite their acknowledged efficiencies, and with the knowledge
that this condemnation might not maximize society's economic effi-
ciency. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Congress was unwilling to
subordinate its distributive-based distaste for trusts and monopolists to
the goal of corporate efficiency when the efficiency gains would be re-
tained by the monopolist. Moreover, this Article contends that the leg-
islative history shows that Congress passed the Sherman Act because it
believed that trusts and monopolies possess excessive social and polit-
ical power, and reduce entrepreneurial liberty and opportunity.
Improving Economic Efficiency
Judge Robert H. Bork, who has written one of the most thorough
analyses of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, contends that the
drafters of the Sherman Act were preoccupied with economic efficiency
rather than with any nonefficiency considerations. 72 Judge Bork argues
that "It]he whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to
improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer wel-
71. A fascinating illustration of the intense debate over the goals of the Sherman Act is
provided by Inglis v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1981). The court
held that "[t]he relevance of the economic tests [for predatory pricing] so developed, how-
ever, must then depend in large part on whether allocative efficiency is a primary goal of the
antitrust laws. As we see those goals, they are limited to the preservation of competition,
and while one may assume that enhanced competition will lead to improvements in alloca-
tive efficiency, this may not always be the case .... Similarly, the search for allocative
efficiency may lead one to accept conduct that is plainly anticompetitive. In any event, our
objective is set by the antitrust laws and it concerns primarily the protection of competition."
652 F.2d at 936 n.20. Later, the court added that "[t]he antitrust laws were designed to
protect competition, not solely to improve allocative efficiency." 652 F.2d at 939-40 (foot-
note omitted). Six months later, the same panel voted unanimously to amend its opinion by
deleting all of the quoted material! Inglis v. ITT Continental Baking Co., Nos. 79-4207, 78-
3604 (Feb. 10, 1982).
72. R. BoRK, supra note 2, at 91.
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fare."'73 Judge Bork asserts that the sole purpose of the Sherman Act
was enhancement of "consumer welfare," a term of art he defined as
the "maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction. ' 74 This
view of "consumer welfare" includes maximum economic efficiency
but excludes anything giving preference to consumers over monopolists
or any concern with "unfair" transfers of wealth from consumers to
monopolists. "Antitrust thus has a built-in preference for material
prosperity, but it has nothing to say about the ways prosperity is dis-
tributed or used."'75
Judge Bork asserts that this congressional mandate "requires
courts to distinguish between agreements or activities that increase
wealth through efficiency and those that decrease it through restriction
of output."7 6 He further asserts that there is "not a scintilla of support"
in the Act's legislative history for "broad social, political, and ethical
mandates," 77 and explicitly rejects distributive issues as a possible area
of antitrust concern. 78
Judge Bork supports his conclusions by analyzing dozens of cita-
tions from the legislative history of the Act, relying most heavily upon
the views of Senator Sherman, its primary sponsor.79 These statements
73. Id.
74. Bork, supra note 66, at 7. The Court, beginning with Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), has condemned the misallocation of resources caused by monop-
oly pricing. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), the Court cited Judge Bork
for the conclusion that the debates "suggest that Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
'consumer welfare prescription."' Id at 343. See the discussion of this case supra note 2.
75. R. BoRAX, supra note 2, at 90.
76. Bork, supra note 66, at 7.
77. Id at 10. The only other value that he believes can be identified in the legislative
history is the protection of small businessmen. He argues, however, that "this value was
given a complementary (or incidental) but not conflicting role in relation to the goal of
maximization of consumer welfare." Id
78. R. BoRK, supra note 2, at 11: "[I]t seems clear the income distribution effects of
economic activity should be completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust
legality of the activity, It may be sufficient to note that the shift in income distribution does
not lessen total wealth, and a decision about it requires a choice between two groups of
consumers that should be made by the legislature rather than by the judiciary." Interest-
ingly, in his Sherman Act legislative history analysis, Bork observed that the argument in
Congress for a rule against monopolistic mergers "derived in large measure from a desire to
protect consumers from monopoly extortion. ... Where producer and consumer welfare
might come into conflict. . . Congress chose consumer welfare as decisive." Id at 11. A
concern with "monopoly extortion" would seem to be identical to the concern with the in-
come distribution effects of economic activity which Bork says should be made by the
legislature.
79. Judge Bork wrote that Senator Sherman "was by far the most articulate and thor-
ough speaker on the question of what goals antitrust should serve. Those who spoke over-
whelmingly agreed with his position on this issue. Disagreement was largely confined to
questions of remedies and the constitutional reach of Sherman's measure." Bork, supra note
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reveal overwhelming congressional concern with the activities of mo-
nopolies and trusts tending "to advance the price to the consumer"80
and with practices effectively "destroying competition in production
and thereby increasing prices to consumers." 8' Judge Bork thus makes
a convincing case that these concerns were paramount and indeed rep-
resented the overwhelming weight of congressional opinion.8 2
Judge Bork then examines the proposition that Congress was con-
cerned with "the preservation of efficiency," 83 and finds support for the
assertion that Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, did not mean to
destroy existing efficient production methods. 4 In particular, he as-
66, at 45. "Sherman was the prime mover in getting antitrust legislation considered and
pressed through the Senate... [and] though Sherman's bill was completely rephrased by
the Judiciary Committee, of which he was not a member, the final bill in its substantive
policy aspects, embodied Sherman's views." Id at 14-15. For a description of the evolution
of Sherman's initial bill into the Sherman Act, see id at 13 n-9.
80. Id at 16 (quoting remarks of Sen. Sherman, 21 CONG. Rnc. 2457 (1890)). In an-
other example, Judge Bork cited § 1 of the bill that Sherman drafted. "ITjhat bill declared
illegal two classes of arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations: (1) those
made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition, and (2) those
designed, or which tend, to adyance the cost to consumer of articles of commerce." Id at 15
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). Judge Bork analyzes this language in the following
manner: "Sherman employed these two criteria of illegality in every measure he presented
to the Senate. The first test, which subjects all firms to market forces, is hardly a means of
preserving social values that consumers are not willing to pay for. It can be reconciled only
with a consumer-welfare policy. The second test is even more explicit. The touchstone of
illegality is raising prices to consumers. There were no exceptions. Sherman wanted the
courts not merely to be influenced by the consumer interest but to be controlled completely
by it." Id at 15-16 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
81. 21 CONG. REc. 2558 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Pugh).
82. Bork, supra note 66. Judge Posner cited Judge Bork approvingly in summing up
Congress' intent: "The framers of the Sherman Act appear to have been concerned mainly
with the price and output consequences of monopolies and cartels ... " R. PosNBR, supra
note 4, at 23 (citing Bork, supra note 66).
83. Bork, supra note 66, at 26-31.
84. "Sherman took great pains to stress that his bill would in no way interfere with
efficiency.... '[The bill] does not in the least affect combinations in aid of production
where there is free and fair competition.' He stressed the legality of efficiency repeatedly,
citing partnerships and corporations as two forms of combination which were efficiency-
creating and therefore lawful. He said corporations 'ought to be encouraged and protected
as tending to cheapen the cost of production.' He also praised the efficiency-creating corpo-
rate merger.
"Not once did Sherman suggest that courts should blunt or discourage efficient size or
conduct in the interest of any social or political value. The only limit he urged to the crea-
tion of efficiency by combination was justified explicitly in terms of consumer welfare. He
thought combinations of monopolistic size would not pass their efficiencies on to consumers:
"'It is sometimes said of these combinations [the monopolistic trusts] that they reduce
prices to the consumer by better methods of production, but all experience shows that this
saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer. The price to the consumer depends upon
the supply, which can be reduced at pleasure by the combination.' Here again Sherman
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serts that Congress did not intend to forbid monopolies attained solely
through efficiency.8 5 Criticizing the assertion that values other than
efficiency should play a role in Sherman Act interpretation,8 6 he con-
cludes that "Congress' position with respect to efficiency cannot be ex-
plained on any hypothesis other than that consumer welfare was in all
cases the controlling value under the Sherman Act."87 In light of his
definition of "consumer welfare," Judge Bork contends that Congress'
only goal was to promote economic efficiency.88 In summary, Judge
Bork concluded that the Sherman Act was intended to improve eco-
nomic efficiency and does not reflect any congressional concern with
the effects of monopoly power on the distribution of wealth and other
nonefficiency goals.
Allocative Efficiency
The efficiency-oriented view of the Sherman Act, as propounded
by Judge Bork and others,89 has initial appeal. No basis exists, how-
identified injury to consumers as occurring through restriction of output by firms with mar-
ket control." Id at 26-28 (citations omitted). Judge Bork's conclusions will be analyzed
throughout this paper.
85. Id at 28-31.
86. Id at 39-42. For example, Judge Bork examines Judge Hand's assertions in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), that the Sherman Act
should have as a goal the protection of small businessmen. He analyzes the legislative state-
ments that Judge Hand relied upon, and concludes that while Congress certainly showed
sympathy for small businesses insofar as they were hurt by the trusts, their concern never
constituted an affirmative desire that the Act should seek their protection as an end in itself.
Their protection, Judge Bork asserts, was thought to be an incidental benefit of the Act.
Bork, supra note 66, at 39-42.
Judge Bork found only a single occasion upon which he believed that the Senators
considered the preservation of small businesses as an end in itself, and concluded that "it is
impossible to find even colorable language suggesting most of the other broad social or
political purposes that have occasionaliy been suggested as relevant to the application of the
Sherman Act." Id at 41-42 (citation omitted). He backs up this assertion with a footnote in
which he examines a few additional legislative statements which might support other nonef-
ficiency goals and calls them "isolated remarks and shreds of casual rhetoric." Id at 43
n.105. Judge Bork deliberately declines to consider the effects of the forces of populism that
provided much of the impetus for the passage of the Sherman Act. Id at 44 n.106.
87. Bork, supra note 66, at 26.
88. Id; see also R. BoRK, supra note 2, at 90-91.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. Areeda and Turner appear to come to
essentially the same conclusion as Judge Bork, although they phrase it in less absolute terms.
They identify "fairness" and "populist" goals as the principal nonefficiency goals that the
antitrust laws might reach. But they conclude that "[a]s a goal of antitrust policy, 'fairness'
is a vagrant claim applied to any value that one happens to favor. In our context, it may
connote competition or its absence." 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at 21. They
further conclude that these goals should play a role in antitrust analysis only insofar as they
affect the efficiency of our economy: "In one set of meanings, competition promotes fair
results in the sense of prices close to cost and multiple choices for buyers and sellers. Coin-
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ever, for their contention that Congress was concerned only with allo-
cative efficiency. Indeed, it is unlikely that in 1890 many economists,
much less legislators, understood the impact of monopoly power on
allocative efficiency.
Judge Bork's review of the Sherman Act's legislative history con-
clusively demonstrates that Congress was preoccupied with the higher
prices facing consumers as a result of monopolistic pricing.90 Although
he is correct to conclude that Congress was concerned with "consumer
welfare," 91 he incorrectly restricts the definition of this key term to eco-
nomic efficiency.
The modern economist, Judge Bork asserts, knows that the only
harmful result of monopoly pricing is its adverse effects on allocative
efficiency 92 therefore, in the interest of consumer welfare, the antitrust
petitive results are thus thought to be fair. Similarly, practices promoting competition are
fair while those impairing it are not. . .. The promotion of fairness in these senses also
promotes efficiency and progressiveness. But competitive processes and results are also
called unfair by those who wish higher returns than competition gives them.. .. Here we
note only that this conception of fairness is, of course, antithetical to both competition and
economic efficiency." Id at 21-22. They also asserted that "the weighing and resolution of
conflicting interests and objectives would involve the courts in essentially political decisions
for which there are no workable legal standards, and would often place them in a regulatory
or supervisory role for which they are ill-equipped." Id at 13.
Although they find some support for nonefficiency goals, Areeda and Turner neverthe-
less "concur with what we perceive to be the main thrust of the case law because... neither
the statutes nor the legislative histories compel or even strongly suggest a different course of
antitrust interpretation. If anything, they support the priority of competition and its effi-
ciency goals." Id at 12-13. In their view, promoting "non-efficiency goals over efficiency
would be excessively costly, futile, and unadministrable." ld at 24. They believe that
"[o]nce antitrust rules are properly framed in terms of competitive and efficiency considera-
tions, there is little room left for non-conflicting additional prohibitions; and avoiding con-
flict would require difficult if not elusive efficiency determinations that in many instances
would otherwise be unnecessary. Accordingly, the contribution to populist goals from rules
specially created to promote them would be far too small to warrant the inevitable legal
difficulties, uncertainties, and enforcement costs they would involve." id at 30. Moreover,
they think goals other than efficiency are inappropriate as antitrust standards even if they do
not conflict with efficiency objectives. Areeda and Turner conclude that the Sherman Act's
legislative history is vague, uncertain, seldom on point, abounding with casual language,
and deserving of relatively little weight. Id at 14-15. Interestingly, they do not appear to
directly confront the wealth transfer issue. Although their merger analysis, for example,
"assumes that the income transfer from consumers to producers is neutral," they do not
directly discuss a possible concern with distributional questions. Id at 149 n.2.
90. See supra notes 80-82 & accompanying text.
91. Bork, supra note 66, at 16. Judge Bork noted that "[tihe legislators did not, of
course, speak of consumer welfare with the precision of a modern economist but their mean-
ing was unmistakable." Id at 10. Judge Bork also stated that "It]he rules implied by the
[consumer welfare] policy of [Congress] are alterable as economic analysis progresses ..
Id at 47.
92. See R. Box, supra note 2, at 90-91, 111; Bork, supra note 66, at 7, 9.
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laws should be concerned only with improving allocative efficiency. 93
According to Judge Bork, the redistribution of wealth from consumers
to producers is not an appropriate focus because it involves a value
judgment and "could only rest upon a tenuous moral ground."94
Although modern economists often eschew economic value judg-
ments, the 1890 Congress may have been more willing to make them.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates that Senator Sher-
man and other legislators condemned trusts for raising prices and re-
stricting output,95 but no evidence has ever been found to suggest that
any legislator understood that monopoly pricing causes allocative inef-
ficiency.96 It is extremely unlikely that the legislators' distaste for mo-
nopoly pricing could have been based upon its impact on allocative
efficiency: the concept of allocative efficiency was, at best, on the verge
of discovery by leading economic theorists when the Sherman Act was
passed.97
More importantly, leading economists of the day had very little
93. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 90-91, 111; Bork, supra note 66, at 7, 9.
94. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 11. Judge Bork writes that "consumer welfare has no
sumptuary or ethical component, but permits consumers to define by their expression of
wants in the market place what things they regard as wealth." Id at 90.
95. See supra notes 80-81.
96. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 66.
97. Alfred Marshall, for example, devoted seventeen pages of the 1890 edition of Prin-
ciples of Economics to a chapter entitled "The Theory of Monopolies" in which only one
footnote discussed either allocative inefficiency or any incipient version of this concept. A.
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 466 n.1 (1890). Modem understanding of allocative
efficiency is based, inter alia, on the assumption of Pareto optimality, first proposed in 1909.
V. PARETO, supra note 34. Some of the precursors of this concept can arguably be found in
Pareto's first major work, Cours D'Economie Politique, which was published in 1896-1897.
See supra notes 33-35 & accompanying text. Not until 1938 did the first modem and rigor-
ous discussion of allocative efficiency appear. Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to
Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938). Even
this path-breaking and influential discussion, concerned with allocative inefficiency resulting
from improper taxation and incorrect railroad and public utility rate-setting, did not discuss
the antitrust implications of allocative inefficiency.
Scherer noted that other nineteenth century economists discussed what we today term
allocative efficiency insofar as it related to taxation and the government regulation of public
utilities: "The notion of a 'deadweight welfare-loss triangle' entered the mainstream of An-
glo-American economics in the first edition of Marshall's Principles [citation omitted]. An
obscure English-language precursor was Jenkin, On the Princiles Which Regulate the Inci-
dence of Taxes, reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 227, 233 (R. Mus-
grave & C. Shoup eds. 1959) (originally published in 1871). A variant of the concept can be
traced to Dupuit, On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works, translated in 2 INT'L
ECON. PAPERS 83, 108 (A. Peacock, et al. eds. 1952) (originally published in French in
1844)." Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974,
977 n.20 (1977).
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influence on the passage of the Act.98 It is unlikely, then, that the legis-
lators who passed the early antitrust laws were aware that monopoly
pricing led to allocative inefficiency. 99 Nothing in the legislative his-
tory of the Sherman Act suggests that they were. No commentator has
pointed to any economic testimony that referred to a concept resem-
bling "allocative efficiency," nor is there the slightest evidence that any
member of Congress was even remotely familiar with this type of wel-
fare loss. l°°
Given the state of economic theory at that time, the assertion that
legislators supporting the Sherman Act were influenced by considera-
tions involving allocative efficiency is without credibility. Congres-
sional distaste for the pricing and output consequences of monopoly
pricing must therefore be rooted in other concerns. These concerns in-
clude the distribution of wealth between consumers and producers and,
secondarily, the maintenance of productive efficiency, preservation of
economic opportunities for small enterprises, and the concentration of
economic, social, and political power in a few hands.
Productive Efficiency
Although the legislative history of the Sherman Act never alludes
to any concept resembling allocative efficiency, it does repeatedly
praise corporate productive efficiency and recognize that free competi-
tion leads to efficient competitors. The productive efficiency of free
competition was especially encouraged when gains were passed on to
consumers. Nevertheless, there is little basis for suggesting that the
Sherman Act was passed primarily to improve or even to preserve pro-
98. It is worth remembering that the antitrust laws were passed by politicians, not econ-
omists. Professor Hofstadter observed that "[tihe Sherman Act was framed and debated in
the pre-expert era, when economists as a professional group were not directly consulted by
legislators. But even if they had been, they would have given mixed and uncertain advice."
R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE, supra note 5, at 200. Professor Stigler's conclusion
is even more striking: "A careful student of the history of economics would have searched
long and hard, on July 2 of 1890, the day the Sherman Act was signed by President Harri-
son, for any economist who had ever recommended the policy of activity combatting collu-
sion or monopolization in the economy at large." Stigler, The Economists andthe Problem of
Monopoly, 72 AM. EcoN. Rnv. 1, 3 (1982).
99. Indeed, the following analyses of the antitrust laws' legislative histories demon-
strates that not even the most recent major antitrust law, the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger
Act of 1950, was passed to enhance allocative efficiency. See infra notes 255-65 & accompa-
nying text.
100. See generally R. BORK, supra note 2; Bork, supra note 66. One could, however,
speculate about Congress' likely reaction had it known that trusts and monopolies caused
allocative inefficiency. It seems reasonable to conclude that they probably would have used
this as another reason to condemn them.
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ductive efficiency; indeed, the trusts were viewed as extremely efficient.
Rather, Congress wanted to pass a law for other purposes which ham-
pered productive efficiency as little as possible.
Many scholars have suggested that the trusts existing in 1890 were
efficient at production.10 Even their harshest critics admit this.
0 2
Senator Sherman appreciated the efficiencies of large corporations
generally:
Experience has shown that they are the most useful agencies of mod-
em civilization. They have enabled individuals to unite to undertake
enterprises only attempted in former times by powerful governments.
The good results of corporate power are shown in the vast develop-
ment of our railroads and the enormous increase of business and pro-
duction of all kinds.10 3
But congressional endorsement of trusts' efficient operations stopped
when consumer prices rose, and the legislature withheld approval from
combinations that, while yielding more efficient methods of competi-
101. See, e.g., McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, 1 J.L. &
ECON. 137 (1958); see also R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE, supra note 5; Koller, The
Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 105 (1971).
It is unclear how much of monopoly efficiency can be ascribed to the fact that monopo-
lies took the form of trusts, and how much merely came about because these trusts were
often combinations of large, efficient corporations. It is unclear, in other words, how much
of their productivity would have been lost if they were broken up. An important question to
ask is whether Congress believed that it would jeopardize significant productive efficiencies
when it broke up the trusts. Perhaps Congress wanted to achieve its other goals out of a
belief that it could substantially assist consumers and at the same time only impair produc-
tive efficiency a modest amount.
102. Principally for this reason, some economists in the late 1800's believed that monop-
olies were, in balance, beneficial for society. See Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust
Law.- 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. Rav. 221, 238-39 (1956); see also R. HOFSTADTER, THE
PARANOID STYLE, supra note 5; Stigler, supra note 98. At the same time, however, a minor-
ity of legislators held the belief that a lack of competition lowered productive efficiency. For
example, Representative Fithian stated his belief that "skill is created and is stimulated by
competition. A recent writer on political economy says: 'Wherever monopoly is dominant,
the incentive for improvement and skill is deadened. It is only when competitors contend
with each other for the favor of the consumer that they are stimulated to attract that con-
sumer by presenting him with wares both skillfully and cheaply made."' 21 CONG. RFc.
4102 (1890). Representative Vest stated: "We know very well that competition always
reduces prices. . . . I say if you let these two manufacturing interests compete together and
create competition, you then secure lower prices to the consumer. That is the law of trade
and that is the law of manufactures [sic] the world over." Id at 2466.
Congress's dilemma became manifest in Mr. Dooley's comment on Teddy Roosevelt's
early attitude towards the trusts: "The 'trusts,' says [Roosevelt], 'are heejoous monsthers
built up be th' enlightened interprise iv th' men that have done so much to advance progress
in our beloved country,' he says. 'On wan hand I wud stamp thim undher fut; on th' other
hand not so fast."' H. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT 172 (rev. ed. 1956).
103. 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890). "When corporations unite merely to extend their busi-
ness, as connecting lines of a railway without interfering with competing lines, they are
proper and lawful." Id; see also remarks of Senator Sherman cited by Bork, supra note 84.
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tion, also produced higher consumer prices. The trusts were con-
demned despite their efficiency in large part because they kept the
fruits of such efficiency. As Senator Sherman pointed out in qualifica-
tion of his praise for efficiency, "It is sometimes said of these combina-
tions that they reduce prices to the consumer by better methods of
production, but all experience shows that this saving of cost goes to the
pockets of the producer.' 104 Congressional condemnation of monopo-
listic extractions of wealth was so strong that it is even unlikely that
Congress meant to provide an exception for a monopoly based solely
upon superior efficiency.105
104. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (emphasis added). Senator Sherman and others ex-
pressed similar views elsewhere. The Senator, for example, commented that "[the courts]
will distinguish between lawful combinations in aid of production and unlawful combina-
tions to prevent competition and in restraint of trade. .. ." id at 2456. He also said, "If
they [the Standard Oil trust] conducted their business lawfully, without any attempt by these
combinations to raise the price of an article consumed by the people of the United States, I
would say let them pursue that business." Id at 2469.
Representative Mason also condemned the trusts despite their efficiencies: "Some say
that the trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced prices; but if the price of oil, for
instance, were reduced to I cent a barrel it would not right the wrong done to the people of
this country by the "trusts" which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven honest
men from legitimate business enterprises." Id at 4100. A slightly different sentiment was
expressed by Senator Edmunds: "Although for the time being the sugar trust has perhaps
reduced the price of sugar, and the oil trust certainly has reduced the price of oil immensely,
that does not alter the wrong of the principle of any trust... because in the long run,
however seductive they may appear in lowering prices to the consumer for the time being,
all human experience and all human philosophy have proved that they are destructive of
public welfare and come to be tyrannies, grinding tyrannies, that have sometimes in other
countries produced riots, just riots in the moral sense, and so on." Id at 2726. Moreover,
none of the citations to the legislative history presented by Judge Bork confronted this trade-
off. None suggested allowing higher prices to consumers in order to improve, or even to
preserve, corporate efficiency. See supra note 84.
105. The controversy over whether Congress wanted to prohibit a monopoly achieved
entirely by skill and efficiency comes largely from an exchange at the very end of the Sher-
man Act debates. Senator Kenna asked: "Is it intended by the committee, as the section
seems to indicate, that if an individual. . by his own skill and energy, by the propriety of
his conduct generally, shall pursue his calling in such a way as to monopolize a trade, his
action shall be a crime under this proposed act?...
"Suppose a citizen of Kentucky is dealing in shorthorn cattle and by virtue of his supe-
rior skill in that particular product it turns out that he is the only one in the United States to
whom an order comes from Mexico for cattle of that stock for a considerable period, so that
he is conceded to have a monopoly of that trade with Mexico, is it intended by the commit-
tee that the bill shall make that man a culprit?" 21 CONG. REc. 3151 (1890).
Senator Edmunds gave a direct response to Senator Kenna's hypothetical: "[I]n the
case stated the gentleman has not any monopoly at all. He has not got the possession of all
the horned cattle in the United States. ... He has not done anything but compete with his
adversaries in trade, if he had any, to furnish the commodity for the lowest price. So I
assure my friend he need not be disturbed upon that subject." Ia at 3151-52. Senator
Edmunds' response indicates that he believed that no monopolization was involved in the
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Although Congress was aware that trusts and monopolies raised
hypothetical, so he did not really consider the need for an exception for a firm that achieved
its monopoly solely by skill.
Senator Hoar then gave his well-known answer: "[I]n the case put [by Senator Kenna,
if.... . a man who merely by superior skill and intelligence, a breeder of horses or raiser of
cattle, or manufacturer or artisan of any kind, got the whole business because nobody could
do it as well as he could was not a monopolist, [unless] it involved something like the use
• . . [of unfair] competition, like the engrossing, the buying up of all other persons engaged
in the same business." Id. at 3152. Senator Edmunds then provided the final answer to
Senator Kenna's question: "I have only to say. . . that this subject was not lightly consid-
ered in the committee, and that we studied it with whatever little ability we had, and the best
answer I can make to both my friends is to read from Webster's Dictionary the definition of
the verb 'to monopolize': 1. To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of, as a commod-
ity or goods in market, with the view to appropriate or control the exclusive sale of; as, to
monopolize sugar or tea.
"Like the sugar trust. One man, if he had capital enough, could do it just as well as two.
2. To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right of, especially the right of trading to
any place, or with any country or district; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade.
"... . [W]e were not blind to the very suggestions which have been made, and we
thought we had done the right thing in providing, in the very phrase we did, that if one
person instead of two, by a combination, if one person alone, as we have heard about the
wheat market in Chicago, for instance, did it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the
public interest as if two had combined to do it." Id The Sherman Act, forbidding any
person to "monopolize or attempt to monopolize," was then passed by the Senate. Id at
3153.
This crucial segment of the debate deserves careful consideration. It would seem that
Senators Hoar and Edmunds provided opposite answers to Senator Kenna's question. Sena-
tor Hoar clearly did not consider a firm to be guilty of "monopolization" if it "got the whole
business" by skill and efficiency alone. Senator Edmunds, however, defined "to monopo-
lize" as merely "[tlo engross or obtain by any means .. " Edmunds intended that "if one
person... did it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the public interest as if two had
combined to do it." Edmunds clearly condemned every monopoly, although by his first
response he did not consider the hypothetical situation given to describe a monopoly. Thus,
it would appear that these statements should be construed as offsetting one another al-
though, if a judgment had to be made, since Senator Edmunds spoke last and was one of the
main sponsors of the bill, his statements could perhaps be said to carry greater weight. The
fact that this discussion took place at the very end of the Sherman Act debate could very
well mean that it embodied Congress' final view on the subject. However, these statements
were also less able to be corrected or opposed by Senator Sherman or other legislators.
An alternative reading of this dialogue, which accepts Senator Hoar's comments and
distinguishes or downplays Senator Edmunds' reply is, of course, possible. Under this inter-
pretation, an exception would exist for monopolies achieved by efficiency alone. One possi-
bly could conclude that Congress' desire to avoid discouraging innovation and
industriousness outweighed its general distaste for monopoly pricing. Of course, Congress
would not extend this exception to firms that combined in order to generate productive
efficiencies, perhaps because its experiences with trusts led it to conclude that their true
motive was probably to eliminate competition, rather than increase efficiency.
In addition, single-firm monopolization based on superior efficiency often involves
lower prices to consumers during the period when the firm is attempting to increase its mar-
ket share. By contrast, monopolization by merger or conspiracy, not based upon internally
generated efficiencies, generally involves no short-term benefits to consumers. Thus, the
long-term monopoly overcharges might have weighed more heavily in the multiple firm case
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prices and restricted output, the legislators were unaware that this
caused allocative inefficiency. I1 6 They thought that monopolies were
relatively efficient producers and that breaking them up could decrease
productive efficiency.107 Yet, Congress enacted the Sherman Act
largely to prohibit and condemn them.108 Clearly, the chief economic
concern was not productive efficiency; 109 if Congress' main goal was to
encourage that form of industrial organization that was, in 1890, most
efficient, it would have praised the trusts, not condemned them.
Rather, the Sherman Act was intended to insure that consumers ob-
tained their "fair share" of the benefits of free competition.
Protecting Consumers from Unfair Transfers of Wealth
In the legislative debates over the Sherman Act, Congress clearly
condemned the use of market power to raise prices and restrict out-
put.110 This condemnation, however, did not arise from concern with
allocative efficiency. The debates strongly suggest that Congress con-
demned trusts and monopolies because they had enough market power
to raise prices and "unfairly" extract wealth from consumers, turning it
into monopoly profits. 1
and might have prompted Congress to condemn it even when it was based upon superior
efficiency.
Nevertheless, if the main thrust of the statute is kept in mind, including Congress' basic
condemnation of monopoly pricing despite a potential sacrifice of efficiency, the Sherman
Act does not appear to provide an exception for the efficient monopolist.
106. See supra notes 80-84, 95-100 & accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 101-03 & accompanying text. It is unclear just how much of a loss
in productivity Congress would have been willing to tolerate in order to break up the trusts.
An extreme case of the recognition that it might sometimes be necessary to sacrifice produc-
tive efficiencies in order to achieve other goals is exemplified by the court's divestiture order
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See Averitt, Section 5: Structural Remedies in Competition
Cases under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 40 OHIO ST. L.. 781 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Averitt, Structural Remedies].
In a merger context the Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion: "Possible econo-
mies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which
lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protect-
ing competition." Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble, 385 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
108. A possible exception to this general desire to prohibit monopolies may have been
that provided for an "efficient monopolist." But see supra note 105.
109. It should be noted that while Congress was also concerned about small businesses,
this concern was based upon a preference for small businesses as an end in itself, rather than
upon the belief that protecting small businesses was a good way to increase the total effi-
ciency or wealth of the economy. See infra notes 143-53 & accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 80-84, 95-100 & accompanying text.
111. See 21 CONG. RIc. 2461 (1890). On July 10, 1888, Sherman offered a resolution,
which was adopted without debate, condemning certain trusts and other business arrange-
ments which "tend to foster monopoly or to artificially advance the cost to the consumer of
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In the legislative debates, Congress discussed at length price in-
creases by trusts and the resulting higher consumer prices. '" 2 For ex-
ample, Senator Sherman, defending the bill's constitutionality, asked
that Congress protect the public from trusts that "restrain commerce,
turn it from its natural course, increase the price of articles, and there-
fore diminish the amount of commerce." 113 From this and other simi-
lar evidence Judge Bork correctly concluded, "The touchstone of
illegality is raising prices to consumers. There were no exceptions."
114
The debates strongly suggest that higher prices to consumers were
condemned because they unfairly extracted wealth from consumers
and turned it into monopoly profit. For example, during the debates
Senator Sherman termed monopolistic overcharges "extortion which
makes the people poor," and "extorted wealth." ' 1 5 Congressman Coke
necessary articles of human life. . . ." 19 CONG. REc. 6041 (1888). Sherman stated: 'This
bill does not seek to cripple combinations of capital and labor, the formation of partnerships
or of corporations, but only to prevent and control combinations made with a view to pre-
vent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to increase the profits of the producer at the
cost of the consumer." 21 CONG. Rnc. 2457 (1890); see also id at 2461 (1890). Sherman
added: "The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it to disregard the
interest of the consumer." Id He termed consumers subject to monopolistic pricing "unfor-
tunate victims." Id
Representative Heard stated: "We know that by such means the trusts which control
the markets on sugar, nails, oils, lead, and almost every other article of use in the commerce
of this country have advanced the cost of such articles to every consumer, and that without
rendering the slightest equivalent therefor these illegal conspiracies against honest trade
have stolen untold millions from the people." Id at 4101.
112. See supra note 84.
113. 21 CONG. Rac. 2462 (1890). Sherman also stated: "The sole object of such a com-
bination is to make competition impossible. It can control the market, raise or lower prices,
as will best promote to selfish interests.. . . Its governing motive is to increase the profits
of the parties composing it. The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it
to disregard the interest of the consumer. It dictates terms to transportation companies, it
commands the price of labor without fear of strikes, for in its field it allows no competitors.
Such a combination is far more dangerous than any heretofore invented, and, when it em-
braces the great body of all the corporations engaged in a particular industry in all of the
States of the Union, it tends to advance the price to the consumer of any article produced."
Id at 2457.
114. Bork, supra note 66, at 16.
115. 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890). On July 10, 1888, Sherman had offered a resolution,
adopted without debate, which condemned certain trusts and other business arrangements
which "tend to foster monopoly or to artificially advance the cost to the consumer of neces-
sary articles of human life .. " 19 CONG. Rnc. 7 (1888). Sherman also stated that "It]his
bill does not seek to cripple combinations of capital and labor, the formation of partnerships
or of corporations, but only to prevent competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to in-
crease the profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer." Id. at 2457. Sherman added:
"The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it to disregard the interest of
the consumer." Id. Sherman termed consumers subject to monopolistic pricing "unfortu-
nate victims." Id. at 2461.
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referred to the overcharges as "robbery."'1 6 Representative Heard de-
clared that the trusts, "without rendering the slightest equivalent," have
"stolen untold millions from the people."117 Congressman Wilson
complained that the beef trust "robs the farmer on the one hand and
the consumer on the other."118 Representative Fithian declared that
the trusts were "impoverishing" the people through "robbery."' 19 Sen-
ator Hoar declared that monopolistic pricing was "a transaction the
direct purpose of which is to extort from the community... wealth
which ought-to be generally diffused over the whole community.' 120
Senator George complained that "They aggregate to themselves great
enormous wealth by extortion which makes the people poor." 12 1
Congress condemned monopolistic overcharges in strong moral
terms, rather. than because of their efficiency effects. 122 Purchasers,
whether resellers l2 or ultimate consumers, were entitled to purchase
116. Id. at 2614.
117. Id. at 4101 (emphasis added). The full quotation reads: "We know that by such
means the trusts which control the markets on sugar, nails, lead, and almost every other
article of use in the commerce of this country have advanced the cost of such articles to
every consumer, and that without rendering the slightest equivalent therefore these illegal
conspiracies against honest trade have stolen untold millions from the people."
118. Id. at 4098.
119. Id. at 4103. (Fithian was reading, with apparent approval, a letter from a
constituent.)
120. 21 CONG. Rnc. 2728 (1890).
121. 21 CONG. REc. 1768. Senator George continued: "Then making this extorted
wealth the means of further extortion from their unfortunate victims, the people of the
United States, they pursue unmolested, unrestrained by law. . . . [They] have extorted their
il-gotten gains from the poor and then used the money thus obtained to complete the ruin of
the people." Id. Senator George also complained that consumers were being robbed. Id. at
3150. He complained that the trusts were able to "fleece and rob the people." Id.
The Supreme Court has also used similar language. In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 153 (1967), the Court implied that it was an antitrust goal to "protect the public
from price gouging by firms with monopoly power. . . ." See also Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339-43 (1979), discussed supra note 2. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
262 (1976), Justice White, in dicta in a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, stated that "the antitrust laws are aimed at preventing monopoly profits and price
fixing, which gouge the consumer."
122. Perhaps Congress was expressing more concern about preventing redistributions of
wealth because they were relatively observable and certain. Efficiency gains, on the other
hand, were probably more speculative in nature, and there was no guarantee that monopo-
lists would pass them on to consumers.
123. Senator George, for example, recognized: "An advance in price to the middlemen
is not mentioned in the bill, for the obvious reason that no such advance would damnify
them; it would rather be a benefit, as it would increase the value of the goods he has on
hand. He buys to sell again. He buys only for profit on a subsequent sale. So whatever he
pays he receives when he sells, together with a profit on his investment; and so of all of them,
including the last, who sells directly to the consumer. The consumer, therefore, paying all
the increased price advanced by the middlemen and profits on the same, is the party neces-
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competitively priced products. Members of Congress also condemned
the unequal distribution of wealth resulting from monopolistic
overcharges. 24 The legislators decided that competitive prices were
"fair" whereas monopoly prices were not; therefore, consumers were
entitled to own that quantity of wealth known today as "consumer sur-
plus." The unfair prices, in effect, robbed consumers of that wealth.
As a result, Congress was willing to risk some immediate efficiency
losses in order to benefit consumers ultimately. Congress was willing to
pass the Sherman Act in large part in an attempt to prevent such "un-
fair" transfers of wealth from consumers to monopolies.
Other Goals
Curbing the Social and Political Power of Trusts and Monopolies
Evidence also suggests that more than economic considerations
motivated Congress to curb the power of trusts and monopolies. Al-
though the concerns discussed thus far relate to the economic power of
monopolies and trusts, Congress was also motivated by a desire to curb
the social and political power of large businesses. This additional pur-
pose is demonstrated by analyzing the history of the Sherman Act in
light of the economic, social, and political context in which the law was
passed.
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress condemned
monopolies in part because they increased the cost of goods to consum-
ers. Logic would seem to indicate that pressure from consumers bur-
dened by higher prices contributed to the passage of the Sherman Act.
This cannot be the complete explanation, however, because just prior
to the passage of the Act, price levels in the United States were stable or
sarily damnified or injured." 21 CONG. REC. at 1767. He complained however, "The intent
to advance the price to the wholesale or retail dealer alone will not do; it must be to advance
it to the consumer. This leaves unpunished and perfectly lawful all these combinations
which have proven so disastrous, that have for their object a decrease in the price to be given
to the producer, and also those speculative movements now so common by which there shall
be a temporary advance in the market, to last till a day not far off, when there shall be a
settlement." Id These quotations also suggest that the existence of middlemen should not
nullify consumers' right to purchase competitively priced goods.
124. 21 CONG. REC. 2728 (1890). Senator Sherman stated: "The popular mind is agi-
tated with problems that may disturb social order, and among them none is more threaten-
ing than the inequality of condition of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a
single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to control pro-
duction and trade and to break down competition." Id at 2460.
Senator George expressed a similar concern: "Is production, is trade, to be taken away
from the great mass of the people concentrated in the hands of a few men who, I am obliged
to add, by the policies pursued by our Government, have been enabled to aggregate to
themselves large, enormous fortunes?" Id at 2598.
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slowly decreasing. 125 In 1890, American consumers paid less for goods
than at almost any time since the end of the Civil War. 126
Despite the then-recent rise of trusts, this phenomenon of falling
prices is easily explained. The first trusts of any significance probably
did not achieve their full power until a few years before passage of the
Act. 27 Although some trusts did raise prices in the years immediately
before 1890, overall consumer prices decreased dramatically from the
end of the Civil War until approximately 1884, when they leveled
off.128 In addition, the last half of the nineteenth century witnessed a
125. Prices were failing, whether measured by the consumer price index, the cost of
living index, or the wholesale price index. For example, in the generation between the end
of the Civil War and the enactment of the Sherman Act, the consumer price index went
down by 41%. Not only were prices falling on the average, they were falling for products in
many of the industries that were cartelized, such as fuel and lighting (by 66%), metal and
metal products (by 60%), textiles, chemicals and dyes, sugar, leather, food, spirits, building
materials, etc. 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 201-11 (Bicentennial ed.
1975) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF THE CENSUS].
126. Id
127. W. LETWIN, supra note 24, at 69-70, picks 1887 as the year of the formation of the
first significant trusts. Other scholars pinpoint the start of the first great trusts and merger
waves at different years. See, e.g., D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 4 (1959)
(concluding that the movement started in 1879, with the formation of the Standard Oil
trust); OPPENHEIM & WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, CASES AND COMMENTS 317-23
(1967) (concluding that the first "merger movement" began after 1890). Regardless of the
precise date that the first significant trusts were formed, it is generally agreed that they were
stronger after 1890 than before it, and that the peak of the merger movement occurred after
1890.
128. The consumer price index and the cost of living index reveal that prices had not, on
the average, started to increase by the time the Sherman Act was passed.
Consumer
Price Index Wholesale Price Indices
(1967=100) Cost of Living Indices (1913=100) (1910-1914=100)
Federal
Reserve Metals &
Board Burgess All Fuel & Metal
Estimate Estimate Commodities Lighting Products
1890 27 78 67.8 82 72 123
1889 27 78 67.8 81 71 116
1888 27 78 67.5 86 72 121
1887 27 76 65.4 85 70 119
1886 27 76 65.3 82 70 110
1885 27 75 64.6 85 72 109
1880 29 80 71.3 100 92 166
1875 33 86 81.2 118 128 175
1870 38 91 92.5 135 134 200
1865 46 102 108.1 185 214 306
1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 125, at 201-11.
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great industrial revolution; 129 large-scale production, new technology,
and increased production speed resulted in tremendous efficiencies.' 30
The industries that spawned some of the most notorious trusts also
benefitted most from the new efficiencies. As a consequence, prices
often fell despite the existence of the trusts.13 1
Falling prices during this period in fact contributed to the forma-
tion of the trusts. Viewing falling prices and increased production with
alarm, producers sought to arrest this trend by combining or entering
agreements to stabilize or raise prices, restrict output, and suppress
competition.132 This trend was only beginning, however, by 1890. Most
large and significant trusts were formed or achieved full power after
and in spite of the passage of the Sherman Act.' 33
While prices might have fallen more rapidly had the trusts not at-
tempted to halt their decline, 134 it seems unlikely that consumers would
strongly condemn the trusts only because prices were not dropping as
rapidly as they should have been. 135 It is possible that even though
overall prices were stable or decreasing, Congress or the public could
have focused their attention on those prices that were rising and con-
cluded that trusts were, on the whole, causing higher prices. It is more
likely that other factors were at work. Consumers probably were an-
gered less by the reduction in their wealth than by the way in which the
wealth was extracted.
The legislative history reveals that a major factor leading to the
passage of the Sherman Act was a congressional desire to curb the
power of trusts. While Congress was concerned about the uses of this
power to raise prices and restrict output, it also desired, as an end in
129. The expansion of the railroads transformed the United States into one economic
entity. Industrial growth and innovation were rapid and immense, creating tremendous ad-
vances in transportation, communication and distribution. See A. CHANDLER, JR., THE IN-
VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 250-59 (1977).
130. A. CHANDLER, JR., supra note 129, at 250-59.
131. See supra note 128. See also infra text accompanying note 133.
132. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM, ch. 6 (1969) [hereinafter cited as R.
HOFSTADTER, REFORM]; W. LETwIN, supra note 24, at 139.
133. See R. HOFSTADTER, REFORM, supra note 132, ch. 6; W. LETWIN, supra note 24, at
139.
134. It is uncertain whether in 1890, monopolies and trusts were responsible for more
price rises than price declines. They did bring capital, large-scale production, organization,
and modern technology to industry. Price reductions resulting from these efficiencies could
have outweighed the price increases resulting from their monopoly power.
135. Trust decisions to raise prices often achieved great notoriety. Their efficiency gains
were, of course, relatively invisible. In retrospect, it seems that a trust could have made a
good case that its existence was in the public interest by merely pointing to the consumer
price index.
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itself, the prevention of accumulation of power by large corporations
and the men who controlled them. Alarm over corporate aggrandize-
ment of economic, social, and political power pervaded the debate. 36
The legislators feared not only the economic consequences of monop-
oly power, but potential social disruptions as well.1 37 Moreover, this
apprehension has been recognized repeatedly by courts interpreting the
legislative history of the Act.138
136. As Senator Sherman warned, "[It] we will not endure a king as a political power we
should not endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the neces-
saries of life. If we would not submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of
trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity." 21 CONG.
REc. 2457 (1890). This theme runs throughout Senator Sherman's opening remarks. "If the
concentered powers of this combination are entrusted to a single man, it is a kingly preroga-
tive, inconsistent with our form of government, and should be subject to the strong resist-
ance of the State and national authorities." 1d He framed the issue in the following
manner: "The point for us to consider is whether, on the whole, it is safe in this country to
leave the production of property, the transportation of our whole country, to depend upon
the will of a few men sitting at their council board in the city of New York." Id at 2570.
Sherman further stated: "The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb
social order, and among them none is more threatening than the inequality of condition of
wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single generation out of the concentration
of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade and to break down compe-
tition. These combinations already defy or control powerful transportation corporations
and reach state authorities. They reach out their Briarean arms to every part of our country.
They are imported from abroad, Congress alone can deal with them, and if we are unwilling
or unable there will soon be a trust for every production and a master to fix the price for
every necessity of life." Id at 2460. Senator George expressed a similar fear, asking, "Is
production, is trade, to be taken away from the great mass of the people and concentrated in
the hands of a few men. . . ?" 21 CONG. Rnc. 2598 (1890).
137. Senator Hoar warned that "[t]he complaint which has come from all parts and all
classes of the country of these great monopolies, which are becoming not only in some cases
an actual injury to the comfort of ordinary life, but are a menace to republican institutions
themselves, has induced Congress to take the matter up." Id at 3146 (1890). See also supra
text accompanying note 104.
Senator Sherman wanted to protect the "industrial liberty of the citizens," id at 2457,
and believed that trusts caused inequality of wealth and opportunity that "may disturb so-
cial order." Id at 2460. In his strongest statement expressing fear of corporate power, he
cautioned that "Itjhey had monopolies and mortmains of old, but never before such giants as
in our day. You must heed their appeal or be ready for the socialist, the communist, and the
nihilist. Society is now disturbed by forces never felt before." Id at 2457.
138. Perhaps the most famous expression of this recognition was Judge Hand's citation
to the above-quoted remarks of Senator Sherman, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945): "We have been speaking only of the economic rea-
sons which forbid monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are others, based upon
the belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their
economic results. In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself... showed that
among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of
capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them." Id at 428. In one of the
first major Sherman Act cases, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Chief
Justice White offered a similar explanation: "The debates ... . conclusively show. . . that
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A review of the social history of the period illuminates the reasons
underlying Congress' alarm. The post-Civil War period saw a rural
agricultural nation transformed into an increasingly urban and indus-
trial society. Work patterns changed. By the end of the Civil War indi-
vidual yeoman farmers had all but vanished. In their places stood
entrepreneurs and commercial farmers who shipped their goods to
markets and then used the resulting cash to purchase goods from small
businesses. 139 Thus, traditional independence gradually changed into
interdependence.
With the rise of trusts, interdependence became impotence. Deci-
sionmaking was transferred from traditional power centers to the great
industrialists. Self-reliant farmers, business owners, and local leaders
became dependent on the discretionary power of a few very rich men.
Local control of society ended as numerous small power centers were
swept away by the new class, one perceived as greedy and evil. 140 This
transfer of power generated hostility towards the trusts and resulted in
the main cause which led to the legislation was the thought that it was required by the
economic condition of the times, that is, the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of
corporations and individuals, the enormous development of corporate organization, the fa-
cility for combination which such organizations afforded, the fact that the facility was being
used, and that combinations known as trusts were being multiplied, and the wide-spread
impression that their power had been and would be exerted to oppress individuals and in-
jure the public generally." Id at 50; see also United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 332 U.S. 533, 553-54 (1944). Another early Supreme Court interpretation of the Sher-
man Act's legislative history, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897), came to the same conclusion: "[Trading combination] may even temporarily, or
perhaps permanently, reduce the price of the article traded in or manufactured ...
"[I]t is not material that the price of an article may be lowered. It is in the power of the
combination to raise it. . . . Nor is it for the substantial interests of the country that any
one commodity should be within the sole power and subject to the sole will of one powerful
combination of capital." Id at 323-24; see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933); United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 901 (D. Md. 1916).
139. For a concise discussion of the myth of agrarian independence and the emergence
of industrial society, see R. HOFSTADTER, REFORM, supra note 132, chs. 1-2.
140. Id ch. 6. Professor Letwin provides a concise description of the public attitude just
before the passage of the Sherman Act: "The great fervor against trusts . . . was for the
people living at the time nothing so sudden or strange. It was simply a familiar feeling
raised to a high pitch, intense because the speed with which new trusts were being hatched
made it seem that they would overrun everything unless some remedy were found soon. The
general disposition of the public was not in doubt. There were numerous objections to the
trusts.... . Trusts, it was said, threatened liberty, because they corrupted civil servants and
bribed legislators; they enjoyed privileges such as protection by tariffs; they drove out com-
petitors by lowering prices, victimized consumers by raising prices, defrauded investors by
watering down stocks, put laborers out of work by closing down plants, and somehow or
other abused everyone. The kind of remedy that the public desired was also clear enough; it
wanted a law to destroy the power of the trusts." W. LETWIN, supra note 24, at 70.
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political pressure on Congress to pass antitrust legislation. 41
The political and social evils of accumulated power, recited in the
legislative debates and reiterated by the cases and historians, probably
engendered more public resentment toward the trusts than did an iso-
lated rise in prices during an era of stable and declining prices. 42 The
congressional complaint, therefore, was directed not solely at the effects
of monopoly power-higher prices and poorer consumers-but also at
the process that produced them. The Sherman Act was intended not
only to achieve competitive prices but also to restructure the economy
in ways insuring a "fair" process for economic, social, and political
decisionmaking by reducing the unfairly accumulated power of the
trusts.
Protecting Small Businesses
Congress also expressed concern for preserving business opportu-
nities for small firms.143 The opportunity to compete has been viewed
as particularly important for small entrepreneurs, perhaps because of
141. Certain exceptions to the Sherman Act were almost certainly not enacted in order
to increase economic efficiency, but were probably provided in order to transfer power, and
perhaps wealth, toward unions and states and in order to curb the social and political power
of the trusts. See generally Noll, Antitrust Exemptions: An Economic Overview in NCRALP
REPORT, supra note 70, at 168-70. The exceptions have the overriding purpose of promoting
such political goals as federalism and the regulatory power of the states. See, e.g., Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). One "exception" to the reach of the Sherman Act concerns the
right to petition the state legislatures by a combination attempting to influence legislation
and thereby produce a monopoly or other restraint of trade. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961). The antitrust laws also exempt labor unions from their coverage. See generally L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 723-31 (1977).
142. See supra notes 125-26, 128 & accompanying text. A recent analogy might be
found in the reaction of the American public to the recent rise in the price of petroleum. If
the public had perceived that prices were rising because oil was getting scarce and expensive
to produce, the public certainly would have become unhappy insofar as this meant that
consumers would have to pay more for their gasoline and would, as a consequence, be
poorer. But it is difficult to feel anger if one believes that price increases are caused "legiti-
mately" by the impersonal factors of supply and demand. By contrast, the fact that the
petroleum price increases were dictated by a small group of men acting at their own discre-
tion angered people. The American public felt helpless before OPEC. There was great un-
certainty over what OPEC might do next, and resentment that a small group of men had the
power to make decisions that drastically affected everyone's life. The "unfairness" of the
way that the price increases came about, in addition to their amounts, helped cause the
public anger towards OPEC.
143. In the opening debates on the Act, Senator Sherman stated: "It is the right of every
man to work, labor, and produce in any lawful vocation and to transport his production on
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their vulnerability to predatory activities. 144 Carrying this goal to its
extreme, Representative Mason alone would have condemned trusts
even if they lowered prices to consumers because they could financially
ruin small businesses. 145
Judicial statements of congressional intention to assist small busi-
nesses have been frequent. 146 Courts have even occasionally viewed
equal terms and conditions and under like circumstances. This is industrial liberty and lies
at the foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges ...
"But, they say, competition is open to all; if you do not like our prices, establish another
combination or trust. . . .[But] when the combination already includes all or nearly all the
producers, what room is there for another?" 21 CONG. REC. 2457, 2460 (1890). This sympa-
thy for the welfare of small businesses was also expressed in the Sherman Act debates by
Senator George: "It is a sad thought to the philanthropist that the present system of produc-
tion and of exchange is having that tendency which is sure at some not very distant day to
crush out all small men, all small capitalists, all small enterprises. . . . So now the Ameri-
can Congress and the American people are brought face to face with this sad, this great
problem: Is production, is trade, to be taken away from the great mass of the people and
concentrated in the hands of a few men...?" Id at 2598. Senator George also stated that
"[b]y the use of this organized force of wealth and money the small men engaged in compe-
tition with them are crushed out; and that is the great evil at which all this legislation ought
to be aimed." Id at 3147. See also the remarks of Senator Pugh concerning the freedom of
competitive fairness as a policy to be furthered. Id at 2558.
144. Hofstadter characterized this type of concern as one that was both "psychological
and moral. It sprang from the conviction that competition has a disciplinary value for char-
acter, quite aside from its trictly economic uses. America was thought to have been made
possible by the particular type of character that was forged by competitive individualism, a
type that had flourished in the United States because competitive opportunities had been so
widespread that alert men could hardly fail to see them, to grasp and use them, and hence, to
be shaped by them. The American male character was believed to have been quickened and
given discipline by the sight and pursuit of opportunity. For this process to take place it was
important that business be carried on fairly . . . and that newcomers be able to enter the
game as entrepreneurs ...
"The economic order was not merely an apparatus for the production of goods and
services; it was a set of rules for forging good conduct." R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID
STYLE supra note 5, at 209.
145. "Some say that the trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced prices; but if
the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to 1 cent a barrel, it would not right the wrong
done to the people of this country by the 'trusts' which have destroyed legitimate competi-
tion and driven honest men from legitimate business enterprises." 21 CONG. REC. 4100
(1890).
146. For example, in Charles A. Ramsay v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512
(1922), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was to
secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public against evils commonly incident to
destruction of competition through monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade." See
also United States v. Topco Ass'n, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). This same general purpose has
also found expression in the doctrine that group boycotts and concerted refusals by traders
to deal with other traders constitute violations of the Sherman Act, even if price competition
is unaffected. See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). It has also found expression in
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congressional interest in protecting small businesses as overriding its
consumer-oriented goals. 147
Despite clear judicial recognition, close examination reveals rela-
tively little support in the legislative history, beyond the few references
above, for the "small producer" rationale.1 48 Although there are a few
statements suggesting that the protection of the opportunity of small
business to compete was one motivating factor for the legislators, these
statements do not imply that protection of small businesses was meant
to override other goals.149 Congress probably did not intend to go fur-
the Court's preferences for individual "enterprise and sagacity." Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945).
147. The most famous exposition of the view that the Sherman Act was passed in order
to preserve small businesses even if this might result in higher prices to consumers is proba-
bly that put forth by Judge Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945): "[Congress in passing the Sherman Act] was not necessarily actuated by
economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer
a system of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and charac-
ter, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few ...
"Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of
their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite ofpossible cost,
an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other."
Id at 429 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The desire to preserve opportunity for
small businesses is perhaps explained by the belief that small businessmen were "worthy
men" who lived productive and honest lives. This sentiment was powerfully expressed in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897), where the Court
stated: 'Trade or commerce under [circumstances of artificially reduced prices] may never-
theless be badly and unfortunately restrained by driving out of business the small dealers
and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be unable to readjust
themselves to their altered surroundings. Mere reduction in the price of the commodity
dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class, and the absorption of control
over one commodity by an all-powerful combination of capital." See also Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild v. Federal Trade Conm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941);
An even more striking example of judicial interpretation occurred in a different context
in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), where the Court referred to the
congressional desire to protect "viable, small, locally owned businesses," even though this
might result in "occasional higher costs and prices." Id at 344. See infra text accompanying
note 254.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44. The courts appear to cite repeatedly the
same few references. For example, to support the conclusion reprinted supra in note 147,
Judge Hand relied on the remarks of Senator Sherman and Senator George, supra note 143.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 428-29.
149. Only Representative Mason expressed an intent to protect small businesses at the
expense of consumers. See supra text accompanying note 145. There are perhaps a small
number of overlooked statements that support Representative Mason's view. In addition,
some of the proconsumer statements may have disguised the desires of a few members of
Congress who really favored aid to small businesses. But a few isolated statements do not
represent the intent of Congress. Nor can they establish the policy or spirit of the Sherman
Act. This is especially true because Representative Mason's views run counter to the strong
consumer orientation of the Sherman Act.
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ther than establishment of an economic system providing free opportu-
nities for entry and enough producers to ensure vigorous competition, a
system in which no company became large enough to dominate. 50
Additionally, the congressional intent to assist small businesses
can be interpreted as promoting distributive, rather than efficiency,
considerations. Passage of the Sherman Act may have been intended,
in part, to transfer wealth to small businesses. The legislative history
does not indicate, however, that Congress intended to help small busi-
nesses as a means of improving the overall efficiency of the economy.
The debate suggests only a possible intent to assist small businesses as
an end in itself, not as a means of increasing total economic output.15 1
Sympathetic to the plight of small businesses harmed by trusts,
Congress expressed a desire to create an environment in which small
businesses could effectively compete. It can fairly be said that one of
Congress' goals was to assist small businesses; although consumers' in-
terests were meant to be paramount, and conflicts between the welfare
of consumers and small businesses were generally to be resolved in
favor of consumers, Congress' desire to help small businesses certainly
extended to those circumstances in which small businesses would be
150. Of course, sentiments in the legislative history denouncing large trusts and monop-
olies and those praising small businesses are closely related. In the views of Professors
Kaysen and Turner, "The legislators were well aware of the common law on restraints of
trade, and of the power of monopolists to hurt the public by raising price, deteriorating
product, and restricting production. At the same time, there was at least equal concern with
the fate of small producers driven out of business, or deprived of the opportunity to enter it,
by 'all powerful aggregations of capital.' There was no obvious inconsistency in these two
interests. One could readily have identified free access and large numbers of comparatively
small producers with competitive processes, and in turn have identified competitive
processes derived from such market structures with beneficial economic results for the public
at large. Or, to short circuit the proposition, one could have equated beneficial economic
results with the protection of large numbers of small independent producers." C. KAYSEN &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 19 (1959). Nevertheless, the two concepts are not identical.
For example, one might fear the economic, social, or political power of IBM and desire that
it be split into five parts. Each part would be a multibillion dollar enterprise and one of the
largest companies in a huge industry. Splitting IBM into five companies could help small
computer companies to compete. Alternatively, however, the five new companies could
drive smaller computer companies out of business. One could desire to split up IBM be-
cause of its size and power, regardless of, or even in spite of, the effect that this would have
on small computer companies.
151. Even large businesses were entitled to protection from predation. At one point
Senator George complained, "If some great manufacturer has been injured by an advance
in the price of his raw material he can sue, but the poor man, the consumer, the laborer, the
farmer, the mechanic, the country merchant, all that large class of American citizens who
constitute 80 per cent of our population and who are the real sufferers will have no opportu-
nity of redress, and the bill, so far as they are concerned, will be a snare and a mere delu-
sion." 21 CONG. Rc. 3150 (1890).
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helped but consumers would not significantly suffer.152 Despite the
wishes of Representative Mason,153 however, this expression of sympa-
thy did not amount to a congressional directive to assist small busi-
nesses in ways conflicting with the essential purpose of the Act, the
protection of consumers.
Summary
Congress passed the Sherman Act to further a number of goals. Its
main concern was with firms acquiring or possessing enough market
power to raise prices artificially and to restrict output. Congress' pri-
mary aim was to enable consumers to purchase products at competitive
prices. Artificially high prices were condemned not for causing alloca-
tive inefficiency but for "unfairly" transforming consumers' wealth into
monopoly profits. All purchasers, whether consumers or businesses,
were given the right to purchase competitively priced goods. All sellers
were given the right to face rivals selling at competitive prices.
Concurrently, Congress was interested in encouraging efficient be-
havior in firms. Congress wanted a competitive economy to encourage
the greater efficiencies resulting from competition. Efficiency gains
were particularly desired when benefits passed through directly to con-
sumers. A concern with productive efficiency could not, however, ex-
plain why Congress passed the Sherman Act. Congress condemned the
relatively efficient trusts and monopolies for redistributive reasons.
With the unlikely possibility of an exception for the "efficient monopo-
list,"154 monopolizing conduct was not permitted merely because it pro-
152. Reconciliation of these interests can be illustrated through an analysis of a hypo-
thetical case of predatory pricing. Assume that a firm lowered prices to below marginal cost
in the short ran, destroyed equally efficient competing small firms, and then increased prices
to the monopoly level for an extended period. Because successful predation would hurt both
consumers and small businesses, it would be condemned under either rationale. Suppose,
however, that the predation attempt was unsuccessful because, although the below-cost pric-
ing secured a monopoly position for the predator, as soon as it attempted to price above cost
new competitors entered the market and eroded its market power. Unsuccessful predation
would not hurt consumers; moreover, because they obtained below-cost goods for a short
term, they benefited. However, small firms in the industry were destroyed by the unsuccess-
ful predation attempt. While Congress desired that consumers not pay monopoly prices, at
no point did Congress desire for consumers to be able to purchase goods below the competi-
tive price. Consumers are entitled to competitive prices, not low prices. Unsuccessful preda-
tion should, therefore, be condemned out of a desire to protect small businesses.
For a legal and economic overview of predation, see Hurwitz & Kovacic, JudicialAnal,-
sir of Predation The Emerging Trends, 35 VAiNrD. L. REv. 63 (1982); Hurwitz, Kovacic,
Sheehan & Lande, Current Legal Standards of Predation, in STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND
ANTITRUST ANALysis (S. Salop ed. 1981), and the sources cited therein.
153. See supra note 149.
154. See supra note 105.
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duced efficiency gains for the monopolist.
The Act also involved efforts to decentralize economic, social, and
political decisionmaking to ensure that narrow private interests would
be unable to override the public good flowing from free competition.
The corporate power that the free market inadequately curbed was the
target of the Act. Thus, the Act was also aimed at curbing the social
and political power of large corporations and at encouraging opportu-
nities for small entrepreneurs to compete, both thought to flow from the
desired economic order as expressed in the Act.
The Sherman Act, the first antitrust law, set the tone for future
antitrust legislation. Subsequent antitrust laws represented either ex-
tensions of the same ideas to different economic arenas, or attempts to
better implement the same fundamental principles.
The Federal Trade Commission Act
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act proscribes
"[uinfair methods of competition,"1 55 a largely undefined prohibition
against such traditional antitrust conduct as cartels and monopoliza-
tion,156 and against such consumer protection problems as fraudulent
or coercive business practices.157 Neither this phrase nor any of its
component words, however, are defined in the Act. The same contro-
versy and uncertainty that arose over the goals of the Sherman Act
similarly cloud the meaning of "unfair methods of competition." The
dominant view is that the FTC Act and the Sherman Act have identi-
cal, efficiency-oriented antitrust goals.' 58 A minority of commentators,
however, believe that the FTC Act was passed for a variety of social
and political purposes. 159
A third view is warranted. Although efficiency was a significant
concern of the FTC Act, this Article argues that the overriding goal of
section 5 was the prevention of transfers of wealth from consumers re-
155. FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
156. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C.L. REv. 227 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Averitt, Unfair
Methods].
157. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Acts or Practices" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Averitt, Unfair Acts or
Practices].
158. If both statutes were directed to maximize the economic efficiency of our economy
it stands to reason that the two statutes should be interpreted identically, and that they
would differ only in the scope of their coverage.
159. See supra notes 1, 11-16.
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suiting from "unfair methods of competition."' 160 For example, when
monopolies force consumers to pay more for their goods or when
fraudulent practices lead consumers to purchase goods they do not re-
ally want, wealth is "unfairly" transferred from consumers to firms
with market power.161
The Congress that passed the FTC Act endorsed the Sherman
Act's prohibitions, but feared that that law was inadequate.162 The re-
port of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce noted that "[a~ll
agree that while the Sherman law is the foundation stone of our policy
on this question, additional legislation is necessary."' 63 Thus, the ob-
jective of both statutes was the same: the prevention and curtailment of
monopoly power.l6 The legislative history of the FTC Act shows it
160. The framers of the FTC Act also had a variety of administrative goals, which will
not be discussed in this Article.
161. The case of In re Allied Corp., File No. 811 0191, FTC (Dec. 8, 1982), directly
confronted the wealth transfer issue. FTC Chairman James C. Miller stated that he en-
dorsed the proposition, advanced by agency economists, that elimination of potential mo-
nopoly overcharges should not be counted as a law enforcement "benefit" when the agency
does cost/benefit analyses. Such monopoly overcharges, said Miller, are merely "revenue
transfers." F.T.C. Watch No. 158, Jan. 14, 1983, at 1. Commissioner Clanton, however,
joined by Commissioners Bailey and Pertschuk, stated his belief that "preventing such trans-
fers is one of the goals of the antitrust laws." Id. at 3.
162. The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce expressed this idea in its 1913 re-
port advocating additional antitrust legislation. The committee was of the opinion that the
Sherman Act "should stand as the fundamental law upon the subject, and that any supple-
mental legislation for more effectual control and regulation of interstate and foreign com-
merce should be in harmony with the purpose of the existing statute." S. REP. No. 1326, 62d
Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1913).
163. Refport of the Senate Comm on Interstate Commerce, S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1914). As a consequence, the FTC was empowered to implement the Sherman
Act. The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce stated: "The proper enforcement of
the Sherman Law also requires vigilant supervision which is most effectively obtained by a
body in continual touch with the business organizations in the various industries." Id at 1.
This can also be illustrated by one of the final House debates involving Representative Fred-
erick C. Stevens, a leading FTC sponsor.
REPRESENTATIVE MADDEN. Do the conferees understand, and wish to have the
House understand, that this does away with the Sherman Law?
REPRESENTATrE STEvENS. Not at all; it expressly does not. It is a method of
enforcing it and making it more effective and preventing its misuse.
51 CONG. REc. 14,934 (1914).
The FTC was also charged with improving upon the Sherman Act's prohibitions by
preventing monopolies in their incipiency. See Averitt, Unfair Acts or Practices, supra note
157, at 242-51. The FTC Act also had the explicit goal of preventing those practices which
violated the spirit of the other antitrust laws. See id at 251-71. Seegeneraly Averitt, Unfair
Methods, supra note 156.
164. As Representative Morgan succinctly stated, "Monopoly is the evil we wish to con-
trol. Competition is the thing we wish to maintain." 51 CONG. REc. 8855 (1914). There
was, however, a vocal minority that advocated a mixture of cooperation and competition.
Senator Lippitt, for example, stated: "Cooperation in trade is a living, vital force that can
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was enacted to better accomplish the goals of the Sherman Act, 165 and
to extend Sherman Act principles to one significant new arena: "un-
fair" or "immoral" business behavior.166
The remainder of this section examines the legislative history of
the FTC Act to determine what Congress meant by "competition" and
by "unfair methods of competition." First, a review of the evidence
demonstrates that the FTC Act was directed at insuring that corporate
productive efficiency was both enhanced and passed on to consumers.
The Article next argues that Congress' primary goal was prevention of
"unfair" transfers of wealth caused by market power. The evidence
also shows that, on balance, Congress did not want its distributive goals
to be sacrificed for other objectives. Finally, the evidence relating to
morality goals, the goal of curbing the noneconomic power of trusts
and monopolies, and the goal of promoting the competitive position of
small businesses is examined.
Improving Economic Efficiency
The dominant view of the FTC Act goals proposes that the Act,
properly construed, should be concerned only with maximizing "con-
sumer welfare,"' 167 that is, with encouraging productive efficiency and
not be neglected, and the problem therefore that has to be intelligently met in the legislation
on that subject if the situation is to be put upon a permanent basis is in some way to clearly
formulate into law the intermediate ground between an unlimited and unregulated and de-
structive competition on the one side and an unregulated and unlimited cooperation on the
other." Id at 13,216.
165. Representative Morgan offered a very comprehensive early view of the Act's goals.
Id at 8854.
166. This prohibition on certain business behaviors, combined with the desire to prevent
particular transfers of wealth, gives rise to and provides the goals behind the efforts of the
Bureau of Consumer Protection. See infra text accompanying notes 213-15 & 221-28. In-
deed, Congress' very use of the term "unfair" to modify "competition" strongly suggests a
purpose for the prohibition that may be desired as moral, social or political, but in any case
does not seem to be primarily efficiency oriented.
167. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 51. Bork cautions, "We are compelled, I think, to
accept this definition of 'competition'... . Very likely this is the primary value Congress
had in mind when it used the word. Moreover, because 'competition' as a shorthand expres-
sion for consumer welfare enables us to employ basic economic theory, it avoids the pitfalls
inherent in the other definitions surveyed .... [A]s will be shown. . only this reading is
consistent with other indicia of congressional intent and with the requirements of the judi-
cial function." Id at 61.
It is interesting to note that Bork considers and rejects four possible alternative mean-
ings of competition:
"1. 'Competition' may be read as the process of rivalry. This is a natural mode of
speech. ... Met it is a loose usage and invites the further, wholly erroneous conclusion
that the elimination of rivalry must always be illegal.
"But this identification of competition with rivalry will not do for antitrust purposes. It
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with minimizing allocative inefficiency. Judge Bork states that the
mandated drive to enhance "consumer welfare" focuses on maximum
economic efficiency and excludes such distributive concerns as "unfair"
transfers of wealth from consumers to monopolists.
168
The prevailing view, however, is not supported by the record. Fa-
miliarity with allocative efficiency did not increase substantially from
1890 to 1914, even among economists, who had little influence on the
passage of the Act, much less among legislators.1 69 No mention of any
concept resembling allocative efficiency appears in the legislative his-
tory of the FTC Act.170 On the other hand, the legislative history
places considerable emphasis on preserving and even increasing corpo-
rate productive efficiency.'7 1
makes rivalry an end in and of itself, no matter how many or how large the benefits flowing
from the elimination of rivalry.
"2. 'Competition' may be read as the absence of restraint over one person's or firm's
economic activities by any other person or firm. So viewed, competition is the absence of
. . 'bondage' .... This is not a useful definition, however, for the preservation of compe-
tition would then require the destruction of all commercial contracts and obligations.
"3. 'Competition' may be read as that state of the market 'in which the individual
buyer or seller does not influence the price by his purchases or sales.... This is an enor-
mously useful model for economic theory, but it is utterly useless as a goal of law ... For
the law to move either national markets ... or local markets ... as close as possible to the
model of perfect competition ... would entail an unbelievable loss in national wealth for
no particular purpose.'
"4. 'Competition' may be read, in a meaning closely related to the one just discussed,
as the existence of 'fragmented industries and markets' preserved 'through the protection of
viable, small, locally owned business."' Id at 58-60.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 72-89.
169. While the concept was known to economists, the theoretical underpinnings of allo-
cative efficiency were mostly undeveloped in 1914. See supra notes 91-100 & accompanying
text; A. MARSHALL, supra note 26, at 395-410 (8th ed. 1920) (reprinted 1961). Professor
Stigler, discussing the influence of economists on the 1914 legislation, concluded, "I am
unwilling to believe that economists... had any appreciable influence on antitrust legisla-
tion." Stigler, supra note 98, at 6.
170. None of the scholars who advocate allocative efficiency as the goal of antitrust laws
have been able to point to any remarks in the Act's legislative history that indicate an under-
standing of the concept.
171. The statement that perhaps most strongly supports a major role for efficiency in § 5
analysis came from Senator Hollis: "Fair competition is competition which is successful
through superior efficiency. Competition is unfair when it resorts to methods which shut out
competitors who, by reason of their efficiency, might otherwise be able to continue in busi-
ness and prosper. Without the use of unfair methods no corporation can grow beyond the
limits imposed upon it by the necessity of being as efficient as any competitor. The mere size
of a corporation which maintains its position solely through superior efficiency is ordinarily
no menace to the public interest." 51 CONG. REc. 12,146 (1914). It should be noted that
Senator Hollis was not one of the Act's principal sponsors. Nor did he explicitly confront
the problem that even efficient firms may charge monopolistic prices. Despite his failure to
confront the tradeoff between monopolistic overcharges and efficiency, however, his state-
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Undoubtedly efficiency concerns were meant to play a major role
in section 5 analysis, but remarks of a number of legislators suggest that
efficiency was not Congress' sole objective. Their views imply that
Congress was primarily concerned with preserving those efficiency ben-
efits that flowed directly to consumers. 172 For example, Senator Cum-
ment nevertheless provides support for the view that efficiency should play a strong role in
§ 5 analysis.
Senator Robinson, quoting William H.S. Stevens, a leading economist of the times,
provided a similar definition: "Nearly all normal business men can distinguish between 'fair
competition' and 'unfair competition.' Efficiency is generally regarded as the fundamental
principle of the former-efficiency in producing and in selling, while oppression or advan-
tage obtained by deception or some questionable means is the distinguishing characteristic
of 'unfair competition.'" Id at 12,248. Professor Stevens expressed a similar opinion
shortly after the Act was passed: "Il7he interest of thepublic lies in securing the best goods at
the lowest prices or, translated into other terms, in a competition ofproductive and/or selling
efficiency. In other words, the power given to the Trade Commission under section 5 is the
power to prevent those methods which do not constitute a competition or productive and/or
selling efficiency." W. STEVENS, "UNFAIR COMPETITION," A STUDY OF CERTAIN TRADE
PRACTIcES 236 (1917) (emphasis in original). Stevens continued that "a competition of pro-
ductive and selling efficiency is, in the last analysis, practically synonymous with the public
interest." Id
Further, the 1913 Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce stated that it "believes
that the progress of the world depends in a large measure upon that fair, reasonable rivalry
among men which has hitherto characterized the advances of civilization. S. REP. No. 1326,
62d Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1913). Representative Morgan wanted the Act "[t]o enable us to
assure all the benefits and advantages of the large industrial unit and escape the evils and
dangers thereof. . . .[t]o relieve doubt and uncertainty to business, develop trade, en-
courage commerce, and promote enterprise .. " 51 CONG. REC. 8854 (1914). Additional
concern for efficiency can be found in the earliest proceedings of the FTC, which noted its
desire in making rulings and orders "to promote business efficiency and, within the limits of
practicability, to cooperate with the business world in developing the best standards of com-
mercial ethics." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 26 (1916).
172. One early exchange openly revealed a preference for consumers, and explicitly
stated that the purpose of the Act was not to help corporations:
MR. BARTLETT. [The bill for the creation of the Federal Trade Commission] is in
the interest of the people and not in the interest of the corporations.
MR. STEVENS.... This must all be done with an eye single to the welfare of the
people, and not in the interest of anyone who may desire these modifications ....
MR. BARTLETT. And the course which the gentlemen suggest is not a course that is
in the interest of the corporations, but in the interest of the people themselves.
51 CONG. REc. at 8852 (1914).
Representative Frederick C. Stevens, a House manager of the bill and a leading mem-
ber of the conference committee that produced the final version that was eventually enacted,
addressed this issue at the beginning of the debates: "The people have the right to look to us
to ascertain what evils there really are and what remedies may be necessary, and at the same
time preserve the inestimable blessings of our system of government and the wonderful effi-
ciency and progress of our business affairs. This measure--by regulating efficiency of our
organizations and institutions so that the people can get the benefit of that efficiency, can
maintain a prosperity for the masses of our people, can assure them that their Government
continues for their benefit, can assure stability and harmony and in such way conduce to the
general satisfaction with our institutions." Id at 8852 (emphasis added). This same inter-
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mins, one of the bill's two main sponsors and the author of the
influential "Cummins Report," 173 applauded the efficiencies associated
with large firms. He warned, however, that "[w]hatever those econo-
mies and efficiencies may be, they must. . . stop short of one thing,
that is, the power to rule that field of commerce which they attempt to
Occupy.-"174
Even some opponents of the FTC Act based their opposition on
the potentially negative impact on consumers of the inefficiencies that
the Act would require.1 75 The ultimate goal of the opposition was also
pretation also seems to be suggested by Representative Stevens toward the end of the debate:
"In the economic field the Commission should assist the business concerns of this country
along the lines demanded by the American people of efficiency and fairness. Then, while it
is done, the pubilc [sic] also wants to know that with this efficiency will equally go fairness in
the distribution of the benefits of such organization and work." Id at 14,938. Representa-
tive Stevens also stated: "[W]e want these men who have accomplished so much and are
capable of so much to realize that there is a responsibility upon them as American citizens,
that they receive a part of the blessings of our institutions, and that they must yield some-
thing and do something for the common welfare and not try to grab it all for themselves."
Id at 8853.
173. S. REP. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
174. 51 CONG. REc. 11,456 (1914). Cummins continued, "[T]here is no business field in
this country so small but that it ought to be occupied by at least two enterprises, whether
individual or corporate." Id at 11,455-56; see also the remarks of Senator Newlands, 51
CONG. REc. 11,109 (1914).
The minority view expressed in the 1914 Report of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce seems to take a similar position. This view would seem to allow
corporations to keep the benefits from their efficiency advantages to the extent that these
profits are not attributable to harm to consumers: "Any advantage large corporations have
over small corporations or individuals through lower costs of production they are entitled to,
but they should be prevented from an unfair use of the power that comes from their size
alone." H.R. REP. No. 533, pt. 2, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
175. Senator Lippitt extolled the efficiencies of monopolies because, in his opinion, they
resulted in lower prices for consumers: "I believe that they enable the farmer and the con-
sumer to buy goods at a cheaper price than they can be sold without some form of efficient
organization." 51 CONG. REc. 13,306 (1914). Similarly, Senator Weeks stated that "there
are a great many combinations which have reduced prices as a result of the combination,
and that therefore they have been for the public good." Id at 12,732. Senator Lippitt later
stated that the FTC should not be created because it would achieve the opposite of its stated
goal. He believed that it would make corporations less efficient, and that these losses would
be passed on to consumers: "I have no doubt myself that it will add millions and millions of
dollars to the cost of production of the articles used in the trade of the United States, and I
am sorry that there is not somewhere some more definite information to be obtained upon
this very important phase: for the ultimate result of such expenditures must undoubtedly be
borne by the consumers of the articles as an addition to the already burdensome cost of
living." Id at 13,213. Lippitt later quoted a speech by Victor Morawetz, delivered at the
second annual meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington,
February 12, 1914: "[Slome contracts and combinations of that character are necessary to
secure economy and efficiency in production and in trade and to preserve strong and healthy
competition at home and in foreign markets. If such contracts or combinations involve no
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achieving the lowest possible prices for consumers. 176 They differed
with the sponsors of the FTC Act only about the method which would
best achieve this goal.
The legislative history of the FTC Act thus indicates that Congress
wanted efficiency to play a major role in section 5 analysis. 77 Several
statements even suggest that efficiency was meant to be the only goal of
the Act, or, at least, should not be sacrificed in the pursuit of any other
goal.178 But most statements suggest that economic efficiency was only
one of the legislators' concerns and, further, that Congress wanted to
ensure that purchasers received their "fair" share of these efficiency
benefits.' 79 The evidence suggests, moreover, that the majority of the
legislators subordinated their appreciation for corporate efficiency to
their distaste for monopoly overcharges. The bulk of the legislative
history indicates that efficiency should be a factor in section 5 analysis
only when its benefits accrue primarily to consumers, and not to trusts
or monopolies. That is, Congress was not willing to sacrifice consum-
ers' direct monetary interests in order that monopolists might become
richer. Thus, the 1914 Congress, like the Congress that passed the
Sherman Act, strongly limited the role of efficiency in antitrust
analysis. 180
Protecting Consumers from Unfair Transfers of Wealth
The legislative history of the FTC Act makes clear that Congress
elements of oppression of others, and if they do not put an end to healthy competition in any
branch or [sic] trade or commerce, they should not be prohibited." Id at 13,218.
176. Id A cynic viewing these remarks, however, might speculate that they showed con-
cern for obtaining the lowest possible prices for consumers in part because this seemed to be
a useful tactic to prevent the creation of the FTC.
177. Congressional remarks concerned only productive efficiency. Although members
of Congress did not consider the problem, it seems reasonable to believe that they would
have been concerned with allocative inefficiency had they confronted it. See supra notes 89-
100.
178. See supra note 171 and sources cited therein.
179. See supra notes 172, 174-76 and sources cited therein.
180. Although the debates show more discussion of efficiency in 1914 than in 1890, the
role of efficiency in § 5 analysis seems to be identical to the role it was intended to play in
Sherman Act analysis. See supra notes 95-108 & accompanying text. Under each statute
there are some statements which imply a very strong or even dominant role for efficiency.
The remarks by Senator Hoar in the Sherman Act debates, supra note 105, and Senators
Hollis and Robinson in the FTC Act debates suggest this view. See supra note 171. In each
statute's legislative history, however, the weight of the evidence suggests that efficiency was
meant to be only one factor in the overall welfare analysis, and that efficiency concerns were
not meant to prevail in those cases where they helped cause higher prices for consumers.
Under the majority view, Congress' goal was both to increase firms' efficiency and to insure
that the benefits of modern productivity were directly passed to consumers.
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wanted to insure the existence of free competition and to prevent the
use of market power to extract unfairly the entitlements or property
rights Congress had decided belonged to consumers. Congress' domi-
nant interest was to allow consumers to purchase their goods at com-
petitive prices'81 without sacrificing other consumer interests such as
optimal product quality. 82
Congressional motives in condemning artificially high consumer
prices were no different in 1914 than in 1890; Congress' redistributive
concerns were paramount. Senator Newlands, the Act's main sponsor
and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
framed the issue as a concern for "unreasonable and extortionate
prices.' 183 Senator Lane identified the danger as
[t]he fraud and the theft which is being practiced upon the people of
this country... which mulct the people of this country out of hun-
dreds of millions of dollars each year ... [The people] are also being
compelled to pay arbitrarily fixed and unjustly high prices for what
they consume, they are being robbed .... 184
The Minority Report of the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce complained that "[t]he common people are staggering
under the burden they bear as a result of contributing extortionate
181. The goals of "protecting consumers against the high prices and [guarding] the inter-
ests of employees" were expressed by the House in H.R. REP. No. 533, pt. 1, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 14 (1914) (quoting from the Preliminary Report of the Industrial Commission, submitted
to Congress in 1900). Senator McCumber even wondered if the only goal of the FTC Act
was to control unfair competition whether or not the public obtained their goods "cheaper
than they did before." 51 CONG. REC. 13,232 (1914). The Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce wanted to keep "within limited bounds the activities of a multitude of price-
fixing associations in different branches of business, which, together with the great trusts,
have been potent causes of the present high cost of living." S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1914).
Congress specified competitive rather than low prices out of a recognition that a would-
be monopolist might attempt to use predatorily low prices to drive out competition and then
price at a monopoly level. Senator Reed presented a typical predatory pricing hypothetical:
"It has been charged that.. .[the Standard Oil Company] goes into a trade territory which
is occupied by a rival, drops the price of its products below their actual cost, and thus
crushes and destroys the competitor, meantime selling in other communities at a higher
price and gaining profits there, and out of those profits gained in other places sustaining
itself, while it is selling goods at a loss in the community where their rival is located. When
he is crushed it puts up the price. Now, that could be condemned under the provision I have
drawn." 51 CONG. Rc. 13,231 (1914). See infra notes 200 & 203.
182. See, e.g., remarks of Senators Cummins and Lippitt. 51 CONG. REc. 11,106 (1914).
183. Report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Appendix: Statement by
Sen. Newlands, S. Rm. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1914). Newlands also spoke in
terms of an "unfair or unreasonable price." Id
184. 51 CONG. REc. 13,223 (1914).
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profits to the trusts and monopolies."' 85 Further, the stated goals of
Representative Morgan were "[tjo minimize the power of the large in-
dustrial corporation to concentrate wealth, and to maximize its power
as an agency for the equitable distribution of wealth [and] allay public
suspicion and distrust, remove prejudice and secure the people from
unjust tribute levied by monopolistic corporations."'' 8 6
Even opponents of the Commission recognized redistribution as a
central goal. 87 The legislative history indicates that opponents hoped
to secure competitively low prices for consumers, opposing the bill in
part because in their opinion it would cause productive inefficiencies
that would raise consumer prices.'88
These remarks suggest that Congress was overwhelmingly inter-
ested in securing competitive prices for consumers. 89 Congress' de-
scriptive use of the terms "exactions," "extortionate profits," "theft,"
and "looting" is evidence of its great displeasure and suggests congres-
sional condemnation of supracompetitive prices not because they
caused allocative inefficiency, but rather because they "unfairly" trans-
ferred wealth from consumers to producers. Although price was the
touchstone of congressional concern, Congress had broader aims as
well.' 90 As the next section indicates, these goals were primarily social
and ethical in nature.
185. H.R. REP. No. 533, pt. 3, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1914) (minority report) (Rep. Laf-
ferty's views).
186. 51 CONG. REC. 8854 (1914). See also supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
Even though Congress sought to protect consumers of particular products, it sometimes
was concerned with products that might be inputs for other products. Senator Borah, refer-
ring to an instance of predatory pricing, explicitly named "those who should be benefited
under the law of competition-that is, the consumers or users of these agricultural imple-
ments." Id at 11,232.
187. Senator Burton, for example, stated that "no one here-I can speak with confidence
for the entire Senate-would put one obstacle in the way of punishing dishonesty, of
preventing oppression, of prohibiting exactions." 51 CONG. REC. 14,792 (1914).
188. See supra remarks of Senator Lippitt in text accompanying note 175.
189. See exchange between Representatives Bartlett and Stevens, supra note 172.
190. As Senator Cummins noted, prices were not Congress' only concern: "We often go
wrong, I believe, in assuming that because a great corporation, a vast aggregation of wealth,
can produce a given commodity more cheaply than can a smaller concern, therefore it is for
the welfare and the interest of the people of the country that the commodity shall be pro-
duced at the lower cost. I do not accept that article of economic faith. I think we can
purchase cheapness at altogether too high a price, if it involves the surrender of the individ-
ual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single master mind." 51 CoNG. REC.
12,742 (1914).
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Other Goals of the FTC Act
Preventing Unethical Business Practices
Congressional use of the word "unfair" to describe the types of
competition it wanted to prohibit strongly suggests that the goals of
section 5 include moral or ethical elements. The Act's legislative his-
tory strongly supports the conclusion that Congress wanted to prevent
certain practices not because of any effects on efficiency or wealth dis-
tribution but because Congress considered them inherently unethi-
cal.' 91 The desire to eliminate immoral practices was based, in part, on
the belief that monopolies often resulted from immoral business behav-
ior.' 92 The FTC, it was believed, would become the "social machinery
which will protect the individual from oppression and wrong."'193 Even
the bill's critics thought the prohibition was, in part, an ethical one.' 94
Thus, the legislative history leads to the conclusion that moral or ethi-
cal concerns helped inspire congressional use of the term "unfair."
The debates list several trade practices or conditions that the legis-
lature considered "unfair;," monopolies created by unfair tactics were
191. Senator Newlands, for example, defined the parameters of "unfair competition" to
include "every practice and method between competitors upon the part of one against the
other that is against public morals .... ." Id. at 11,1 12. Newlands wanted legislation to
prevent "practices that shock the universal conscience of mankind." Id at 12,980.
Senator Newlands strongly believed in the desirability of establishing standards of busi-
ness ethics: "[I]t would be utterly impossible for Congress to define the numerous practices
which constitute unfair competition and which are against good morals in trade, for we are
beginning to realize that there is a standard of morals in trade or that there ought to be." Id
at 11,084. He stated the objective of Congress to be "simply to maintain by law good morals
in business as in other matters." Id at 11,108.
192. "Monopoly commences in insidious ways, by practices that are against good morals
and constitute violations of individual rights for which the individual can have an action at
law or in equity, but rights which the individual, because of his poverty or of his insignifi-
cance is often unable to assert against these great organized powers." Id at 12,030. New-
lands believed that his prohibition would cover everything Congress wanted and would
"have such an elastic character that it [would] meet every new condition and every new
practice that [might] be invented with a view to gradually bringing about monopoly through
unfair competition." Id at 12,024.
193. Id at 11,109.
194. Senator Reed, a leading opponqnt of the Act, unsuccessfully proposed an amend-
ment to redefine § 5 as follows: "The term unfair competition is hereby defined to embrace
all these acts, devices, concealments, threats, coercions, deceits, frauds, discriminations, dis-
honest practices, false representations, slanders of business, and all other acts or devices,
whether of like nature with those herein enumerated or not, done or used with the intent or
the effect of which is to destroy or unreasonably hinder the business of another or prevent
another from engaging in business, or to restrain trade or to create a monopoly." Id at
13,310.
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only one such example.195 Many of these practices could be con-
demned because they led to monopoly power and eventually to the
"unfair" extraction of wealth from consumers. Other practices could
be prohibited because they unfairly harmed small businesses. With re-
spect to these practices, characterizing section 5 concerns in terms of
morality instead of consumer impact or small business protection might
be historically correct, but makes little or no difference in the outcome
of these cases.
Many of the practices mentioned in the debates might not lead to
monopoly power,196 but may have been considered malum in se. 197
Certain predatory practices, such as blowing up a competitor's plant or
industrial espionage, are as obviously immoral as fraud or coercion,198
195. Senator Robinson presented the longest list of unfair practices that appears in the
1914 debates:
1. Local price cutting.
2. Operation of bogus "independent" concerns.
3. Maintenance of "fighting ships" and "fighting brands."
4. Lease, sale, purchase, or use of certain articles as a condition of the lease, sale,
purchase, or use of other required articles.
5. Exclusive sales and purchase arrangements.
6. Rebates and preferential contracts.
7. Acquisition of exclusive or dominant control of machinery or goods used in
the manufacturing process.
8. Manipulation.
9. Black lists, boycotts, white lists, etc.
10. Espionage and use of detectives.
11. Coercion, threats, and intimidation.
Id at 11,230.
In addition, the Democratic Platform of 1912 favored "the prevention of holding com-
panies, of interlocking directors, of stock watering, of discrimination in price, and the con-
trol by any one corporation of so large a proportion of any industry as to make it a menace
to competitive conditions." REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN TEXTBOOK 1912 at 272 reprinted in G.
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 16-17 (1924). Similarly, the Progressive
Platform for that year favored strengthening the Sherman Law by "prohibiting agreements
to divide territory or limit output; refusing to sell to customers who buy from business rivals;
to sell below cost in certain areas while maintaining higher prices in other places; using the
power of transportation to aid or injure special business concerns; and other unfair trade
practices." T. ROOSEVELT, PROGRESSIVE PRINCIPLES, appendix at 319, reprinted in G. HEN-
DERSON, supra, at 17.
196. See supra note 195. Of course, § 5 has a strong incipiency mandate. See supra note
163 for a brief definition of incipiency mandate.
197. Some members of Congress may have viewed even cartels and monopolies them-
selves as malum in se. Senator Newlands suggested that certain practices were against "the
laws of God." 51 CONG. REC. 11,086 (1914) (quoting State v. Central Lumber Co., 24 S.D.
136, 153 (1909)).
198. The legislators often referred to blatantly predatory acts which are relatively rare
today. For example, early in the debates Senator Newlands stated that it had been proven
that the National Cash Register Company "had men in the employ of their rivals, that they
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and were condemned without regard to their effects on efficiency, dis-
tribution, small businesses, or consumers.
The primary impact of the ethical mandate of the statute has been
the creation of the Bureau of Consumer Protection. It is possible to
characterize this Bureau's concern with fraudulent, deceptive, and co-
ercive practices solely as another manifestation of congressional con-
demnation of unfair transfers of wealth from consumers to
producers. 99 It seems at least equally likely that Congress considered
conventional consumer protection problems to be matters of morality
and, for this reason, the object of prohibition.2 o
As a practical matter, however, unethical or immoral conduct has
rarely been a factor in FTC antitrust enforcement.20 1 Only blatantly
unscrupulous practices, such as bribery or industrial sabotage, con-
demned by society under any circumstances, are challenged by the
had every form of espionage and detection, and that they even resorted to bribery of the
employees of the rival concerns." Id at 11,108.
199. It should also be noted that these practices generally lower economic efficiency.
For example, coercive or fraudulent transactions can lower business confidence or individ-
ual incentive and might thus decrease the total stock of goods produced by the economy. It
must be emphasized, however, that such practices were not condemned because of their
efficiency effects.
200. This point is illustrated in the following exchange between Senator Lippitt and
Senator Cummins:
SENATOR Lippr. [I]f the competition is of such high character as to reduce the
price to the public, it is going to be a very difficult question to say that it is injuri-
ous to the public. I presume he means it is unfair to the public, it is injurious, and
that because in some way it will ultimately result in higher prices to them, but if the
competition results in lower prices to the public, it is fair to them?
MR. CUMMINs. Not always-If one goes into a store and desires a certain thing
and through a misrepresentation, such as I have indicated, he takes another thing
he is injured, and the people generally are injured if the same thing is practiced on
them, without regard to the price, without regard to the quality of the goods
involved.
51 CONG. REc. 11,106 (1914).
201. Only in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1933), and
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972), did the Court rely
upon moral or ethical objections as the basis for finding an antitrust violation. In Sperry &
Hutchinson the Court referred with approval to the factors that the FTC may consider "in
determining whether a practice that is neither in violation of the antitrust laws nor deceptive
is nonetheless unfair (I) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the com-
mon law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some
common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers
(or competitors or other businessmen)." Id at 244-45 n.5. For a detailed discussion of this
case, see Averitt, Unfair Methods, supra note 156.
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FTC on ethical grounds alone.202 Otherwise, immoral or unethical
practices are challenged only when the practice is one that unfairly
transfers wealth from consumers to producers, unduly harms small
businesses, or causes economic inefficiency. 20 3 As a prescriptive matter,
it rarely makes a difference whether congressional displeasure with cer-
tain practices is characterized by distributive preferences for consumers
or small businesses, or by ethical considerations. 2°4 Under either ex-
planation Congress has directed that these practices be prohibited.20 5
Curbing the Social and Political Power of Trusts and Monopolies
The FTC Act also was inspired by congressional interest in curb-
ing the social and political power of large trusts and monopolies al-
though this factor is less significant than in the Sherman Act debates.
Nevertheless, as historian Richard Hofstadter has noted, the trusts and
monopolies inspired "a fear founded in political realities-the fear that
the great business combinations, being the only centers of wealth and
power, would be able to lord it over all other interests and thus to put
202. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchison, 405 U.S. 233 (1972); Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1933).
203. The Act was also designed to help firms that were subjected to unfair business
practices. For example, Senator McCumber inquired, "Here are two manufacturers selling
their articles in competition with each other in a certain territory. One of the manufacturers
advertises that his goods are produced by the most modem methods, that they are in every
respect as good or better than those of his competitor, and that he will sell them 25 per cent
cheaper than his competitor. We will assume that that public statement is false and untrue,
that it is absolutely unfair, but the result has been that the competitor in that field has re-
duced the price of his product to meet the competition, and the public are getting his goods
25 per cent cheaper than they did before. Under that condition can not the man or corpora-
tion who has been compelled to reduce the price of his product by reason of that competition
go before this commission and insist that his competitor's goods are not as good as his and
that the competition is unfair, and ask an injunction against the continuance of that claim
for the goods of the competitor?" 51 CONG. REC. 13,232 (1914). Senator Reed answered:
"Certainly... the Senator has stated a very strong case, a case in which bad morals were
involved, in which falsehood was involved, and yet the effect was to promote competition,
and hence promote the general welfare." Id. Even though prices would fall in the short
term, the behavior described by Senator Reed would probably not promote long-term com-
petition and general welfare.
204. For certain immoral acts, however, differences would still remain. If the acts were
blatantly immoral, such as industrial espionage, murder, or destroying a competitor's plant,
it seems doubtful that the FTC should even allow the defendant to attempt to justify its
actions on economic grounds. The FTC should be able to ban such blatantly immoral prac-
tices by a per se approach.
205. Although there were certainly views to the contrary, the legislative history also
seems to suggest that Congress meant to condemn immoral practices in part because they
harmed other businesses. In addition to the quotations presented in this section, some of the
statements infra in notes 210-11 & accompanying text suggest this.
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an end to traditional American democracy. ' 20 6 One Minority Report
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce de-
plored the "unfortunate state of the Union" because "[flifty men in the
United States control, through interlocking directorates, 40 percent of
the wealth of the country. '20 7
This fear was echoed throughout the debates. 20 8 Congressman
F.C. Stevens stated:
Vast wealth has been accumulated, especially in the hands of a few,
irresponsible except to their own consciences and sense ofjustice and
patriotism, and these powers have become so concentrated and in-
volved that disentanglement is extremely difficult.
From this situation the great mass of our people have a very just
apprehension that this wealth, and power growing out of it, may be
not only used to the detriment but also may be a potential source of
injury and oppression.
He also advocated the creation of the FTC because "[t]he people will
not be afraid of mere size if it knows that an able and wise and power-
ful commission is guarding their interests ....
Strong statements by Congress notwithstanding, the strident rheto-
ric that pervaded the Sherman Act debate was largely missing. Be-
cause the FTC Act was, in large part, an attempt more effectively to
accomplish the Sherman Act's goals, it is not surprising that most
speakers debated ways to fine-tune existing antitrust law, rather than
declare that Congress should do something about the powerful trusts.
The same problems may have existed in both 1914 and 1890, but the
contemplated solution in 1914 was more ameliorative than innovative.
206. See R. HOFSTADTER, R ORM, supra note 132, at 277. "At bottom, the central fear
was fear of power and the greater the strength of an organized interest the greater anxiety it
aroused. Hence it was the trusts, the investment banking houses, the interlocking director-
ates, the swollen private fortunes that were most criticized." Id at 241.
207. H.R. REP. No. 533, pt. 3, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1914) (minority report) (Rep. Laf-
ferty's views).
208. See, e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 8850 (1914). Senator Newlands, commenting on the
"Cummins Report," S. REP. No. 1326, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. xii (1913), added that "we find
that the trusts are more powerful today than when the antitrust act was passed and that the
evils have grown up so interwoven with the general business of the country as to make men
tremble at the consequence of their disruption." S. REP. No. 1326, 63d Cong., 3rd Sess. 19
(1914) (additional views of Sen. Newlands, quoting a speech he made in the Senate, Jan. 11,
1911). For a discussion of the "Cummins Report," see Averitt, Unfair Methods, supra note
156, at 231-32. Senator Kenyon feared that "[i]f we are going to concede, after all these
years, that this Government is powerless to destroy monopoly, then we have got to concede
that monopoly is powerful enough to destroy this Government . . . ." 51 CONG. REc.
13,158 (1914); see also id at 13,211 (remarks of Sen. Lippitt); id at 8850 (remarks of Rep.
F.C. Stevens).
209. 51 CONG. REc. 14,938 (1914).
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Protecting Small Businesses
A number of statements in the legislative history of the FTC Act
imply that direct protection of small businesses was an explicit goal of
the Act.2 10 There were also suggestions that competition was the only
object of the statute. 2 1 It seems most likely that Congress' primary goal
210. For example, Senator Newlands expressed a desire to stop any practice that tended
"to injury of a competitor unfairly." Id at 12,980. Senator Reed articulated the purposes
underlying the FTC Act as follows: "We are trying to keep the doors of competition open in
this land. We are trying to keep the highways of opportunity unobstructed. We are trying to
keep it so that the feet of the men of today may travel along an open path, so that all may
have a fair chance to gain a livelihood and to embark in business." Id at 13,231; see also id
at 13,232 (statement of Sen. McCumber), 12,932-33 (statement of Sen. Lewis).
Congressman F.C. Stevens stated, "Vast wealth has been accumulated, especially in the
hands of a few, irresponsible except to their own consciences and sense of justice and patri-
otism, and these powers have become so concentrated and involved that disentanglement is
extremely difficult. "From this situation the great mass of our people have a very just appre-
hension that this wealth, and power growing out of it, may be not only used to the detriment
but also may be a potential source of injury and oppression." Id. at 8850. Further, he
advocated the creation of the FTC because "[t]he people will not be afraid of mere size if it
knows that an able and wise and powerful and patriotic commission is guarding their inter-
ests .... " Id. at 14,938.
Senator Lane feared that if the proposed legislation were not artfully crafted, "every
small and honorable dealer may be put to intentional and infinite annoyance or driven out
of business by his larger or more crafty rival." Id. at 13,223. Senator Burton felt, "In our
business life there must be a free field for all, and along with this tendency toward opera-
tions on an enormous scale no policy should be adopted or allowed under which equality of
opportunity shall be destroyed or the deserving competitor driven out of business." Id at
14,792; see also id. at 12,980 (remarks of Sen. Newlands).
These quotations suggesting a moral objective to the Act also show that businesses, in
addition to consumers, were objects of the Act's protections. See supra notes 191-205 &
accompanying text.
211. "Where there is a practice or a class of practices which has for its main purpose an
injury to the public by eliminating competition which ought to exist in the public interest, in
such cases it is a fraud on the public, both as to purpose and results. If it be for the public
interest to preserve healthful competition, then it is our duty to provide the means for it." 51
CONG. REC. 14,937 (1914) (statement of Rep. Stevens); see also id at 14,936-38.
Senator McCumber agreed with Representatives Stevens and Bartlett, see their discus-
sion supra note 172, about the intended beneficiaries of the Act: "I would like to vote for a
trades commission bill the object of which would be to facilitate trade, insure honest compe-
tition, and insure a competition that would be beneficial to the public and not interfere with
any competition that does not concern the public at large." Id at 13,303.
Senator Cummins emphasized the specific aims of the Act: "The unfairness must be
tinctured with unfairness to the public, not merely with unfairness to the rival or competi-
tor. . . . We are not simply trying to protect the people of the United States, and of course,
there must be in the imposture or in the vicious practice or method something that has a
tendency to affect the people of the country or be injurious to their welfare." Id. at 11,105.
This cannot, however, be fully reconciled with Senator Cummins' later statement that "we
must do something to preserve the independence of the man as distinguished from the power
of the corporation; that we must do something to perpetuate the individual initiative. We
often go wrong, I believe, in assuming that because a great corporation, a vast aggregation of
wealth, can produce a given commodity more cheaply than can a smaller concern, therefore
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was preventing harm to the general public by prohibiting those prac-
tices that harmed small businesses to the extent that the practices
harmed competition in general. Congress was certainly concerned with
providing equal opportunity for small entrepreneurs and with con-
demning unfair business methods, in part, because of the effect of such
methods on small businesses.212
Although some members of Congress supported the protection of
small businesses as an end in itself, it appears that Congress did not
intend to protect small businesses if higher prices for consumers re-
sulted. Interpreting the statute as a directive to aid small businesses
only when this aid does not interfere with any of Congress' other goals
is more consistent with the general import of the FTC and Sherman
Acts.
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Synthesis
As previously discussed, the antitrust concerns embodied in the
FTC Act were based primarily upon distributive concerns.213 A similar
argument can be made concerning Congress' consumer protection
goals. That is, Congress did not condemn practices such as fraud be-
cause they were inefficient 214 rather, it considered them to be unfair
transfers of wealth from purchasers to sellers.215
Congress' intentions perhaps could be characterized as an implicit
and unconscious attempt to propnote competition by preventing specific
types of market failures. This characterization is appropriate because a
basic assumption underlying the Act was that the free market, when
functioning properly, would best structure and "regulate" the Ameri-
it is for the welfare and the interest of the people of the country that the commodity shall be
produced at a lower cost. I do not accept that article of economic faith. I think we can
purchase cheapness at altogether too high a price, if it involves the surrender of the individ-
ual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single master mind." Id at 12,742.
212. The first stages of a monopolization plan often harm small businesses and aid con-
sumers. Only the advanced stages of monopolization, when prices have been raised above
competitive levels, are likely to harm consumers. Condemnation of monopolization in its
incipiency thus primarily stems from a concern with the welfare of small businesses. See
also supra note 156.
213. See supra notes 181-89 & accompanying text.
214. Of course, one could justify a prohibition against fraud on efficiency grounds. See,
e.g., Darby & Karni, Free Compedtion and the OptimalAmount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & EcON. 67
(1973). The important point, however, is that Congress did not do so.
215. For example, Senator Reed referred to a case in which one man had "copied an-
other man's goods" and concluded that the copier "was taking advantage of the other man's
art and genius and ability. He was, in effect, stealing the other man's ideas." 51 CONG. REC.
12,023 (1914); see also remarks of Senator Reed, id at 12,026.
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can economy.216 While in the long run the operation of the free market
might erode every cartel or monopoly, or force companies engaging in
fraud or other anticompetitive practices to go out of business, by 1914
Congress recognized that, in the short run, the free market did not
always function perfectly. With the advantage of hindsight, one might
well conclude that the FTC was established because of a congressional
belief that such factors as false information, 21 7 imperfect or incomplete
information, 218 free rider problems, 21 9 or insufficient resources 220
216. Senator Newlands, in an appendix to the 1914 Report of the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce, stated that Congress "desires to maintain by governmental action if
need be, the full competitive system and to rely chiefly on competition as the regulator of
corporate business." S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1914) (appendix). See also the
comment by Representative Morgan, supra in the text accompanying note 190. In his ad-
dress of January 20, 1914, President Wilson gave his early view that the FTC should be
established so that it would function "only as an indispensable instrument of information
and publicity, as a clearing house for the facts by which both the public mind and the man-
agers of great business undertakings should be guided, and as an instrumentality for doing
justice to business where the processes of the courts or the natural forces of correction
outside the courts are inadequate to adjust the remedy to the wrong in a way that will meet
all the equities and circumstances of the case." Address by President Wilson on Trusts and
Monopolies, H.R. Doc. No. 625, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1914). Wilson was saying that the
FTC should act only when the "natural forces of correction" were inadequate due, to use his
example, to imperfect information, which is an example of and cause of market failure.
Representative R.B. Stevens also framed the issues in these terms: "[I]f we are to rely
on the theory of competition to protect the public from the power of large corporations, it is
imperative that the Government shall see to it that competition is on fair and equal terms."
Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 533,
pt. 2, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914) (minority views, delivered by Rep. Stevens). In addition,
the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce noted in its February 26, 1913 report: "In-
terference with free competition was generally but not necessarily a restraint of trade, for
there were some restrictions that could be put upon competition and upon competitors that
left the competitive force as an adequate protection to the people." S. REP. No. 1326, 62d
Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1913).
217. The 1914 House Commerce Committee report stated: "The publicity secured by
the governmental agency should be such as will prevent the deception of the public through
secrecy in the organization and management of industrial combinations or through false
information. Such agency would also have at its command the best sources of information
regarding special privileges or discriminations, of whatever nature, by which industrial com-
binations secure monopoly or become dangerous to the public welfare." Report of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 533, pt. 1, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1914) (quoting the Final Report ofthe Industrial Commission, submitted to Congress
in 1902, vol. 19, at 650-51); see also the views of President Wilson, supra note 216.
218. Congress believed that if the FTC provided the necessary information, imperfect
markets would often correct themselves. The House Report on the bill that later became the
FTC Act suggested that publication of excessively high business profits would encourage
other firms to enter the industry, thus lowering prices. H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1914). One businessman testified that the publication of profit levels would cause
businesses to keep prices low in order to avoid attracting new competition. Testimony of
Wadill Catchings, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1914). Other members of Congress also stated their belief that the
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caused the free market to protect inadequately consumer welfare in the
short term. Congress believed that in these circumstances FTC inter-
vention to correct market failures, performed prudently, could prevent
unfair transfers of wealth from consumers to producers, improve eco-
nomic efficiency, and otherwise improve "consumer welfare."
With the one prohibition against "unfair methods of competition"
of section 5, Congress attempted to stop "unfair" transfers of wealth
caused by such divergent practices as predation and fraud.221 The mar-
publication of profit information would invite entry, thereby obviating the need for antitrust
enforcement. Id at 65, 204-05, 220. It was also stated that the publication of the "special
privileges or discriminations" used to gain monopolies would ensure private actions which
would bring them to an end. See H.R. REP. No. 533 at 4-5; see also 51 CONG. Rac. 8843,
8858, 8980-81, 8983, 8985 (1914). The 1914 House Commerce Committee Report stated that
reports issued by the FTC would lead to an "elevated business standard and a better busi-
ness stability." Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R.
REP. No. 533, pt. 1, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1914). Congress also quoted, with approval, the
Preliminary Report of the Industrial Commission, submitted to Congress in 1900: "The
larger corporations--the so-called trusts-should be required to publish annually a properly
audited report showing in reasonable detail their assets and liabilities, with profit and loss;
such reports and audit under oath to be subject to Government inspection. The purpose of
such publicity is to encourage competition when profits become excessive, thus protecting
consumers against too high prices and to guard the interests of employees by a knowledge of
the financial condition of the business in which they are employed." Id at 4.
219. In Federal Trade Comm'n v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929), the Court held that "[t]o
justify filing a complaint the public interest must be specific and substantial.. . . Some-
times, because, although the aggregate of the loss entailed may be so serious and widespread
as to make the matter one of public consequence, no private suit would be brought to stop
the unfair conduct, since the loss to each of the individuals affected is too small to warrant
it." Id at 28. For the FTC's proceedings, see 5 F.T.C. 24 (1922).
In the Sherman Act debates, Senator George challenged the practical effect of such
consumer protectionism: "Will any single one of those men who have been thus wronged to
the amount of ten, fifteen, twenty, or fifty dollars bring a separate suit? How can he main-
tain it? He is to employ a lawyer, he has to go to a distance of from 100 to 500 miles, perhaps
to a distant State, to maintain his suit. Who will do it? I ask Senators to stop and reflect
who will do it? Not one of them. If some great manufacturer has been injured by an ad-
vance in the price of his raw material he can sue, but the poor man, the consumer, the
laborer, the farmer, the mechanic, the country merchant, all that large class of American
citizens who constitute 90 percent of our population and who are the real sufferers will have
no opportunity of redress, and the bill, so far as they are concerned, will be a snare and a
mere delusion." 21 CONG. Rnc. 3150 (1890). For a definition of the "free rider" problem
used in the context of an important area of antitrust concern, resale price maintenance, see
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 91-92 (1964).
220. Senator Newlands, for example, stated his belief that private antitrust suits would
not eliminate unfair competition because "[t]he suit of an individual against a strong combi-
nation is the contest of a lilliputian against a giant." 51 CONG. REc. 11,083 (1914).
221. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717. The statute was
subsequently amended to add the prohibition against "unfair acts or practices." Id. (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976)). Interestingly, Congress did not always use
such terms as "fraud," "predation," and "price discrimination" to stand for totally separate
problems. The following exchange, which occurred toward the end of the House debates,
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ket failures that section 5 was meant to correct, however, can be classi-
fied into two general categories, a distinction developed in
collaboration with my colleague, Neil Averitt.222 Congress was primar-
ily concerned with market failures that were external to consumers and
restricted or distorted consumers' available options. Those are the
traditional antitrust concerns and are the responsibility of the Bureau
of Competition of the FTC.223 At the same time, however, Congress
wanted to prevent market failures that occurred internally to consum-
ers and affected their ability to choose freely and rationally among the
options the market presented. This latter category is the area of con-
cern of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection. 224 These two main
departments of the FTC were designed to work together to provide two
levels of protection for consumers, addressing both internal and exter-
nal market failures, thereby ensuring that consumers received the full
illustrates the close linkage between the competition and consumer protection missions of
the statute.
MR. COOPER. Suppose a corporation worth $100,000,000 should advertise that it
would sell and that it does actually sell its product to one consumer in a certain
town for 50 cents, and should advertise that it would not sell and does refuse to sell
to any other in that town or in that State for less than $1?
MR. STEVENS OF MINNESOTA. That is clearly fraud.. . . [S]uch an act might
have a result to greatly injure the public by interfering and destroying competition,
which the public needs, and that is the purpose of such discrimination. To that
extent the injury and intent and result would be a fraud upon the public, now
known to the law and under the jurisdiction of this bill.
51 CONG. REC. 14,936 (1914). A short time later Representative Cooper inquired whether
there would be any fraud if a corporation "sells its product below cost throughout a certain
county or perhaps an entire State, but does not increase the cost of the product to consumers
in any other community or State." Representative Stevens replied: "Mr. Speaker, our bill
does meet the situation, in this way: Where there is a practice or a class of practices which
has for its main purpose an injury to the public by eliminating competition which ought to
exist in the public interest, in such cases it is a fraud on the public, both as to purpose and
results." Id at 14,937.
Because of our current view that fraud and these antitrust concerns are separate
problems, Representative Stevens' views might seem somewhat puzzling. Perhaps he was
condemning both types of action as a "fraud on the public" because each "unfairly" took
consumers' property.
222. See Averitt, UnfairActs or Practices, supra note 157, at 281-84.
223. The work of the Bureau of Competition (BC) comes under the broad heading of
antitrust; it deals with monopolization, cartels, resale price maintenance, mergers, and simi-
lar issues. See generally Averitt, Unfair Methods, supra note 156.
224. The Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP) prevents or redresses a number of prac-
tices that directly injure consumers, such as fraud, deception, the provision of insufficient
consumer information and unfair credit practices. See generally Averitt, Unfair Acts or
Practices, supra note 157.
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benefits flowing from a competitive market.22 5 No consumer choices
were to be artificially impeded.
The Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion normally are thought of as performing substantially different func-
tions. It is tempting to think of these functions as being very different
and only related on the most general and abstract level, insofar as both
Bureaus ultimately attempt to improve consumer welfare. Both the an-
titrust and consumer protection missions, however, were originally au-
thorized by the single prohibition against "unfair methods of
competition." The Congress that used this single phrase to establish
one Commission to deal with both kinds of problems surely considered
them to be closely related.
Both the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection were created to prevent certain "unfair" transfers of wealth and
to enhance economic efficiency.22 6 These goals are sought whenever
225. It should be noted that these two levels of protection do not perfectly correspond to
the respective functions of the BC and the BCP that have evolved over time.
The following chart attempts to illustrate the synthesis of the FTC's purpose with the
advantage of hindsight. A modem observer might state that the goals of both the BC and
the BCP are virtually identical, including, primarily, the prevention of certain "unfair"
transfers of wealth and, secondarily, the enhancement of economic efficiency and other
goals.
A UNIFIED APPROACH TO § 5
Goals (The same for each When? Whenever there is What should be prevented
half of the statute) a market failure or corrected?
Bureau of Competition
-prevent unfair transfers external to the consumer, A. The manifestations
of "consumers' surplus" and caused by -monopolies
-imperfect ---cartel, etc.
-- encourage economic information B. The market failure
efficiency, especially if -free rider should be directly
the benefits accrue to problems corrected
consumers -others
Bureau of Consumer Protection
-prevent immoral business internal to the consumer, A. The manifestations
competition and caused by -fraud
-imperfect -- coercion, etc.
-promote entrepreneurial information B. The market failure
opportunity -free rider should be directly
problems corrected
-a lack of
free will
-- others
226. The primary difference is that the BC is also concerned with reducing the social
and political power of large corporations. The other goals overlap. For example, even
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there are market failures that interfere with the operations of the free
market. 227 In these cases the FTC may either correct the market failure
directly or intervene in the market and undo the anticompetitive effect
of the failure. 228
Congress' overall mission in passing the FTC Act was to
strengthen and improve the Sherman Act, and to better implement its
competition goals. Congress viewed "competition" as the rule of the
marketplace that would best achieve and enhance "consumer welfare,"
as Congress defined the term. Congress charged the FTC with carrying
out its wishes in a faithful manner, subject to a crucial constraint: the
FTC can act only when the free market does not function properly, and
only when the FTC, by acting, is likely to improve consumer welfare.
The FTC Act is a more forward-looking and flexible statute than
is the Sherman Act. It also encompasses a more expansive range of
trade practices, such as unethical or fraudulent business practices. But
its ultimate goals were identical to those of the Sherman Act.
The Clayton and Celer-Kefauver Acts
Experience with the Sherman Act and the Supreme Court decision
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States229 led Congress to conclude that
additional antitrust legislation was necessary.2 30 In enacting the FTC
and Clayton Acts, Congress made two virtually simultaneous re-
sponses. 231 The FTC Act, as we have seen, reflected the belief that
since it was impossible fully to specify in advance all of those practices
which might harm competition, it was necessary to enact a broad prohi-
bition and to leave the implementation specifics to an administrative
though the prevention of immoral acts is normally thought of as a BCP concern, immoral
acts can also constitute predatory practices.
227. Many market failures, such as imperfect information, can trigger violations of
either half of the statute, corresponding to both the BC and the BCP. Others, however, such
as the absence of free will, seem more closely linked to only one half, either the BC or the
BCP.
228. For example, suppose that a monopoly has arisen through "unfair methods of com-
petition." The FTC might be forced to intervene directly into the marketplace and impose
structural relief. But if, to use the suggestion often made in the legislative history, see supra
note 218, publishing the profits earned by the monopolist would be likely to cause entry into
the market which would erode the monopoly, structural relief might not be necessary.
229. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
230. For a more detailed discussion of the effect of this case, see Averitt, Unfair Meth-
ods, supra note 156.
231. The FTC Act was enacted September 16, 1914, and the Clayton Act, October 15,
1914. In the FTC Act debates Senator Lippitt stated: "Here is the judiciary bill, the Clayton
bill; they are all involved together. The instant you pass this bill you have got to go on and
consider the Clayton bill, which is interlocked with it." 51 CONG. REC. 13,164 (1914).
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agency.232 The Clayton Act233 reflected a congressional desire to pro-
hibit specific practices believed to be harmful. Several legislators be-
lieved that the Clayton Act was duplicative and unnecessary because
the broad prohibitions of the FTC Act encompassed all the specific in-
terdictions contained in the Clayton Act.23 4 Nevertheless, the prevail-
ing view was that the Clayton Act was justified as a way of insuring
that a number of particular practices would be banned.2 35 This ap-
proach also led, in 1950, to the primary restatement and extension of
the Act, the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act. 36
The Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prevents firms from acquiring rival
companies where "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
232. As Justice Brandeis eloquently observed in a dissenting opinion in Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 434 (1920), "The Clayton Act.. .was framed largely with
a view to making more effective the remedies given by the Sherman Law. The Federal
Trade Commission Act... created an administrative tribunal, largely with a view to regu-
lating competition."
The passage of the Clayton Act was an election promise of the Democratic Party under
the leadership of Woodrow Wilson who stated in 1913 that society was sufficiently familiar
with the processes and methods of monopoly and restraints of trade so that legislation could
be passed to deal with price discrimination and other unfair trade practices. See W. PAT-
MAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 7 (1968).
233. 16 U.S.C. § 12 (1914). For a more detailed account of the legislative history of the
Clayton Act, see W. LETwiN, supra note 24, ch. 7; D. MARTIN, supra note 127; 2 A. TouL-
MIN, supra note 62, ch. 1.
234. For example, Senator Newlands, the principal sponsor of the FTC Act, stated:
"[The Judiciary Committee] can, if it chooses, taking the view that is entertained by the
Interstate Commerce Committee, conclude that section 5 covers all the various practices that
in the common vernacular are termed 'unfair competition,' and having come to that conclu-
sion, the Judiciary Committee can, if it chooses, leave out all legislation with reference to
specific practices which are today regarded as unfair competition, or they can put them in,
according to their pleasure." 51 CONG. Rc. 12,030 (1914); see also id at 15,829 (remarks of
Sens. Borah and Culberson).
235. Senator Clapp expressed what very well might have been Congress' final opinion
on this proposition: "[Tihose things that may be made plain, upon which we are generally
agreed, should be prohibited. We should prohibit them, and then leave the Commission
with that territory to work in which we are unable to cover by specific cases." Id at 14,259.
236. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1950). Another major amendment was the Robinson-Patman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936), which prohibited certain forms of non-cost-justified price dis-
crimination between businesses that purchase the same goods where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.
Space does not permit a full examination of the goals of the Robinson-Patman Act. It is
relatively certain, however, that the Act was not passed solely to increase economic effi-
ciency, although efficiency was mentioned as a legislative goal. See, e.g., Committee on the
Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 306, 368 (1936). The legislators also
stated that their intent was not to cause higher prices for consumers. Id at 368-69. Congress
was probably more concerned, however, with the financial status of small businesses.
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lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. '237 The overall
purpose of the Act, stated in the Senate Judiciary Committee's report
on the final bill, was to prevent such mergers in their incipiency.238
The legislators explicitly expressed their desire for competition.2 39
Congress, in other words, wanted to implement essentially the same
goals as those embodied in the Sherman and FTC Acts.
More specifically, Congress wanted to stop the formation of mo-
nopolies that might engage in supracompetitive pricing that, in Con-
gress' opinion, unfairly transferred consumers' wealth to monopolists.
Some advocates pressed for passage of the Clayton Act because some
firms otherwise would have "the power to arbitrarily control prices and
thus exact unjust profits from the people." 240 The remarks of one Sena-
tor expressed a desire to protect consumers and to encourage corporate
efficiency in the belief that these benefits would be passed on to con-
sumers: "The chief purpose of antitrust legislation is for the protection
of the public, to protect it from extortion practiced by the trust, but at
the same time not to take away from it any advantages of cheapness or
better service which honest, intelligent cooperation may bring."' 241
Thus, Congress remained preoccupied, as it was when it passed the
Sherman and FTC Acts, with the redistributive effects of market
power. While it wanted to achieve its direct consumer impact goals,
Congress wanted to accomplish them in a manner that did not unduly
sacrifice corporate efficiencies, largely because that sacrifice could harm
the public. This evidence, 242 although somewhat limited, when ana-
lyzed in light of the general proconsumer, procompetition goals of the
237. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914).
238. "Briefly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies,
seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and in
themselves, are not covered by the Act of July 2, 1890, or other existing anti-trust acts, and
thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and
monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation." Senate Judiciary Report, quoted
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 264 F. 138, 162 (E.D. Mo. 1920), afd, 258
U.S. 451 (1921).
239. For example, Representative Morgan stated that "the one thing we wish to main-
tain, and retain and sustain, is competition. We want to destroy monopoly and restore and
maintain competition." 51 CONG. REc. 9265 (1914).
240. Id Representative Hamlin stated: "The only reason why trusts and combinations
are declared illegal is because they are organized and operated for the express purpose of
more effectively exploiting the people by taking advantage of their necessities and control-
ling the price of those necessities to the consumers, as well as the purchase price which they
have to pay for the raw material." Id at 9556. Senator Cummins wanted to protect "the
people against the rapacity and the avarice of monopoly . Id at 14,256.
241. Id at 14,223 (remarks of Sen. Thompson).
242. See supra text accompanying note 241. In addition, see infra text accompanying
note 245 (remarks of Sen. Borah).
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antimerger laws, suggests that a merger should be prohibited, despite
potential gains in efficiency, if that merger is likely to create a firm with
market power that could adversely affect consumers.
Other evidence suggests that Congress was also motivated by con-
cern for the social and political power possessed by large corporations,
based on the fear that the mere existence of this power had the poten-
tial to cause social disruption. One Representative, for example, con-
demned the discretionary political power of men like J.P. Morgan:
[A]ll of the power represented by this wealth is lodged in the hands
of a few men. Can anyone doubt the danger which such concentra-
tion permits?
• ..It is useless to say that the power represented will never be used
to the detriment of the American people. . . . [Ilt is too great a
power to be concentrated-it affords too great a temptation to frail
humanity.243
Congress also worried that the concentrated wealth and power of those
who controlled large corporations could threaten the very fabric of the
nation. The House Committee Report accompanying section 8, which
deals with interlocking directorships, warned that "[t]he concentration
of wealth, money, and property in the United States under the control
and in the hands of a few individuals or great corporations has grown
to such an enormous extent that unless checked it will ultimately
threaten the perpetuity of our institutions."244 Acknowledging the pos-
sibility that antimerger legislation might sacrifice corporate efficiency,
one Senator nevertheless strongly condemned monopolies and trusts
243. 51 CONG. REc. 9186 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Helvering). See also remarks of Sen-
ator Cummins, id at 14,536.
244. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914). Representative Kelly echoed this
fear "Enterprises with great capital have deliberately sought not only industrial domination
but political supremacy as well .... Great combinations of capital for many years have
flaunted their power in the face of the citizenship, they have forced their way into politics
and government, they have dictated the making of laws or scorned the laws they did not like,
they have prevented the free and just administration of law. In doing this they have become
a menace to free institutions and must be dealt with in patriotic spirit without fear or favor."
51 CoNG. REc. 9086 (1914). Representative Madden expressed the same concern, but in
stronger language: "[Tlhe invisible Government which has controlled the visible govern-
ment in this Nation for many years has been unscrupulous big business .... If this Nation
is to be a Government of the people by crooked big business, the doom of our free institu-
tions is assured." Id at 9087.
Representative Nelson used equally striking words: "As surely and rapidly as the
properties of all the people pass into the hands of a few trust magnates, public sentiment,
rapidly forming, when once fully aroused, will multiply the socialistic vote as a protest
against monopoly privilege. And the day when the people must choose between public own-
ership of trusts for the benefit of all and the private ownership of the trusts for the privileges
of the few, will witness the final triumph of socialism in this country. Therefore, we should
act in our days of grace, while we are yet masters of our national destiny." Id at 9167.
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because they "divide our people into classes, breed discontent and ha-
tred, and in the end riot, bloodshed, and French revolutions. '245 This
brief examination of the Clayton Act's legislative history suggests that
its substantive goals were identical to those of the Sherman and FTC
Acts; the desire to prevent transfers of wealth from consumers to pro-
ducers caused by monopoly pricing was Congress' paramount, but not
exclusive, goal. A more detailed analysis of the Clayton Act's primary
amendment and restatement, the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act,
reveals similar concerns.
The Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act
Section 7 of the original Clayton Act prevented companies from
purchasing the stock of rival companies if the acquisition of that stock
might lessen competition. 246 A large number of companies evaded the
prohibitions of the Act, however, by accomplishing mergers through
asset acquisition.247
A 1948 study by the FTC describing the post-World War II
merger movement 248 concluded that corporate acquisitions from 1940
to 1947 had caused the disappearance of almost 2,500 firms with total
assets of more than five billion dollars, representing approximately
5.5% of all manufacturing assets in the United States at the time.249
The report warned:
[N]o great stretch of the imagination is required to foresee that if
nothing is done to check the growth in concentration, either the giant
corporations will ultimately take over the country, or the Govern-
ment will be impelled to step in and impose some form of direct reg-
ulation in the public interest.250
In recognition of this increased concentration, 25' the Celler-Kefauver
245. Id at 15,955 (remarks of Sen. Borah).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914).
247. See Arrow-Hart Hegeman Elec. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 291 U.S. 587
(1934); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
248. FTC, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT V (1948).
249. Id at 17. For a more detailed discussion of the FTC report and other studies of the
period on corporate mergers, see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 230-33 (1961), and the sources cited therein. Many.
of the citations and references in this section of the paper are from Bok's article. For other
discussions of the legislative history, see D. MARTIN, supra note 127, ch. 7; Muris, The Effi-
ciency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 381 (1980);
Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act-. A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1952).
250. FTC, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT V, at 68.
251. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (quoted in Brown Shoe v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962)).
Although Congress believed that the nation was experiencing a great increase in indus-
trial concentration, this perception was probably false. One study of the time, and several
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Act was enacted to ensure that the antimerger laws applied to acquisi-
tion of assets as well as stock.252
The most comprehensive judicial expression of the goals of the
amendment is the famous statement by Chief Justice Warren in Brown
Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States:253
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the
1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a rising
tide of economic concentration in the American economy....
Other considerations cited in support of the bill were the desirability
of retaining "local control" over industry and the protection of small
businesses. Throughout the recorded discussion may be found exam-
ples of Congress' fear not only of accelerated concentration of eco-
nomic power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to other
values a trend toward concentration was thought to pose.254
The following section examines the Celler-Kefauver Act's legisla-
tive history to find support for the Chief Justice's conclusion. It exam-
ines, in turn, the legislators' efficiency, distributive or consumer impact,
and other goals.
Improving Economic Efficiency
The quoted passage from Brown Shoe did not mention economic
efficiency as one of Congress' central objectives. Nor does Professor
subsequent studies, have largely confirmed the conclusion that the merger wave of this pe-
riod was relatively harmless, and that industrial concentration was not growing during this
period. See E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 16-43
(1957); Bok, supra note 249, at 231-33. Even if Congress' perception was incorrect, however,
"Congress relied heavily upon the Commission report in enacting the amended section 7,
and no judge can overlook this point in carrying out the task of interpreting the statute in
accordance with the intentions and desires of its framers. This is not to say that every legis-
lative misconception must be rigorously applied until it is formally retracted. But even in
the foggy world of antitrust, it is no simple thing for a court to overrule a major premise of
Congress by appeal to the supervening authority of the Review of Economics and Statistics.
Thus, if we are to gain an understanding of the outer limits of the court's discretion under
section 7, we must turn to the reports and debates which culminated in the passage of the
amendment." Id at 234. (footnotes omitted)
252. In most respects the fundamental purposes of the Act were redebated. Representa-
tive Celler, for example, stated: "I feel that most of the gentlemen who oppose the bill
would like to repeal the Clayton Act in its entirety. That is the import of their argument, it
strikes me." 95 CONG. REc. 11,489 (1949). Representative Keating added: "Mr. Speaker,
the issue is very clear. Either we should repeal the Clayton Act entirely or we should amend
it to make it effective." Id See also Muris, supra note 249, at 393 n.47.
253. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
254. Id at 315. The first sentence was later quoted in United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). The Senate Report stated that a primary purpose of
the Act was "to limit future increases in the level of economic concentration resulting from
corporate mergers and acquisitions ... ." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
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Bok find in the legislative record much evidence of a congressional
concern for efficiency. He noted that
none of the justifications for mergers by big companies were ac-
corded any significance by Congress. Efficiency, expansion, and the
like were ignored or simply brushed aside in the deliberations. Even
opponents of the bill did not seek to argue that the interests of large
companies would be infringed unwisely or unfairly by the bill.2 55
He therefore concluded that improved efficiency was not a central goal
of the Celler-Kefauver Act.256 Of course, other commentators believe
that, in amending section 7, Congress had significant efficiency goals.257
These scholars, however, are impeded by their inability to point to a
sufficient amount of evidence in the legislative history indicating that
economic efficiency figured significantly in the debates leading to the
1950 amendment.258
255. Bok, supra note 249, at 307.
256. Bok's observations imply that Congress did not mean to provide an efficiencies
defense in merger cases: "There is little basis for concluding that the achievement of lower
costs as such should give rise to favored treatmen( under Section 7. The possibility of lower
costs was brushed aside in the legislative deliberations and there is every reason to believe
that Congress preferred the noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets to limited
reductions in the cost of operations." Id at 318 (citations omitted). See also id at 236-37.
The conclusion that Congress was disinclined to permit an efficiencies defense was adopted
by the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,
580 (1967) (quoting Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962)): "Pos-
sible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some
mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in
favor of protecting competition."
257. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at subch. 9E; Muris, supra note 249,
at 393-402. This interpretation opens the door to the assertion that a merger likely to lead to
increased efficiency should not be illegal.
258. For the most comprehensive analysis of the legislative history of the Celler-
Kefauver Antimerger Act which advocates the conclusion that Congress had strong effi-
ciency goals and did not mean to preclude an efficiencies defense in merger cases, see Muris,
supra note 249, at 393-402.
Professor Muris provides four categories of direct evidence that Congress indicated that
increased efficiency should point towards the legality of mergers:
1. Evidence from the legislative history of prior bills on the same subject which Con-
gress chose not to enact. However, Muris noted that the first serious efforts to amend the
Clayton Act began in 1941. Id at 393. Between 1943 and 1949 sixteen bills to amend the
Clayton Act were introduced in Congress. See D. MARTIN, supra note 127, at 221. Thus,
quotations from the legislative record of a selected number of these bills, none of which were
enacted, provide only very indirect insight into the motivations of the Congress that, years
later, passed the Celler-Kefauver Act.
2. Mergers between relatively small firms were permitted. This probably only meant,
however, that Congress exempted small mergers because there was little chance that they
would lead to a firm with a monopoly power, even if they resulted in a firm that was more
efficient and more competitive.
3. The "failing company" exception. The wealth redistribution and efficiency effects
of this exception are complex and uncertain. Since the failing company exception can save
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Despite the recent vintage of this amendment, a search of its legis-
lative history reveals no evidence of congressional concern with alloca-
tive inefficiency. Nor do those scholars advocating a strong efficiency
orientation to the Act present such evidence. 259 The record does con-
tain, however, considerable discussion of productive efficiency.
It should come as no surprise that opponents of the bill asserted
that it would inhibit the efficiency of both large and small firms.
260
the costs of bankruptcy proceedings, and the management best able to utilize the failing
assets will often be a horizontal competitor, the failing company exception could be justified
from an efficiency perspective. The exception also, however, has clear distributive effects. It
could enable the stockholders and creditors of the acquired company to receive more for
their assets. It could also cause a transfer of wealth to the acquiring company if, through the
addition of the productive facilities of the failing company, it increased its market power.
The failing company exception could also result in benefits to consumers, for without it
there could be a short-term under-supply of the failing company's product. This could re-
sult in higher prices to consumers in the short term. Further, if a high level of industry
instability increased the cost of capital to businesses in that industry, consumer prices could
go up in the long term.
Although Bok recognized that Congress had a number of motivations, he concluded
that "Congress's general unconcern with efficiency would indicate that this factor cannot be
accorded much importance in accounting for the exception." Bok, supra note 249, at 340
(footnote omitted). For a full analysis of the failing company exception, see id at 339-47.
Further, the goals of an exception to an Act cannot necessarily be attributed to the rest of the
Act.
4. Professor Muris quotes a discussion between Senator Kefauver and Senator
O'Connor involving two newspapers that might want to save costs by having "an arrange-
ment by which one plant would print both newspapers, with each one following its own
editorial policy." Muris, supra note 249, at 400-01 (citing 96 CONG. REc. 16,456 (1950)).
The discussion concluded that such a proposal would violate the law only where "'it would
result in a substantial lessening of competition .... It may well be that by effecting a better
arrangementfor a more profitable undertaking, in the manner described, competition would be
stimulated rather than lessened."' Id (quoting Sen. O'Connor) (emphasis added by Muris).
Despite his contention that this dialogue evidences an intent to allow efficiency de-
fenses, the venture was to be allowed only if it did not result in a "substantial lessening of
competition." Thus, the joint venture was not to be allowed, despite its efficiency-enhancing
possibilities, if it might lead to a firm with market power. This exchange probably means
that the Act was passed to stop the formulation of firms with market power, and that effi-
ciencies are to be considered only if the merger would not be likely to lead to a significant
chance of a lessening of competition or to ,higher prices for consumers. But, if a merger is
not likely to lead to a lessening of competition or to higher prices for consumers, then it
should not be prohibited by § 7. Even if the author's and Professor Muris' examinations of
the legislative history failed to uncover every reference to a congressional desire for effi-
ciency, it seems fair to conclude that Congress' principal concerns lay elsewhere.
259. See discussion of Muris, supra note 258.
260. For example, Representative Goodwin stated: "By preventing harmless and rea-
sonable mergers among small and medium-sized concerns, this bill by freezing them to their
present status of size will foreclose the chance that they may by consolidation or acquisition
ever approximate either the size or efficiency that the big competitors have already achieved.
Thus we will hurt small business and help big business." 95 CONG. Rac. 11,487 (1949); see
also Hearings before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st &
GOALS OF THE ANTITRUST LAWSSeptember 1982]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Even the Act's proponents admitted that efficiency was important.261
Their view, however, was that the Act would help, not hinder, corpo-
rate efficiency. As one Representative stated, "[wihen three or four
producers take the place of 20 or 30 the chances are great that price
competition will be crippled-that the big concerns will adopt a live-
and-let-live policy towards each other at the sacrifice of their efficiency
and their progress. ' 262 To Representative Celler, "bigness" did not
"mean efficiency, a better product, or lower prices." 263 Rather, the
"main reason for antitrust laws is that we believe the competitive sys-
tem is more efficient than monopoly." 264 Moreover, he deprecated "the
idea that efficiency and lower prices only come with bigness. We now
know that in many lines the middle-sized concerns are either more effi-
cient than the big ones, or else they are of no positive difference. And
lower prices do not always accompany bigness. '265
Thus, Congress' efficiency concerns in passing the Celler-Kefauver
Act were substantially identical to its goals in 1914 and in 1890. Allo-
cative efficiency was not a motivating factor, but productive efficiency
was a goal of legislators on both sides of the debates. Given the legisla-
tors' passion for "competition," it seems clear that they were willing to
risk some efficiency losses in order to prevent the possible rise of mar-
ket power. We can be certain that Congress wanted to err on the side
of losing productive efficiency rather than risk the formation of market
power. It is, however, unclear how far Congress would have been will-
ing to go. There is no indication that Congress chose to impose large
2d Sess. 140 (1950) (statement of the National Tool & Die Mfg. Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings]; see also Hearings Before House Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., I st
Sess. 45 (1949) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (statement of Gilbert Montague):
"[T]hese bills will handicap the small and medium-sized corporation, and will protect the
large corporation, and will lay the dead hand of arrested development upon the entire na-
tional economy." Cf. id at 83: "[Ain acquisition of this type could be justified in the public
interest only if there were some economies resulting, if there was some improvement in
efficiency resulting therefrom." (statement of John M. Blair, assistant chief economist, FTC).
261. Senator Donelly, for example, was concerned with the bill's "effect on prices, the
effect on productive efficiency." Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 308.
262. 95 CONG. REC. 11,723 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Yates).
263. Id at 11,717 (1949); see also id at 11,496 (statement of Rep. Boggs).
264. House Hearings, supra note 260, at 61.
265. Id at 64. Further, Representative Carroll stated that "[f]ree competition safe-
guards not only the consuming public; it also encourages small business and the develop-
ment of new types of business and industry." 95 CONG. REC. 11,493 (1949). Representative
Yates wrote, "When three or four producers take the places of 20 or 30, the chances are great
that price competition will be crippled, that declining markets will be dealt with by restric-
tion of output instead of by price reduction, that the big concerns will adopt a live-and-let-
live policy towards each other at the sacrifice of their efficiency and their progress .
Id.
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and certain efficiency losses to gain small and speculative market power
benefits. Given Congress' general desire to encourage efficiency in an-
timerger legislation, categories of mergers likely to result in large and
certain efficiency gains should not be prevented short of a substantial
risk that the firms might acquire more than an insignificant degree of
market power.266
Protecting Consumers from Unfair Transfers of Wealth
In enacting the Celer-Kefauver Act, Congress was principally
concerned that mergers would create or increase market power leading
to supracompetitive pricing which directly harmed consumeis. Propo-
nents of the legislation framed the economic issues in terms of protect-
ing consumers from monopolistic exploitation. One Representative
predicted that the legislation would help "to preserve the chances of the
average man to make a place for himself in business and [protect] the
consuming public from unfair exploitation." 267 Another accused cer-
tain companies of "maintaining high prices which injure the consumer"
and called monopoly prices "outrageous. ' 268 Quoting with approval
from the FTC's report, a Representative perceived that "under compet-
itive capitalism consumers are protected from high prices by the con-
stant rivalry among numerous firms for a greater share of the
market. ' 269 A Senator castigated opponents of the bill:
266. There was apparently no explicit analysis of the possible tradeoffs involved in im-
plementing actions that simultaneously increase efficiency and raise prices to consumers. A
very close case was presented when an economist who testified in favor of the legislation
stated that mergers should be permitted up until the point where scale economies in that
industry were exhausted. See testimony of Dr. John D. Clark, member, Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, House Hearings, supra note 260, at 37: "I am sure that you would find, with
respect to any of those companies that you have mentioned, that the actual advantage of cost
of production ceased to grow at a point of size far less than that they have now reached. -In
other words, for example, I do not know the steel industry, but supposing [sic] a $25,000,000
plant exhausted the opportunity for further reduction in unit costs. That gives you a datum
point from which to start in determining how far you ought to permit the steel firms to grow
in order to attain social advantage." As he stated that this point would come at lower levels
of concentration than existed at that time, he did not seem to be advocating increased effi-
ciency as justifying higher prices for consumers. Although Bok does not believe that effi-
ciency was one of Congress' primary goals, see supra notes 255-56, he nevertheless wrote,
"Perhaps more explicit guidance should be demanded from Congress before adopting an
interpretation which could block really important increases in efficiency." Bok, supra note
249, at 318.
267. 95 CONG. REc. 11,506 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
268. Id at 11,492 (remarks of Rep. Carroll). Carroll also stated: "We all know that if
there is free competition the public will be protected from unduly high prices and artificial
scarcities .... [C]ompetition keeps prices low and quality high." Id at 11,722.
269. Id at 11,506 (remarks of Rep. Byrne).
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The whole trouble with you folks is, a lot of you forget there is such a
thing as the consumer, as the great American buyer, the fellow who
keeps these beloved corporations you love so much alive, and makes
them profitable and sometimes the Government of the United States
has to think about that great group of 140,000,000 consumers, and
protect them against unjust exploitation. 7 0
One Representative recognized that a prophylactic action was required
because, once a company becomes a monopoly, "[tihe protection that
surrounds property rights has become attached to the monopoly
property."'27 1
Even opponents of the legislation framed the issues in terms of
harm to consumers, arguing, however, that there was no substantial
risk of exploitation of consumers. One opponent stated that the merger
bill was not needed because he did "not subscribe to the doctrine that
the businessmen of our country are crooks and that those who carry on
their business through the instrumentality of corporations are out to
fleece and extort higher and higher prices from their customers. 27 2
Witnesses who testified against the legislation also framed the issues in
terms of benefits to consumers.273 In summary, both supporters and
opponents of the amendment wanted to prevent consumers from pay-
ing artificially high pricies. The prevailing legislators feared higher
prices due to market power so much that they wanted to stop trends
towards concentration in their incipiency.274
270. Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 180 (remarks of Sen. Kilgore); see also 95
CONG. REC. 8147 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Patman).
271. 95 CONG. REC. 11,493 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Yates).
272. Id. at 11,490-91 (remarks of Rep. Goodwin).
273. James L. Donnelly, former Vice-President of the Illinois Manufacturing Associa-
tion, referred to "the customers' and consumers' interest which, of course, is paramount in
all these considerations ... " Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 30. Benjamin C. Marsh,
Executive Secretary, People's Lobby, Inc., stated: "The assumption seems to be that compe-
tition and absence of monopoly will alone improve the quality of goods and reduce the
price, and so benefit consumers .... [T]his assumption is not justified .. ." Id at 251.
One opponent of the bill even argued against the amendment on the ground that the existing
distribution of wealth in society was fair or, if anything, skewed unduly against the fair and
necessary interests of businesspersons. He presented excerpts from works by Professor
Slichter of Harvard University at the House Hearings, attempting to demonstrate that a fair
distribution of income resulted from technological progress: "mhe gains of technological
progress have not gone in the main to capitalists, as Marx thought they would, or even to
consumers, but to employees.... Does the economy distribute its product widely and
fairly? ... There is no basis for the oft-expressed fears that incomes are becoming concen-
trated in the hands of property owners .... [S]erious inequities in the distribution of in-
come are inadequate compensation for pioneering and risk taking and inadequate
compensation for holders of fixed-income securities." House Hearings, supra note 260, at
107-08 (remarks of Mr. Montague); see also discussion between Sen. Wiley and Sen.
Kefauver, 95 CONG. REc. 16,490 (1949).
274. As the Court stated in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), "[A]
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Additional Goals
An analysis of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act
leads to the conclusion that the implications of rising industrial concen-
trations in the American economy were Congress' dominant con-
cern.2 75 Congress of course was concerned with concentration in
particular markets and the amendment was worded to apply to all
mergers that might affect competition "in any line of commerce.
276
It is unlikely, however, that Congress was concerned only with
such economic matters as efficiency and the distribution of wealth.2 77
Congress also feared that high levels of economic concentration might
have disquieting political and social ramifications. Many of the ex-
pressed misgivings regarding undue corporate aggrandizement of
power were relatively mild and ambiguous. 278 Other warnings, how-
ever, were chilling, drawing analogies to the alarming consequences of
concentration abroad.279 Senator Kefauver, one leading sponsor of the
keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw was the rising tide of economic
concentration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time when the trend
to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency. Congress saw
the process of concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it sought to assure the
Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this force at its outset and
before it gathered momentum." Id at 317-18 (footnotes omitted).
275. So great was the congressional fear of industrial concentration that it mandated
changes in the standards of proof of mergers' anticompetitive consequences. For example,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), held
that "[t]his intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants dis-
pensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or prob-
able anticompetitive effects." Id at 363. The Court went on to state: "Such a test lightens
the burden of proving illegality only with respect to mergers whose size makes them inher-
ently suspect in light of Congress' design in § 7 to prevent undue concentration." Id The
Brown Shoe Court noted "[t]hat § 7 was intended to apply to all mergers-horizontal, verti-
cal or conglomerate... ." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 n.31 (1962)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1949)). Members of Congress made
numerous references to conglomerate mergers. Congressman Boggs, for example, stated
that the Act should apply to conglomerate acquisitions because "this is one of the most
detrimental movements to a free enterprise economy .... This is the type which carries
the activities of giant corporations into all sorts of fields, often completely unrelated to their
normal operations." 95 CONG. REc. 11,496 (1949).
276. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1951).
277. See supra notes 255-56 & accompanying text.
278. One Representative cautioned that "[t]here has been a growing trend toward eco-
nomic concentration in the United States... which has reached the stage at which it consti-
tutes a vital threat to the American way of life." 95 CONG. REc. 11,497 (1949) (remarks by
Rep. Boggs). Equally mild was the observation by Representative Celler that "[b]igness
does not mean efficiency, a better product, or lower prices." Id at 11,486 (1949).
279. Id at 11,486 (remarks of Rep. Celler): "I want to point out the danger of this trend
toward more and better combines. I read from a report filed with former Secretary of War
Royall as to the history of the cartelization and concentration of industry in Germany: 'Ger-
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bill, stated:
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in other
nations where mergers and concentrations have placed economic
control in the hands of very few people is too clear to pass over eas-
ily. A point is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching that
point in this country, where the public steps in to take over when
concentration and monopoly gain too much power. The taking over
by the public through its government always follows one or two
methods and has one or two political results. It either results in a
Fascist state or the nationalization of industries and thereafter a So-
cialist or Communist state.2 8
0
More than a generation after the end of World War II it is tempt-
ing to dismiss these statements as mere rhetoric. The sentiments, how-
ever, differ only in degree from those expressed throughout the
many under the Nazi set-up built up a great series of industrial monopolies in steel, rubber,
coal and other materials. The monopolies soon got control of Germany, brought Hitler to
power and forced virtually the whole world into war.'" It should be noted that Representa-
tive Celler's interpretation of the historical events which led to Hitler's rise to power is by no
means universally shared. See, e.g., A. BULLOCK, HITLER: A STUDY IN TYRANNY (1962).
280. 96 CONG. REC. 16,452 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver). These strong views were
not expressed only by the principal sponsors of the amendment. See, e.g., id at 16,446
(remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney: "Collectivism is moving forward apace throughout the world,
and industrial collectivism leads inevitably to political collectivism. That I would like to
avoid."), 16,503-04 (remarks of Sen. Aiken: "All of us know too well what has happened in
countries where opportunity has been vested in the hands of a few. The result has been that
either socialization or a totalitarian form of government has taken over .... ").
Years earlier, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a proposal to Congress entitled Rec-
ommendations to the Congress to Curb Monopolies and the Concentration of Economic
Power: April 24, 1938, proposing the creation of a Temporary National Economic Commit-
tee. Id, reprinted in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
1941 (1938 volume), at 305-32. Roosevelt began his message to Congress with the warning,
"[T]he liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to
a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself. . . . Among us today a
concentration of private power without equal in history is growing.
"This concentration is seriously impairing the economic effectiveness of private enter-
prise as a way of providing employment for labor and capital and as a way of assuring a
more equitable distribution of income and earnings among the people of the Nation as a
whole." Id at 305-06. Professor Pitofsky, supra note 15, at 1064, concluded: "Virtually all
proponents of the bill who spoke asserted that the merger trend must be blocked because
concentrated economic power would lead to increased government control, because freedom
would corrode and totalitarianism prosper, and because absentee ownership by large corpo-
rations would diminish local initiative and civic responsibility." (Footnote omitted.) Bok
expressed a similar view in his analysis of the legislative history of the amendment. He
concluded that "there emerges a common definition of the problem at hand, a common
philosophy as to its import, and a common notion, on a very general plane, of what the new
act could do about it . . . . This situation was appraised in the same Jeffersonian, egalita-
rian fashion by almost all who spoke for the bill. . . . In the minds of the Congressmen, the
growth of these large economic groups could lead only to increasing government control;
freedom would corrode, and the nation would drift into some form of totalitarianism." Bok,
supra note 249, at 234-36 (footnote omitted).
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Sherman,281 FTC,282 and Clayton Act283 debates. The perceived rise in
industrial concentration in 1950 merely provided another occasion for
congressional repetition of the alarm regarding the increased social and
political power of big business.284
The debates also show a concern for the welfare of small busi-
nesses. In Brown Shoe, Chief Justice Warren characterized Congress'
desire to protect small businesses as going further than a directive to
assist them in borderline cases where so doing would be unlikely to
result in higher prices for consumers.285 Although the debates do evi-
281. See supra notes 136-42 & accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 206-09 & accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 240-45 & accompanying text.
284. Numerous statements in the legislative history display concern for the possible so-
cial and political implications of unduly high concentration levels. With the exception of the
statements mentioning conglomerate mergers, however, see supra note 275, it is unclear
whether this manifest anxiety is attributable to concentration within individual markets or to
aggregate levels of concentration. For example, Congress' references to "economic concen-
tration," "cartelization and concentration," and "concentration and monopoly" are ambigu-
ous on this point. In light of the fact that Congress worded the final bill in terms of "lines of
commerce," Congress possibly was concerned only with concentration levels within markets.
Nevertheless, a large conglomerate might possess almost as much social and political power
as a similarly sized monopoly, and this country could be taken over by large conglomerates
as easily as by large monopolists. In light of the fact that the merger problem facing Con-
gress in 1950 primarily concerned mergers within markets, it is not surprising that Congress
paid very little attention to conglomerate mergers. Nevertheless, if Congress had confronted
this issue, see supra note 61 & accompanying text, it might have been concerned also with
aggregate levels of industrial concentration in 1950.
An interesting unanswered question is whether the strong statements that condemned
the corporate aggrandizement of social and political power should make any difference in
merger cases. What difference would it make, in other words, if, as the Court stated in
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963), there are mergers
"whose size makes them inherently suspect in light of Congress' design in § 7 to prevent
undue concentration"? Should the horizontal merger guidelines be lowered when large
mergers are involved?
Even though § 7 was ultimately cast in terms of competition within markets, the
amendment was intended to apply to conglomerate mergers. See supra text accompanying
notes 277-78. Suppose that there were a large conglomerate merger that had no net effect on
individual markets. Could the FTC in carrying out its mission to enforce the "policy" or
"spirit" of the other antitrust laws, seesupra note 163, use the congressional fear of increased
aggregate concentration levels (expressed in the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the
FTC Act, and the original Clayton Act, as well as in that of the Celler-Kefauver amend-
ment) to halt a pure conglomerate merger that was neutral in its economic effects? The
question is, for now, unanswered.
285. Chief Justice Warren wrote, "It is competition, not competitors, which the Act pro-
tects. But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasion-
ally higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization." Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
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dence a desire to assist small businesses, it is doubtful that Congress
meant to do so if this would result in higher prices to consumers. 286
Summary
The primary goals of the Clayton Act were virtually identical to
286. For example, in the Senate Hearings Senator O'Connor asked, "There are some
who contend that in instances where a closely held business with a very limited number of
principals might by reason of one of a number of causes wish to sell, wish to dispose of its
assets, whether they might be prevented from doing so, or be prevented from getting as
advantageous a consideration if this enactment is put through, rather than under existing
circumstances when they can negotiate possibly with another concern just about of the same
size, possibly, nearby, and whether you think it would in the end have any effect." Rep.
Patman replied, "I think the public interest is paramount. If this would be injurious to the
public I think it should be prevented, even though the owner would probably not get as
much. It is the public interest that is involved, and we should not permit these consolida-
tions and mergers to the extent that it will lessen competition or create monopoly, looking at
the public interest as No. 1." Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 131. In the Senate debates
Senator Keon asked: "[A] small-businessman can now sell to a large competitor, whereas,
from what the Senator says, if the bill became law, he would be foreclosed from doing so."
Senator O'Connor replied: "Not necessarily. It would all depend upon whether or not the
sale would have the effect of substantially lessening competition." 96 CONG. REC. 16,441
(1950).
Another goal was to encourage corporate expansion through internal growth rather
than through merger. As the Court stated in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 370 (1963): "[Slurely one premise of an antimerger statute such as § 7 is that
corporate growth by internal expansion is socially preferable to growth by acquisition. See
also United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 947 (S.D.N.Y.
1965): "An underlying premise of the Clayton Act. . .is that internal expansion is more
healthy for the economy than expansion by merger."
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the Court suggested reasons
why Congress preferred internal corporate expansion rather than expansion by merger: "A
company's history of expansion through mergers presents a different economic picture than
a history of expansion through unilateral growth. Internal expansion is more likely to be the
result of increased demand for the company's products and is more likely to provide in-
creased investment in plants, more jobs and greater output. Conversely, expansion through
merger is more likely to reduce available consumer choice while providing no increase in
industry capacity, jobs or output. It was for these reasons, among others, Congress ex-
pressed its disapproval of successive acquisitions." Id at 345 n.72.
The assertion that there are sound economic reasons to prefer corporate growth by in-
ternal expansion to growth through merger could be the subject of a lengthy discussion.
Regardless, the opinion of Congress should prevail; we must proceed upon the assumption
that corporate growth by internal expansion is socially preferable to growth by merger.
Moreover, this judgment may not have reflected any desire to sacrifice significant pro-
ductive efficiencies. While Congress has condemned the power of large companies, it also
encourages the growth of our economy. One way to reconcile these two beliefs is to prefer
corporate growth by internal expansion. By making mergers difficult, Congress may have
hoped to encourage more of this kind of growth. Perhaps Congress, in expressing this pref-
erence, was making the judgment that there were few advantages to consumers that resulted
from corporate growth by merger. Congress may have passed the 1950 Amendment in part
because it wanted the advantages that came from economic growth but saw few advantages
to consumers from mergers and many dangers that might instead result.
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those of the Sherman and FTC Acts. The Clayton Act was passed pri-
marily to prevent mergers that might lead to the creation of corpora-
tions with sufficient market power to extract wealth unfairly from
consumers. The legislative record also evidences a congressional desire
to curb the growth of the social and political power of these corpora-
tions and to protect small businesses, and suggests that Congress
wanted to encourage corporate efficiency. Although the precise role
that efficiency was intended to play in Clayton Act analyses is unclear,
the debates suggest that this Act, like the Sherman and FTC Acts, is
primarily concerned with the efficiency benefits directly passed through
to consumers. Congress did not exhibit a desire to forego redistributive
goals in order to give nascent monopolists the profits that might flow
from increased productive efficiency. Thus, the Clayton Act, together
with the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, manifests the same procon-
sumer, antimonopoly, anti-corporate power and pro-market control
bias present in the earlier legislation.
Despite the large number of factors influencing the passage of the
antimerger laws, Congress' central purpose deserves emphasis. The an-
timerger statutes were passed primarily to benefit consumers directly.
The overriding economic purpose was the prevention of consumer ex-
ploitation through supracompetitive pricing, a likely consequence of
merger-created market power. The concept of allocative efficiency
does not figure significantly in the legislative record and no significant
evidence exists that Congress was willing to forego its market power
concerns in order to increase corporate efficiency. Congress hoped to
preserve and achieve corporate efficiencies, to be sure, but not at the
cost of allowing significant increases in market power. The legislative
history suggests that resolution of otherwise doubtful or ambiguous sit-
uations should be in favor of a strict antimerger policy. Congress was
willing to forego relatively large efficiency gains in order to be very sure
that it prevented corporate acquisitions of market power, unless the re-
sulting efficiency gains would be both large and certain and the risk of
significant market power slight.
The implications of Congress' noneconomic concerns, however,
are less clear. It is extremely difficult to determine how, and to what
extent, to implement in an antitrust analysis the fervently expressed
congressional goal of preventing corporate aggrandizement of political
and social power or the congressional directive to assist small busi-
nesses in ways that do not result in artificially high prices for consum-
ers. That determination is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
the use of Congress' economic goals-its distributive and efficiency
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concerns--can be illustrated relatively easily. The next section of this
Article briefly analyzes a horizontal merger resulting in a firm with mo-
nopoly power. This simplified analysis considers the differences that
might arise if redistributive goals, in addition to or instead of efficiency
goals, were taken into account in antitrust decisionmaking.
Comparison of Efficiency and Wealth Transfer Goals: Analysis
of a Horizontal Merger
Distributive and efficiency goals often work in perfect harmony.
Monopoly pricing causes both allocative inefficiency and transfers of
wealth from consumers to producers; therefore, firms acquiring monop-
oly power are viewed negatively from either a distributive or efficiency
perspective, at least initially. Similarly, business practices that do not
give rise to or take advantage of market power and thus do not harm
consumers would not be prohibited under either view of the goals of
the antitrust laws. 287 Nevertheless, it often makes a considerable differ-
ence whether wealth transfer goals, in addition to or instead of effi-
ciency goals, are ascribed to the antitrust laws.
An illustration of these differences is provided by a brief examina-
tion of the economic consequences of a horizontal merger.288 Suppose
the FTC, or a court, is deciding whether to prohibit a horizontal
merger, and there is a significant chance that this merger might give the
resulting firm substantial, persistent monopoly power. If the new firm
were able to restrict output and to charge monopoly prices, both alloca-
tive inefficiency and the transfer of wealth from consumers to the mo-
287. This assumes that the practices neither harm consumers as a group nor "unfairly"
redistribute property rights among consumers.
288. This analysis omits any explicit consideration of the effects of the merger on small
businesses or on the social and political power of trusts or monopolies. The discussion is
based upon an analysis first proposed by Professor Williamson in Economies as an Antitrust
Defense- The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Wil-
liamson, Economies]. It is often used by advocates of an efficiency orientation to the anti-
trust laws as a guide to focus attention on the relevant issues. For example, Judge Bork
stated that this form of analysis "can be used to illustrate all antitrust problems, since it
shows the relationship of the only two factors involved, allocative inefficiency and produc-
tive efficiency. The existence of these two elements and their respective amounts are the real
issues in every properly decided antitrust case. They are what we have to estimate-whether
the case is about the dissolution of a monopolistic firm, a conglomerate merger, a require-
ments contract, or a price-fixing agreement." R. BORK, supra note 2, at 108. For a more
detailed discussion of the maximization of allocative and productive efficiency in a horizon-
tal merger context, see id, ch. 5, and Muris, supra note 249, at 384-93. For a cogent analysis
of the influence of politics on antitrust enforcement, see Kovacic, The Federal Trade Com-
mission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587 (1982).
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nopolist would result.28 9 Further, suppose that the merger would also
create significant efficiencies in production. The wealth transfer and
efficiency effects of this merger can be illustrated by the following well-
known diagram:290
P2
W A,: allocative inefficiency loss
Wealth Transfer
Price P, AC,
A 2 : AC 2
cost savings
Q2 Q1
Quantity
Under the theory that Congress was motivated by efficiency con-
siderations alone, Judge Bork interpreted the diagram, explaining that
[t]he diagram assumes that the merger reduces the long-run average
costs of the two firms from AC to AC2 but that the increased market
power created by the merger results in a restriction of output so that
the rate moves from Q, to Q2. We then see that consumers have lost
output-for which they would have been willing to pay an amount
above cost equal to the area labeled A1-and have gained in resource
savings an amount equal to the area A2. Obviously, if A2, the cost
savings, is larger than A1, the dead-weight loss, the merger represents
a net gain to all consumers. If A, is larger than A2, a net loss
results.2
9 1
Two additional points concerning this diagram should be ex-
plained. First, Judge Bork wrote that the area A2 represents a gain to
consumers. The direct effects of the merger, however, will not produce
289. See supra notes 30-36 & accompanying text. This analysis assumes the existence of
significant barriers to entry, and ignores, for the sake of simplicity, many topics such as
incentives to innovate. For a detailed exposition of these assumptions and other issues in-
volved in the tradeoff, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 39, at -.
290. For a more detailed explanation of this diagram, see R. BORK, supra note 2, ch. 5
(citing Williamson, Economies, supra note 288).
291. Id at 108.
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this result. Because the monopolist charges the monopoly price P 2, and
because A2 is below this line, all of the cost savings directly accrue to
the monopolist. Consumers might, of course, receive some of these
benefits indirectly,292 or in the long run, 29 3 but it is also possible that
part or all of these benefits will be wasted by the monopolist in an effort
to obtain or protect its monopoly. 294 The direct effect of the merger,
however, is to give the cost savings, shown as A2, to the monopolist as
part of its monopoly profits.
More importantly, Judge Bork's discussion does not consider the
wealth that, without the merger, would have been consumer surplus,
but was transferred to the monopolist as a result of the merger.295 In
the diagram, the striped rectangle, W, represents the property that,
under the theory espoused by this Article, Congress meant to provide
292. The area, A2 , which directly accrues to the monopolist, represents another compo-
nent of its monopoly profit. This portion of the monopoly profit, however, can be said not to
"cost" consumers of the product anything, unlike area W, because it did not exist before the
merger. It represents a loss to consumers only if the productivity gains could be realized
(perhaps after some period of time) without the merger. Moreover, since area A2 represents
efficiency gains, fewer resources will go into making the product. These resources will be
freed for other uses and will accrue to society as a whole. Of course, it is not possible to be
sure that all or even most of the A 2 benefits will be passed on to consumers of the product in
question, or even to similarly situated consumers. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that
part of the A2 benefits should indirectly be passed on to some consumers. See id at 107-10.
293. See infra note 305. Further, consumers will be directly benefited if the efficiencies
are so large that prices decrease.
294. Judge Posner wrote: "[T]he expected profits of the merger will generate an
equivalent amount of costs as the firms vie to make such mergers or, after they are made, to
engross the profits generated by the high postmerger price through service, competition or
whatever." Posner, supra note 57, at 821. If this did happen, then the rectangle A2 should
not be counted as a benefit of the merger. See Muris, supra note 249, at 392 n.41 for a
discussion of Posner's arguments.
295. Judge Posner argues that because firms will compete to obtain monopoly profits,
part or all of this monopoly profit could be dissipated by wasteful non-price competition to
achieve or protect the monopoly. See supra note 54 & accompanying text. If the deci-
sionmaker believed that this were likely to occur, part or all of area W should be counted as
an efficiency loss. If, as this paper asserts, "consumers' surplus" was intended by Congress
to be the entitlement or property of consumers, and if, as a practical matter, compensating
side payments cannot be made, any merger analysis that only considered efficiency would
violate Pareto optimality. The consumers will suffer the allocative inefficiency losses, area
AI and the loss of wealth, area W. The monopolist, and, indirectly, consumers, and still
other members of society will obtain the productive efficiency gains. See R. BORK, supra
note 2, at 108. Since these groups are not identical, even if area A2 exceeded the combined
area of AI and W, if the decisionmaker were to allow the merger, one result of this welfare
tradeoffwould be to give wealth to some people and take wealth away from others. Since, as
a practical matter, no compensating side payments will ever be made, the tradeoff calcula-
tion proposed by this model would violate Pareto optimality. We might still, of course,
subjectively wish to allow such a merger despite the fact that it violates Pareto optimality.
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to consumers, but that was obtained by the monopolist as a result of the
merger.
If a court viewed maximum economic efficiency as the only goal of
the antitrust laws, the merger would be prevented if and only if area
A, the allocative efficiency loss, exceeded area A2, the productive effi-
ciency gain.2 96 Alternatively, if the decisionmaker believed that Con-
gress cared only about preventing "unfair" transfers of wealth from
consumers to producers caused by market power, the probable exist-
ence of area W would always require prohibiting the merger.
A number of approaches, however, consider both efficiency and
redistribution, thus remaining faithful to Congress' design. For exam-
ple, the total "negative effects" of the merger-the allocative ineffi-
ciency (A,) plus the redistribution of wealth (W)-could be balanced
against the "positive" effects of the merger-the productive efficiency
gains (A2). The merger would be prevented only if the negative effects
of the merger were likely to outweigh its positive consequences. 297
Another decisional rule that finds considerable support in the anti-
trust laws' legislative histories would use the price paid by consumers
as the standard and condemn any merger likely to lead to higher prices
for consumers. A price standard would probably come closest to faith-
fully carrying out legislative intent, since Congress' overriding concern
was with preventing consumers from paying supracompetitive
prices.29 In cases where price is unlikely to increase there would be no
wealth transfer from consumers to firms with market power. This stan-
dard would consider only those efficiency gains that accrued directly to
consumers. Such gains would occur only when the efficiency gains
were so large that they resulted in downward price pressure greater
than the upward pressure resulting from increased market power.299
This rule would not consider any benefits of the merger directly re-
tained by the monopolist. If it were applied in the merger hypothetical,
296. This conclusion ignores Posner's contributions, supra notes 54 & 295. If the deci-
sionmakers were persuaded that Posner was correct a high proportion of the time and that
the conversion of monopoly profits to costs was significant and long lasting, area A2 would
not be entered into the analysis as a positive factor because both areas A2 and W would
instead be counted as losses to society. The merger would, accordingly, be stopped in any
case in which the decisionmaker believed that area A,, A2, or R was likely to exist.
297. Moreover, this balancing could be done in a number of ways. If the decisionmaker
believed that Congress cared equally about efficiency and redistribution, they should be
weighed equally. If, as this Article asserts, it was believed that Congress cared much more
about wealth transfers, efficiency concerns could only be counted to break a tie or when the
wealth transfer was uncertain.
298. See supra notes 80-82, 180-81, 240-41 & 267-72.
299. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 239, at -.
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the resulting increase in productive efficiency, A2, would not be
counted because these benefits accrue directly to the monopolist.
Therefore, if either of the negative consequences of the merger, areas
A, or W, are likely to arise, the merger would be prevented. More
concretely, if the product's price is likely to increase, the merger should
be prohibited. If the price to consumers is unlikely to increase, how-
ever, the merger would be allowed.300
These are not the only possible ways to implement efficiency and
wealth transfer considerations in merger analysis. The important point
is to emphasize that the decision as to which goals are important is
crucial, and that the holdings in merger cases and other types of anti-
trust actions will vary considerably under the different approaches. 30 1
Professor Williamson, commenting upon the horizontal merger exam-
ple, points out that "[i]nasmuch as the income distribution which oc-
curs is usually large relative to the size of the dead-weight loss,
attaching even a slight weight to income distribution effects can some-
300. This would mean that those mergers creating market power which would result in
efficiencies so large that they lead to lower prices for consumers should be permitted. The
resulting monopoly profits would be allowed because they were not extracted from consum-
ers, who were made better off by the merger. In these cases the merging firms would be
allowed to keep all of their efficiency gains. Adoption of this standard would imply that
even though a more complex tradeoff might in some circumstances be warranted, because
Congress considered these other circumstances unlikely or too difficult to predict or analyze,
for simplicity it used prices-to-consumers as the standard. As a practical matter, of course,
this approach is best implemented when merger guidelines are established, not on a case-by-
case basis.
One critical determination would be of the proper burden of proof. For example, if one
believed that the redistributive concerns of the statute were paramount and that an efficiency
defense was appropriate, the very heavy burden of proving efficiency benefits from a merger
could be placed upon the defending party. As has been proposed by Areeda and Turner, the
decisionmaker could only count efficiency gains when they exceed some threshold level. 4 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 4, at 148-50. Alternatively, if one believed, contrary to
the arguments presented in this Article, that the efficiency goals of the statute were central,
redistribution could only be permitted to count, for example, as a "tipping" factor when the
competing allocative and productive efficiency considerations were roughly equal.
301. For example, tying arrangements and attempts to monopolize produce obvious re-
distributive and efficiency effects. Tying arrangements are sometimes used by monopolists
as a way to price discriminate and thereby acquire purchasers' surplus. See R. POSNER,
supra note 4, at 176-80. A particularly dramatic monopolization illustration would occur if
a firm monopolized the insulin market because this could result in virtually no allocative
inefficiency yet create a large wealth transfer. The results of actions in these areas of anti-
trust concern would change substantially if distributive concerns were included in the deci-
sionmakers' analysis.
More generally, other types of economic regulation might not be in the public interest if
only efficiency goals were considered, but would be in society's interest if distributive goals
were also a concern.
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times influence the overall valuation significantly." 30 2 Judge Bork also
acknowledges that if distributive effects were counted in a horizontal
merger analysis, "the results of trade-off calculations would be signifi-
cantly altered. ' 30 3 Indeed, even if the wealth transfer is only assumed
to be twice as large as the allocative inefficiency, a very conservative
assumption, the inclusion of this factor in antitrust analysis would have
a profound effect. A rule that includes only efficiency considerations
would permit far more mergers than one considering both efficiency
and redistributive effects. Conversely, an approach considering only
redistributive effects would prevent far more mergers.
This analysis contains only a summary of the most direct and ob-
vious efficiency and distributive effects of a horizontal merger.3°4 A
realistic merger enforcement policy must consider severe and poten-
tially overwhelming implementation problems. This is particularly
true when enforcers attempt to implement a case-by-case application of
theoretical economic concepts to real-world situations that are ex-
tremely conjectural. These difficulties include problems in estimating
how high the monopoly might be able to raise its prices, how much
more efficient the resulting firm might be, what kinds of problems
might arise from the uncertainty and unavailability of data,305 and de-
302. Williamson, Economies, supra note 288, at 28. Professor Williamson later wrote
that "a product-specific claim that user and producer interests should be weighted unequally
...does not vitiate the partial equilibrium model. It merely requires that the appropriate
weights be specified. To the extent that purchaser interests are given greater weight than
supplier interests, the economies burden is increased, ceteris paribus." Williamson, Econo-
mies Revisited, supra note 40, at 711. Although Williamson recognizes that his model could
certainly incorporate distributive concerns, he states his belief that these concerns should be
ignored. Id at 710-11.
303. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 110.
304. Indirect, long-run, or dynamic effects also could be examined if the decisionmaker
believed that this would further Congress' ultimate goals. Differences in outcomes under the
approaches might be particularly pronounced if, in application, only direct effects are con-
sidered. Yet, consideration of indirect, long-run or dynamic factors would vastly, and per-
haps impossibly, complicate the analysis. For example, if the problem were considered in a
dynamic context it would be necessary to compare the present value of resource savings that
would occur due to the efficiency gains in a competitive situation with the present value of
the net efficiency gain (A2-Al) that would occur if the firms merge and produce a monopoly.
These savings are affected over time by the rate at which entry occurs or the monopoly
power erodes, the expenditure of resources by the monopolist to prevent the erosion of its
monopoly power, see supra notes 54 & 295, the possibility that the monopoly will, on the
average, engage in less than the socially optimal level of research and innovation, see supra
note 55, and the amount of resources that the monopolist might waste due to X-inefficiency,
see supra text accompanying note 54. Similarly, the decisionmaker might want to ask why
the same efficiencies could not be achieved by means of internal expansion, how soon this
might happen, and a large number of other questions.
305. For example, it would seem to be virtually impossible to measure the area of any of
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cisions concerning which economic assumptions to apply.3 6 These dif-
ficulties occur to varying degrees under each of the approaches that
explicitly consider efficiency and/or transfers of wealth. At best, they
significantly weaken the soundness and predictability of the analyses;
at worst, they transform all of these analyses when applied on a case-
by-case basis into mere theoretical exercises.
These practical problems support arguments against employing a
rule-of-reason analysis to evaluate mergers307 or many other types of
antitrust violations. The better approach is to develop rules that give
rise to simplified and predictable antitrust analysis, 30 8 incorporating
the triangles or rectangles presented in the diagram. As one commentator said, "One might
assert a general theory of the second best as follows: 'If a state of affairs is the product of n
variables, and you have knowledge of or control over less than n variables, if you think you
know what's going to happen when you vary "your" variables, you're a booby.' That is, in
complex processes (which most social processes are) a move in the right direction is not
necessarily the right move. To pick a simple illustration, if I am on a desert island, sub-
sisting solely on cocoanuts and oysters and beginning to hate it a lot, and across the bay
from me there is another island, lush and fertile, I do not improve my position in life by
swimming half way across." Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominal-
ism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 476 (1974); see R. BORK, supra note 2, at 125-27.
306. Conventional microeconomic analysis necessarily rests upon a large number of as-
sumptions. Precise, well-developed prescriptive as well as descriptive models taking these
factors into account are a necessity before any analysis can begin, for the violation of any of
these assumptions renders the analysis, to some degree, invalid. These assumptions, which
are crucial to the competitive operation of the free market, involve the presence or absence
of perfect information, the working of the capital market, barriers to entry, economies of
scale, immobility of resources, product differentiation, and externalities. The presence of
any of these factors complicates economic analysis, and a failure to take them into account
can render an economic analysis useless. See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 4, at 282-318 for a summary of the debate regarding the theoretical and empirical sig-
nificance of these and similar factors.
307. These practical considerations do not, however, mean that a direct consumer im-
pact characterization of the goals of the antitrust laws, perhaps with price to consumers as its
benchmark, cannot be implemented, or that its implementation would be more difficult than
the implementation of an efficiency-based analysis. A rule that considered both efficiency
and distribution concerns would be no more complex than a rule that only considered effi-
ciency, since both would require the same prediction concerning market power and econo-
mies. Further, an approach that only considered redistributive effects, or an approach that
considered efficiency effects only when they were directly passed on to consumers, would be
relatively simple. It would not, in the merger example, at least, involve a balancing of com-
peting considerations. If, and only if, the decisionmaker determined that there was a signifi-
cant chance that the merger might result in a significant transfer of wealth from consumers
to a monopolist, ie., if and only if there were a significant chance that prices to consumers
would be raised, would the merger be prevented.
308. Professor Turner concluded in his seminal 1965 article, Conglomerate Mergers and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313 (1965): "In theory, the ideal regulatory
policy would be one that discriminated carefully on a case-by-case basis between those
mergers that threaten substantial anticompetitive consequences and those that do not. In
both efficiency and distributive considerations into the formulation of
the merger guidelines.
Despite the critical problem of developing administrative ap-
proaches to antitrust analysis, it must be recalled that "when the law-
making power speaks upon a particular subject, over which it has
constitutional power to legislate, public policy in such a case is what the
statute enacts. ' 309 Congress never promised that the administration of
the antitrust laws would be easy.310 It had definite goals that it wanted
to accomplish when it enacted the antitrust laws. The primary obliga-
tion of the FTC and the courts is determining Congress' basic objec-
tives. Only then does their task become that of formulating
fact, it seems almost impossible to carry out any such policy and still have an effective an-
timerger statute ...
'Taken literally, section 7 asks for a predictive economic judgment, a conclusion as to
the probability of various possible economic consequences of a merger, and an assessment of
the substantiality of those effects. Except in the most obvious cases, economic theory simply
does not permit confident judgments on these issues even when all the economically relevant
facts have been duly assembled. Thus, broadening the range of factual inquiry in each case
beyond certain limits gives little or no hope of promoting rational decisionmaking. But even
if this were not so, the effectiveness of the statute would largely be destroyed if the outcome
of cases turned on a review of all the economic facts. With limited enforcement resources,
few cases could be brought. With a wide variety of fact situations, the precedential value of
particular decisions--their value as guides to the legality of other mergers-would be lim-
ited. Inevitably, the number of mergers with substantial anticompetitive effects would tend
to increase. Consequently, there is little to be lost and much to be gained by directing the
law toward rationally based general rules that are framed in terms of what seem to be partic-
ularly significant factual issues, capable of easy resolution." Id at 1318-19 (footnote citing
Professor Bok's article, supra note 249, omitted).
309. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,340 (1897). The Court
also reasoned: "[W]e are asked to read into the act by way of judicial legislation an excep-
tion that is not placed there by the lawmaking branch of the Government, and this is to be
done upon the theory that the impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it cannot be sup-
posed Congress intended the natural import of the language it used. This we cannot and
ought not to do. That impolicy is not so clear, nor are the reasons for the exception so potent
as to permit us to interpolate an exception into the language of the act, and to thus materi-
ally alter its meaning and effect. It may be that the policy evidenced by the passage of the
act itself will, if carried out, result in disaster to the roads and in a failure to secure the
advantages sought from such legislation. Whether that will be the result or not we do not
know and cannot predict." Id; cf R. Borne, supra note 2, at 69: "There must surely be a
canon of statutory construction holding that, other things being equal, courts should attri-
bute to the legislature a policy intent which, because of the scope and nature of a body of
law, makes that law effective in achieving its goals, renders the law internally consistent, and
makes for ease of judicial administration." (Emphasis added.)
310. Senator Cummins, for example, anticipated difficulty in analysis performed under
§ 5 of the FTC Act: "I have not a bit of doubt of the difficulty of the. cases. We have never
... accomplished anything good yet without great difficulty. If those who passed the anti-
trust law and those who passed the interstate commerce law had been appalled because they
were difficult of administration, we would have yet been without any regulation of interstate
commerce." 51 CONG. REc. 11,106 (1914).
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implementation approaches that come as close as is practicable to car-
rying out these goals. Thus, decisionmakers have latitude in deciding
precisely how to incorporate both efficiency and distributive considera-
tions in antitrust analysis. To ignore either, however, would contra-
vene congressional desires.
This Article suggests that both distributive and efficiency consider-
ations are meant to play a role in antitrust analysis. Because many
antitrust violations cause both economic inefficiency and wealth trans-
fer from consumers to firms with market power, in many antitrust cases
no conflict between these goals would arise. Conversely, if the firm or
firms in question were unlikely to achieve market power, the activity in
question probably would not violate the antitrust laws under any view
of the antitrust laws' goals. Nevertheless, the merger example
presented in this section illustrates the sort of case in which antitrust
results depend greatly upon the goals employed in the analysis.
Conclusion
This examination of the legislative histories of the antitrust laws
shows that Congress had a limited number of specific goals. The same
small list provides the underpinnings of each of the Acts. The exami-
nation of each Act's legislative history in light of the relevant social and
economic context has attempted to shed some light on these goals.
Each antitrust law grew in part out of a desire to define and protect
consumers' property rights, an antipathy toward corporate aggregations
of economic, social, and political power, and a concern for small entre-
preneurs. The concern at the end of the nineteenth century focused on
the excessive power of trusts and of the industrialists who controlled
them, primarily as this power was used to harm consumers. Congress
also had efficiency goals and resented trusts because they had the
power to determine whether or not individuals had a fair opportunity
to compete. Discontent existed over the potential political power re-
sulting from control over thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in
assets and over potential disruptions to society that might occur unless
these aggregations of power were curbed.
As the United States entered the twentieth century, great increases
in industrial concentration occurred, despite the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act. The FTC and Clayton Acts were intended to refine and
extend the Sherman Act and better implement its basic goals by filling
in the gaps in its coverage. In particular, the FTC was given a mandate
to prevent "unfair methods of competition." Congress intended this
phrase to include such disparate acts as fraud and monopolization pri-
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manly because each caused "unfair" transfers of wealth from consum-
ers to producers.
The Celler-Kefauver amendment was born largely in the shadow
of World War II. Reminded of the high and rising level of industrial
concentration, Congress believed it was necessary to strengthen the
Clayton Act. Congress recognized the need for efficient, large-scale
economic production, but feared the social unrest, or worse, that could
be precipitated by concentrated corporate power. The dramatic state-
ments in the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act
probably reflect less a fear of imminent fascism than a desire to curb
increases in industrial concentration for a large number of social and
political reasons.
These congressional value judgments were the motivations under-
lying the antitrust laws. The effects of market power on allocative effi-
ciency caused little or no concern in even the most recent major
antitrust statutes. Of course, in every one of the antitrust laws' legisla-
tive histories Congress applauded the productive efficiency of modern
corporations. Stressing the benefits resulting from free competition,
Congress wanted to provide incentives that would help firms compete
vigorously. Congress wanted to encourage economic efficiency and to
ensure that the fruits of this efficiency were passed on to consumers, but
efficiency was never its primary goal. Congress attempted to accom-
plish its overriding redistributive aims in such a way that the benefits of
modern productivity would still be substantially reilized. The evi-
dence does not suggest, however, that Congress wanted the antitrust
laws to allow increases in corporate efficiency at the cost of undermin-
ing its basic redistributive goals.
The antitrust laws were enacted to become broad and flexible eco-
nomic mandates to improve "consumer welfare," as Congress defined
this term. Recent advances in economic theory provide the methodol-
ogy that can help determine when market power is likely to harm con-
sumers, as opposed to those times when free market forces that will best
ensure consumers' protection are operating. This sophistication should
lead to increasingly precise implementations of Congress' commands
that all purchasers, whether consumers or businesses, be given the right
to purchase products priced at no more than the competitive level and
that all sellers be given the right to compete against products priced at
no less than that level.
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